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velocity to cause internal damage to spacecraft components or 
occupants.  Attached spall occurs when there is not sufficient impact 
energy to cause release of spall fragments.  Attached spall will leave 
a bump on the back of a target and internal hollow cavity within the 
target. 
Flux Cumulative number of  micro-meteoroid and/or orbital debris 
particles of a given diameter (or mass) and greater per unit area and 
time.  Typical units are number/(m2 – year).  The cross-sectional 
flux, Fc, is in terms of cross-sectional area, whereas surface flux, Fs, 
is in terms of surface area.  For a sphere or randomly tumbling plate, 
the cross-sectional area is exactly ¼ the surface area.  The 
relationship between Fc and Fs is: Fc = 4 Fs.   
Node 3 ISS attached pressurized module 
Penetration Can mean either partial penetration (i.e., cratering) or complete 
penetration of a surface or shield.   Additional clarification is 
provided when used.  For ISS, penetration means complete 
penetration or detached spall from the last layer of shielding.  
Perforation is a frequently used word to describe complete 
penetration creating a “through hole” and/or “through crack”.   
Probability of No 
Impact (PNI) 
Probability that MMOD of  a certain size or greater will not impact 
an item of interest over a specific time period. 
Probability of No 
Penetration (PNP) 
Probability that MMOD will not penetrate a shield, target or item of 
interest over a specific time period used in the PNP calculation. 
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Probability of No 
Catastrophic 
Failure (PNCF) 
Probability that MMOD will not cause loss of crew or loss of 
spacecraft over a specific time period used in the PNCF calculation.  
Catastrophic failures usually are a subset of MMOD penetrations 
(i.e., not all penetrations lead to catastrophic loss).   
Rear wall Last layer of a shield 
Shield All layers providing MMOD protection; i.e., including all bumpers 
and rear wall 
TransHab An inflatable module concept proposed by NASA for ISS and Mars 
missions (Transportation Habitat) 
Witness plates Plate(s) added to HVI test article to record damage from penetration 
of rear wall (witness plates added behind target), or damage from 
secondary ejecta (witness plates added in front of target) 
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1 Introduction 
Spacecraft are subject to micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impact 
damage which have the potential to degrade performance, shorten the mission, or 
result in catastrophic loss of the vehicle.   Specific MMOD protection requirements 
are established by NASA for each spacecraft early in the program/project life, to 
ensure the spacecraft meets desired safety and mission success goals.  Both the design 
and operations influences spacecraft survivability in the MMOD environment, and 
NASA considers both in meeting MMOD protection requirements.   
The purpose of this handbook is to provide spacecraft designers and operations 
personnel with knowledge gained by NASA in implementing effective MMOD 
protection for the International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and various science 
spacecraft.  It has been drawn from a number of previous publications [10-14], as 
well as new work.  This handbook documents design and operational methods to 
reduce MMOD risk.  In addition, this handbook describes tools and equations needed 
to design proper MMOD protection.  It is a living report, in that it will be updated and 
re-released periodically in future with additional information. 
Providing effective and efficient MMOD protection is essential for ensuring safe 
and successful operations of spacecraft and satellites.  A variety of shields protect 
crew modules, external pressurized vessels and critical equipment from MMOD on 
the International Space Station (ISS).  Certain Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle systems 
are hardened from MMOD impact, and operational rules are established to reduce the 
risk from MMOD (i.e., flight attitudes are selected and late inspection of sensitive 
thermal protection surfaces are conducted to reduce MMOD impacts).  Science 
spacecraft include specific provisions to meet MMOD protection requirements in 
their design (for example, Stardust & GLAST).   Commercial satellites such as 
Iridium and Bigelow Aerospace Genesis spacecraft incorporate MMOD protection.   
The development of low-weight, effective MMOD protection has enabled these 
spacecraft missions to be performed successfully.  This handbook describes these 
shielding techniques.  For future exploration activities to the Moon and Mars, 
implementing high-performance MMOD shielding will be necessary to meet 
protection requirements with minimum mass penalty.   
A current area of technology development in MMOD shielding is the 
incorporation of sensors to detect and locate MMOD impact damage.  Depending on 
the type of sensor the signals from the sensor can be processed to infer the location of 
the impact and the extent of damage.  The objective of the sensors is to locate critical 
damage that would endanger the spacecraft or crew immediately or during reentry 
(such as an air leak from crew module or critical damage to thermal protection system 
of reentry vehicles).   The information from the sensors can then be used with repair 
kits, patch kits, hatch closure or other appropriate remedial techniques to reduce 
MMOD risk.  
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1.1 MMOD Shielding Background 
Fred Whipple proposed in the 1940s a meteoroid shield for spacecraft consisting 
of a thin “sacrificial” bumper followed at a distance from a rear wall [9].  The 
Whipple shield is shown in Figure 1-1.  The function of the first sheet or “bumper” is 
to break up the projectile into a cloud of material containing both projectile and 
bumper debris (Figure 1-2).  This cloud expands while moving across the standoff, 
resulting in the impactor momentum being distributed over a wide area of the rear 
wall.  The back sheet (or “rear wall”) must be thick enough to withstand the blast 
loading from the debris cloud and any solid fragments that remain.  For most 
conditions, a Whipple shield results in a significant weight reduction over a single 
plate, which must contend with deposition of the projectile kinetic energy in a very 
localized area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Whipple shields consist of a 
bumper, standoff (gap or 
spacing), and rear wall. 
b) Hypervelocity impacts will 
generate a cloud of bumper and 
projectile debris that can contain 
solid fragments, liquid, and vapor 
particles. 
c) The rear wall must survive the 
fragments and debris cloud 
impulsive loading.  It could fail 
by perforation from solid 
fragments, spall, or tear and petal 
from the impulsive loading. 
Figure 1-1. Whipple Shield Schematic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bumper
standoff
rear wall
Ejecta
debris cloud
Detached Spall
Craters & holes
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On left, is a close-up of the ejecta and debris cloud. On right, a 0.32cm diameter projectile 
impacts bumper at 6.8km/s and at an 
impact angle normal to bumper. 
Figure 1-2. Debris Cloud Observed in High-Speed Camera Film. 
1.2 MMOD Trade Space 
Designing an effective and efficient protection system for a spacecraft should 
consider several factors as follows: 
1.2.1 Mission Duration and Spacecraft Size 
MMOD risk increases relatively proportionally as mission duration and spacecraft 
size increase.  MMOD risk will roughly double as spacecraft size or duration 
increase.  Figure 1-3 illustrates the effect on MMOD risk for a single mission as 
mission duration increases, and the cumulative effect on MMOD risk as the number 
of missions increases. 
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Figure 1-3. Mission duration effect on MMOD risk, and effect of number of missions on 
cumulative MMOD risk (baseline risk = 0.5% or 1 in 200 over 14day mission) 
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1.2.2 Mission Phases and MMOD Environment Models 
Orbital debris is a design issue in Earth orbit, but does not contribute in lunar orbit 
or lunar surface.  Orbital debris consists of high density (metals primarily) impacting 
at hypervelocity (1km/s to 15km/s).  Orbital debris is dynamic, generally increasing 
with altitude up to about 2000km, and subject to increase due to future growth.  
Meteoroids are a hypervelocity threat (10km/s to 70km/s) present in Earth and lunar 
orbit, as well as the lunar surface.  There is a slight concentration of meteoroids in 
low-earth orbit from gravitational focusing by Earth, compared to lunar orbit, off-set 
to some extent (depending on orbital altitude) by shadowing from the Earth/moon 
itself.  MMOD risk is higher in LEO compared to lunar orbit, primarily due to orbital 
debris encountered in LEO which is not present in lunar orbit.  Lunar surface 
elements are subject to impacts by meteoroids as well as low-velocity secondary 
impacts from ejecta, impacting primarily from 0.1km/s to 1km/s.  The most effective 
type of shield and materials of construction vary depending on where the mission 
occurs.  Longer standoff (greater volume) MMOD shields are very effective against 
orbital debris and meteoroids in LEO and LLO, but not against secondaries on the 
lunar surface.  Low-density, high-strength materials work well as outer shielding 
layers for meteoroids, but are not effective against orbital debris because their low-
density does not produce good projectile breakup against higher density orbital 
debris.  However, high strength to weight materials are universally effective as inner 
shielding layers. 
1.2.3 Required Level of Protection 
The requirements for MMOD protection influence the amount of shielding.  
Generally requirements for MMOD protection are expressed in terms of either (a) 
minimum probability of no failure (PNF) from MMOD impact damage that results in 
loss of spacecraft function or endangers crew survivability (i.e., a reliability level), or 
(b) maximum acceptable risk level (i.e., opposite of reliability).  As PNF increases, or 
acceptable risk decreases, spacecraft shielding weight increases, typically 
exponentially (Figure 1-4). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-4. Shielding weight increase as requirements for MMOD protection increase (notional). 
1.2.4 Type of Shielding 
The type of shielding applied to meeting MMOD requirements has a large bearing 
on the overall mass of the shielding system.  Figure 1-5 illustrates how 2-wall 
Whipple shields using aluminum bumpers compare in shielding mass to 3-wall 
 
Level of Required 
Protection
Shield
Weight
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“stuffed Whipple” shields using ceramic and Kevlar fabrics in the intermediate shield 
layer.  The 3-wall shield system can save 50% or more of the shielding mass.  A 4-
wall shield system can save even more mass, given sufficient shield “standoff” or 
volume for the shielding (Figure 1-6).  Greater shield standoff is usually better, if it is 
available, in terms of reducing shield mass. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-5. Effect of shielding type on shield mass needed to meet required MMOD protection 
levels (notional). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-6. Effect of shield standoff on shield mass (notional). 
1.2.5 Flight Attitude 
Spacecraft orientation or flight attitude can have a major affect on MMOD risks 
because the MMOD environment is directional (for example, 20 times more impacts 
occur on forward face than aft face for LEO spacecraft), and because a spacecraft is 
more vulnerable to MMOD damage in some locations compared to others.  For the 
Space Shuttle, certain flight attitudes are 10 times more risky from MMOD than other 
attitudes. 
1.2.6 Failure Criteria 
A clear definition of the maximum allowable damage is required to perform an 
MMOD risk assessment.  Failure occurs if the vehicle sustains MMOD damage just 
above the maximum allowed.  The definition of the failure criteria typically have a 
big effect on MMOD risks and the best means to mitigate those risks.  For reentry 
vehicles, the failure criterion of the thermal protection system (TPS) is of concern.  
TPS failure criteria vary by location on the reentry vehicle and are defined in terms of 
the maximum amount of MMOD damage that can be tolerated for successful reentry.  
If allowable damage is limited to the TPS itself, then the best protection approach is 
to select the most damage resistant TPS material or thicken the TPS.  If damage to the 
 
Required 
Protection Level
Shield
Mass
2-wall shields, conventional materials
3-wall shields, advanced materials
4-wall shields, advanced materials
 
Shield Standoff
Shield
Mass
2-wall shields, conventional materials
3-wall shields, advanced materials
4-wall shields, advanced materials
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TPS and substrate can be tolerated (failure criterion is defined as critical damage to a 
critical component behind the substrate), then the best protection approach may be to 
toughen up the substrate or add interior blankets.  For crew modules, on spacecraft 
not exposed to reentry heating, typical failure criteria are any through-hole or 
through-crack in the pressure shell which would result in loss of atmosphere.  This 
allows the crew cabin pressure shell to serve as part of the MMOD protection shield 
(i.e., as the rear-wall of the shield).  Due to higher level of stress in the walls of 
pressurized propellant tanks and gaseous/liquid storage tanks, the allowable damage 
is usually much less than a complete penetration of the pressure shell itself.  Many 
spacecraft systems (power, thermal control, etc.) are designed with redundancy, such 
that a single MMOD impact failure of one system will not result in loss of the 
spacecraft.   MMOD damage resistance can be relatively easily designed and 
implemented for exposed redundant spacecraft hardware such as radiator panels, 
power and data lines, and other systems.  Failure of one or more of these systems 
could represent partial loss of spacecraft functionality, but not loss of the spacecraft 
unless complete system functionality was lost.   
1.2.7 Impact Damage Detection and Location 
Impact damage detection and location can improve mission success for both 
crewed and non-crewed spacecraft.  For crewed vehicles, damage detection/location 
of leaks in pressure shells of crew modules can provide for time to implement repairs 
or isolation of the damaged module.  For reentry vehicles, damage detection/location 
of critical TPS damage could allow time for repair of the TPS, launch of a 
replacement vehicle, or change in the reentry trajectory to limit heating to the 
damaged TPS.  For spacecraft that periodically encounter impact hazards (such as 
spacecraft in orbit about a planet with a dust ring, or spacecraft that have multiple 
encounters with comets), damage detection sensors integrated into the spacecraft 
shielding can help operations determine safe encounter distances from the threat; i.e., 
if shielding was known to be comprised, it may be possible to target future encounters 
further away from the threat; or if shield integrity was confirmed good, more risky 
near approaches could be planned with higher science return. 
1.2.8 Risk Reduction and Optimization 
The most important step in reducing MMOD risk in the most mass effective 
manner is to identify MMOD risk drivers for the spacecraft (i.e., the most vulnerable 
areas of the spacecraft).  A key to reducing shield mass is through optimization of the 
distribution of shield mass across the spacecraft, by equalizing risk per unit area 
across the spacecraft. 
1.3 Organization of the MMOD Protection Handbook 
The MMOD protection handbook is organized as follows.  The process used in 
designing MMOD protection is described in Section 2.  A key part of the process is to 
identify risk drivers for the spacecraft, and focus on these drivers in reducing MMOD 
risk. Operations options to reduce MMOD risk include selecting flight attitudes that 
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reduce exposure of sensitive spacecraft surfaces to MMOD impact are provided in 
Sections 2.8, 2.9, 2.11.  Spacecraft design options to meet protection requirements, 
including robust shielding and redundant systems, are explained in Section 2.11.  
Section 3 provides some selected examples where the process to reduce MMOD risk 
was exercised on Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. Ballistic limit 
equations used to design and determine the performance of MMOD shielding are 
discussed in Sections 4, 5 and 6.  Impact damage detection and location sensors and 
described in Section 7.  These sensors combined, with a means to mitigate detected 
damage, provide another system design option to reduce MMOD risk.   Section 8 
provides concluding remarks.   
This handbook will be re-released periodically in the future to reflect additional 
methods to reduce MMOD risk, provide new/updated ballistic limit equations, add 
information on software tools available to assist users in design of various shielding 
options, and to provide information on MMOD damage identified on ISS, Shuttle and 
Hubble Space Telescope.  
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2 MMOD Protection Design Process 
Figure 2-1 illustrates the approach to evaluate and design MMOD protection.  In 
using this methodology, the analyst will accurately evaluate spacecraft risks from 
MMOD impact, identify zones and areas of the spacecraft that are the “risk drivers” 
that control the MMOD risk, and evaluate options to reduce risk.  The following 
sections describe each major step in the risk assessment process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1. Process to evaluate and design MMOD protection. 
2.1 Spacecraft Geometry Model 
The spacecraft geometry model dictates the size of the spacecraft, and the size of 
the spacecraft has a direct bearing on MMOD risks.  MMOD impact and failure risk 
increases in direct proportion to increasing area and time exposed to the MMOD flux.  
This proportionality is illustrated in Equation 2-1 which shows the number of 
impacts, N, causing failure is equal to the sum of the impact failures in each region 
(Ni) over all regions (i = 1 to n) of the spacecraft.  N for each region is found from the 
product of the cumulative flux, F (number/m2-year), of meteoroid and debris impacts 
that exceed the failure limits (or ballistic limits), the exposed area, A (m2), and 
duration or time exposed to the MMOD flux, t (year).  
( )∑∑
==
==
n
i
i
n
i
i FAtNN
11
    (2-1) 
MMOD risk is related to N, the expected number of impacts causing damage 
exceeding the failure criteria, through Poisson statistics. Equations 2-2 and 2-3 show 
the relationship between the probability of no penetration (PNP), MMOD risk and the 
number of impacts causing penetration failure from Equation 2-1.  Poisson statistics 
have been used by NASA since Apollo to assess risk from MMOD impact. The same 
approach is used to assess risks for loss of non-critical hardware (functional failure) 
from MMOD, or risks of impact damage exceeding any user-defined damage size 
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(diameter or depth) as long as relevant damage equations exist relating MMOD 
impactor diameter to damage size. 
)exp( NPNP −=     (2-2) 
PNPRisk −= 1     (2-3) 
The spacecraft geometry model physically encompasses the outer mold-line of the 
spacecraft with different regions defined on the surface of the geometry model, 
corresponding to regions with different materials of construction, shielding 
configurations, material thickness and/or failure criteria.  Generally, the geometry 
model becomes more detailed as the design matures and more emphasis is placed on 
better identification of risk drivers and on reducing risk. For instance, there are 
hundreds (over 500) different shield regions defined on the International Space 
Station (ISS) geometry model (Figure 2-2), indicating the different shields protecting 
habitable modules and external critical items (pressure vessels, control moment 
gyros).   
The large number of different shields on ISS is partly a reflection of the 
directionality of the MMOD environment.  For a spacecraft with fixed orientation 
relative to the velocity direction, the front (ram surface) and sides of a spacecraft are 
more exposed to orbital debris impact while the front, sides and top (zenith) are more 
exposed to micro-meteoroid impact.  More robust shielding, which is more capable 
from MMOD protection standpoint, is located where MMOD impact rates are 
highest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2. BUMPER Geometry Model of the International Space Station circa 2006.  Each color 
represents a different shield type.  This model excludes solar arrays. Approximately 150,000 
elements are in the ISS geometry finite element model (FEM), with an average element size of 
20cm x 20cm. 
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2.2 Failure Criteria 
The criteria that defines the failure threshold from MMOD impact has a 
significant influence on MMOD risk.  A key step therefore in the risk assessment 
process is to precisely define what is meant by “failure”, that is to quantify the 
minimum amount of damage that can lead to failure of spacecraft hardware.  The 
“maximum acceptable damage” limit is another way to think of the failure criteria. 
   A failure criterion or criteria is assigned to each region of the spacecraft 
geometry model.  There can be several failure modes, but the one that results from the 
smallest MMOD particle controls MMOD risk for the vehicle or element.  For 
instance, MMOD damage modes and failure criteria for elements of the Space Station 
are given in Table 2-1.  Generally, the failure mode in the left most column is created 
by smaller MMOD particles and is therefore more likely to occur than failure modes 
on the right side of the table.  There are two types of Space Station elements: (1) 
critical and (2) functional.  Critical elements are those whose failure could cause loss 
of crew or vehicle.  Functional elements are those whose loss would degrade the 
functionality of the vehicle, but would not result in loss of vehicle or crew. 
 
 
Table 2-1. Damage Modes and Failure Criteria for Space Station Elements 
Critical 
Elements & 
Components 
Thermal 
Protection 
System 
(TPS) 
Damage 
Spall or 
Perforation 
of Pressure 
Shell or last 
layer of 
shielding 
Damage 
exceeding 
allowables 
to Pressure 
Vessel 
Uncontrolled 
Depressurization 
Catastrophic 
Rupture 
Detonation or 
Deflagration 
Crew 
Modules  X  X X  
Windows  X*  X X  
Pressure 
vessels   X X X  
Propellant 
tanks   X  X X 
Control 
moment 
gyros 
 X   X  
Cargo 
transfer 
vehicles 
 X X X X X 
Crew transfer 
vehicles X X X X X X 
*Window failure criteria is detached spall from redundant pressure pane (which is exterior of primary pressure pane) 
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Functional Elements & Components Surface degradation Leak Short or open circuit 
Radiator panels X   
Radiator panel tubes and connection flex/hard lines  X  
Thermal loop lines  X  
Power lines   X 
Data lines   X 
Batteries  X X 
Solar array X  X 
Window outer pane X   
 
Figure 2-3 is indicative of the complexity of the Shuttle Orbiter vehicle failure 
criteria for MMOD damage that leads to loss-of-vehicle (LOV) during reentry.  This 
figure shows that the upper regions of the wing leading edge (WLE) and nose cap 
(NC) of the vehicle are less sensitive to MMOD damage than lower regions.  For 
instance, 1 inch (2.5cm) diameter through-holes can be tolerated in upper surfaces of 
the WLE and NC, while much less damage is allowed to lower surfaces.  In some 
areas of the lower surface, non-perforating damage, that only leaves a crater exposing 
0.09 inch (0.2cm) diameter of carbon-carbon substrate, is the defined failure criteria 
for LOV.  A 0.8mm diameter aluminum projectile impacting at 7km/s will create 
damage in the WLE material that exceeds this lower surface failure criteria (Figure 2-
4). 
 
1.00” Ø hole 4.89mm
0.50” Ø hole 2.75mm
0.25” Ø hole 1.68mm
0.10” - 0.99” Ø hole             1.10-4.84mm
0.25” Ø exposed substrate (Test 6)    0.81mm
0.19” Ø exposed substrate (Test 11)   0.69mm
0.14” Ø exposed substrate (Test 5)    0.58mm
0.09” Ø exposed substrate (Test 4)    0.47mm
Failure Criteria
Critical
Orbital Debris Ø
(7km/s & 0°)
1.52 m2
0.71 m2
0.18 m2
0.52 m2
0.34 m2
0.54 m2
1.13 m2
2.53 m2
19.09 m2
12.07 m2
RCC areas v ulnerable to the  OD pa rticle * tha t 
perfora te d STS-115 ra dia tor RH4.
*  O D par tic le propert ies:
t ype =  glas s ( or ceramic) f iber  com pos ite
diamet er =  1. 0 – 1.2mm 
as s umed impact  angle = 45°
as s umed impact  vel oc it y =  4km/sec  
Figure 2-3. Wing Leading Edge and Nose Cap Failure Criteria Map 
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Figure 2-4. Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) impact damage due to 0.8mm aluminum projectile 
at 7.1km/s (normal impact).  On left, damage before arc-jet test.  On right, damage after arc-jet 
test simulating reentry conditions indicating burn-through (test stopped when burn-through 
detected).   
 
2.3 Ballistic Limit Equations (BLEs) 
Ballistic limit equations define impact conditions (i.e. particle size, particle 
density, impact velocity, and impact angle) that result in threshold failure of specific 
spacecraft shields, components or subsystems.  A combination of hypervelocity 
impact test results and analyses are used to determine the BLEs.  Many ballistic limit 
equations are semi-empirical, combining data from impact tests as well as the results 
of analytical models or numerical simulations.    
Two types of BLEs are typically defined for a particular spacecraft shield or 
component:  
(1) Design equations.  These are used to determine the dimensions of a shield 
(e.g. thicknesses/areal densities, spacing, etc.) for a “design” impact 
condition (projectile diameter, density, impact velocity, and angle). 
(2) Performance equations.  These equations relate particle size on threshold 
failure of a shield or component to impact and target parameters.  
Sections 4-6 provide details of several BLEs used for shields and spacecraft 
components.  Specific characteristics of each BLE are described including: 
• the relevant spacecraft shield type, subsystem or component (name, use, 
configuration, materials, thickness, gaps, etc), 
• the damage mode or failure mode of the shield/component, 
• the specific ballistic limit equations with appropriate nomenclature 
defined, 
J S C - 6 4 3 9 9  
 
V e r s i o n :  A  
 
 13  
  
An excel program has been developed which enables the user to quickly and 
simply perform ballistic limit calculations for shield configurations subject to 
hypervelocity MMOD impacts.  This ballistic limit analysis program contains both 
design and performance modules for each type of spacecraft shield and component.  
This program will be documented in a later release of the protection handbook. 
2.4 Hypervelocity Impact Tests 
Hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests are an integral part of the analyses conducted to 
ensure adequate design of spacecraft MMOD shielding.  Test data are not only used 
to derive BLEs in the testable velocity range, but also establish damage modes and 
material behavior to HVI conditions.  Test data is extremely useful to validate 
numerical simulations. 
 Two-stage light-gas guns (LGG) are used to accelerate projectiles up to 7 km/s 
(Figure 2-5).  LGGs are capable of launching a variety of different and well-
controlled projectile shapes.  A disadvantage is that LGGs are capable of velocities 
that cover only a fraction of the orbital debris threat.  Since average orbital debris 
velocity in low-Earth orbit is on the order of 9 km/s, LGG can directly simulate only 
40% of the orbital debris threat.   
Other techniques exist to launch projectiles over 10 km/s.  For instance, an 
inhibited shaped charge launcher (ISCL) at Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) is 
capable of launching aluminum projectiles, 0.25g to 2g mass, in the shape of a hollow 
cylinder to 11.5 km/s (Figure 2-6).  Another high-speed launcher that has provided 
useful information on shield capabilities in excess of 10 km/s is the 3-stage 
hypervelocity launcher (HVL) developed at Sandia National Laboratories.  This 
launches thin disks (projectile length to diameter ratio = 0.1-0.2, mass 0.2g-1g) of 
aluminum and titanium from 10-15 km/s with some bowing and tilting of the 
projectile. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5. WSTF .50 caliber two-stage light-gas gun 
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Figure 2-6. SwRI’s Inhibited Shaped Charge Launcher (ISCL).  Several different size charges are 
available that are capable of launching 0.25g to 2g aluminum projectiles up to 11.5 km/s (left 
view).  Projectiles are typically in the shape of a hollow cylinder (right view). 
 
2.5 Analysis and Simulation 
Analyses and simulations are used along with test data to develop ballistic limit 
equations (BLE) for use in MMOD risk assessments.   The most straightforward 
method of deriving Ballistic Limit Equations (BLE) is to run a series of hypervelocity 
impact experiments and to correlate the damage data collected with target and impact 
parameters. BLEs must span the impact velocity ranges of on-orbit impacts, i.e., 1-16 
km/s for orbital debris and 11-72 km/s for micro-meteoroids. Since these velocities 
are beyond the capabilities of laboratory hypervelocity launchers, BLEs should be 
obtained from a combination of laboratory experiments, analytical models and 
numerical simulations. 
Analytical models are possible for simple geometries, initial conditions and 
boundary conditions.  For instance, one-dimensional approaches can be taken to 
determine conditions at the projectile/target interface during hypervelocity impact.  
Analytical models start with governing physical laws and often employ empirical data 
to determine necessary material constants.   
Numerical simulations of hypervelocity impact are often referred to as 
hydrocodes.  These simulations solve all the fundamental conservation equations 
(mass, momentum and energy) important in impact problems, as well as shock and 
dynamic material behavior equations across a 2- or 3-dimensional mesh to trace 
material displacement with time. The relevant equations solved numerically are 
highly coupled and non-linear. Hydrocodes have been around since the 1950s.  They 
got their name because hypervelocity impact produces local pressures in the target 
and projectile that greatly exceed the material strength of these materials, the material 
behaves as if it has no strength, i.e., like a fluid, or hydrodynamic behavior.  Away 
from the impact point, material strength becomes more important.  Numerical 
simulations represent a means to analyze impact phenomena in velocity ranges or 
projectile shapes/impact orientations not easily obtained in launch facilities, and their 
reliability and accuracy strongly depend on the knowledge about materials behavior 
in the hypervelocity regime.  
  
Flight 
Direction
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As a consequence, complete understanding of the impact phenomena at reduced 
velocity becomes essential to extend experimental results and computation 
philosophy to impacts occurring at higher velocity. Laboratory tests must be used to 
establish the Equations of State (EOS) of the materials involved in hypervelocity 
collisions which provide a relationship between pressure, density and internal energy 
of the material. 
A number of hydrocodes are widely used within the hypervelocity analysis 
community, including for instance: 
¾ AUTODYN, Century Dynamics Ltd. 
¾ CTH, Sandia National Laboratories 
¾ EPIC, Alliant Techsystems 
¾ EXOS, University of Texas, hybrid particle-finite element formulation 
¾ LS-DYNA, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
¾ MAGI, Air Force Research Laboratory 
¾ PAMSHOCK, Engineering Systems International 
¾ SOPHIA, Ernst-Mach-Institute 
¾ SPHINX, Los Alamos National Laboratory 
 
2.6 MMOD Environment Models 
NASA standard meteoroid and debris environment models are used in MMOD 
risk assessments to determine the cumulative flux of particles with a diameter that 
exceeds the ballistic limits.  The environment models indicate that there are many 
more smaller particles than larger particles.  Thus, raising the shielding performance 
in terms of the M/OD particle sizes the shielding can “stop” decreases the flux of 
penetrating particles and improves spacecraft reliability.  Figure 2-7 shows the flux of 
orbital debris and meteoroids in an ISS orbit (400km altitude, 51.6deg inclination). 
2.6.1 Micro-Meteoroid Environment Model 
Meteoroids are natural particles in orbit about the sun, which have quite high 
impact velocities relative to spacecraft in orbit about Earth.  Meteoroid velocities 
range from 11km/s to 72km/s, with an average for Earth orbiting spacecraft of 19 
km/s.  The majority of meteoroids impacting a spacecraft are thought to originate 
from comets, with relatively low particle densities ranging from 2 g/cm3 (for particles 
1 micro-gram and less) to 0.5 g/cm3 (particle mass 0.01g and greater).  This is 
contrasted with the meteorites that survive atmospheric entry and are found on 
Earth’s surface which are higher density and thought to originate mainly from 
asteroids.  The previous meteoroid environment model used for shielding design [1, 
4] has recently been updated to the Meteoroid Environment Model (MEM) [2].   
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2.6.2 Orbital Debris Environment Model 
Orbital debris includes non-functional and pieces of spacecraft that are in orbit 
about Earth.  Orbital debris impact velocities are lower then meteoroids, generally 
impacting spacecraft in low Earth orbit at relative speeds of from less to 1 km/s to just 
over 15 km/s, with an average velocity of about 9 km/s for a 400km altitude. The 
debris environment threat is composed of metallic fragments, paint, aluminum-oxide 
and other components of spacecraft and solid rocket motor exhaust.  Typically for 
debris risk assessments, orbital debris particle density is assumed to be 2.8 g/cm3 
corresponding to aluminum metal.  Because the orbital debris environment is tied to 
human activities in space, it is much more dynamic then the meteoroid environment, 
and the orbital debris environment definitions are subject to periodic updates and 
revisions as more data is collected on the amount and evolution of orbital debris in 
Earth orbit.   The current debris environment model for purposes of shielding design 
is ORDEM2000 described in NASA TP-2002-210780 [2]. 
 
MMOD Flux at 400km, 51.6incl., 2006
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Figure 2-7. Flux of meteoroids and orbital debris in low-Earth orbit (in 2006) 
 
2.6.3 Lunar Secondary Ejecta Environment Model 
Lunar secondary ejecta are particles of the moon that are ejected during meteoroid 
impacts on the lunar surface and follow ballistic trajectories to rain back on the 
surrounding surface.  Due to high impact velocity, each primary meteoroid impactor 
can excavate 100 times its own mass in secondary ejecta particles.  These fall back to 
the surface at 10s to 100s of meters per second, and represent a low-velocity impact 
hazard to the lunar lander, EVA crew and surface systems.  A description of the lunar 
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secondary environment is included in a Constellation Program document: Design 
Specification for Natural Environments [17]. 
2.7 MMOD Risk Assessment Tools: Bumper Code 
The Bumper code has been used by NASA and contractors to perform MMOD 
risk assessments since the early 1990s.  Over that period of time, it has undergone 
extensive revisions and updates.  NASA has applied Bumper to risk assessments for 
Space Station, Shuttle, Mir, Extravehicular Mobility Units (i.e., “space suits”), and 
other satellites and spacecraft.  Significant effort has been expended to validate 
Bumper and “benchmark” it to other MMOD risk assessment codes used by some ISS 
International Partners.  Figure 2-1 illustrates where Bumper fits in the risk assessment 
process.  The BLEs and MMOD environment models are embedded into the code.   A 
finite element model (FEM) that describes the spacecraft geometry is created in and 
input into Bumper.   Bumper calculates the number of failures by determining the 
number of MMOD particles that exceed the ballistic limits for each element of the 
FEM, and calculates the total number of failures by summing the individual elements.  
Bumper results are used to determine the “risk drivers”, that is what areas on the 
spacecraft control the risk.  Emphasis is placed on lowering the risk for the “drivers” 
to efficiently reduce overall spacecraft MMOD risk. 
2.8 Spacecraft Operating Parameters 
Spacecraft operating parameters, such as mission duration, spacecraft orientation 
(attitude), orbital altitude, and damage detection/repair can have a major influence on 
MMOD risk.  The year of the flight and orbital inclination have less of an effect.  
Additional details on how these factors effect MMOD risk are given in following 
paragraphs. 
2.8.1 Duration 
The number of failures from MMOD is directly proportional to mission duration, 
all other factors held constant (that is, no changes in the MMOD environment, 
attitude, etc.).  If mission duration increases by 2x, the average number of  failures 
goes up by a factor of 2 for both meteoroids and orbital debris. 
2.8.2 Spacecraft Orientation 
MMOD impacts are directional.  An example illustrating the effect of MMOD 
impact directionality is the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), which had 20 
times more craters observed on the forward face compared to the aft, and 200 times 
more craters on the forward than the Earth facing side. Both meteoroids and orbital 
debris are directional.  Table 2-2 shows the number of impacts from both meteoroids 
and orbital debris on each surface of a cube with fixed orientation in low-Earth orbit.  
In addition to the larger number of impacts occurring on forward and port/starboard 
sides of the spacecraft, these impacts occur at higher relative velocity and at less 
oblique impact angle than for impacts on aft or nadir surfaces of the spacecraft.  
Greater MMOD risk on the front and sides of the spacecraft is a consequence of the 
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combination of higher impact fluxes, higher relative velocity and less oblique impact 
angle.  The directionality of MMOD makes it advantageous to adjust flight attitude to 
reduce MMOD risk by pointing the most vulnerable areas of the spacecraft in aft or 
nadir directions.   For instance, the Space Shuttle risk for damage that exceeds loss-
of-vehicle failure criteria is shown in Figure 2-8.  This figure illustrates certain 
vehicle attitudes (such as belly forward attitudes) result in nearly 10x more MMOD 
risk than low risk attitudes (tail forward and belly to Earth or Space) 
 
Table 2-2. Annual number of MMOD impacts on a cube in 400km altitude, 51.6 deg. inclination 
orbit. Year 2002. Orbital density = 2.8 g/cm3, meteoroid density = 1.0 g/cm3. Environment 
models: ORDEM2000 [3] and SSP30425B [4].  
Number of MMOD particles          
≥ 0.1mm diameter 
Number of MMOD particles          
≥ 1.0cm diameter 
Surface of Cube 
Orbital Debris Meteoroids Orbital Debris Meteoroids 
Forward (front) 5.16 8.31 1.32E-6 5.23E-7 
Starboard 7.79 3.64 7.70E-7 2.29E-7 
Port 7.90 3.64 7.73E-7 2.29E-7 
Aft (back) 0.46 0.92 1.72E-8 5.77E-8 
Space (zenith) 0 5.16 0 3.25E-7 
Earth (nadir) 0 0.53 0 3.33E-8 
Total 21.3 22.2 2.88E-6 1.40E-6 
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Figure 2-8. Space Shuttle MMOD risk of critical damage (loss-of-vehicle) as function of flight 
orientation (10day duration, 400km altitude, 51.6 deg inclination, year 2008).  Flight direction to 
left with Earth direction toward bottom of page. 
 
2.8.3 Orbital Altitude 
As indicated in Table 2-3, the operational altitude of the spacecraft in Earth orbit 
influences orbital debris flux (and risk from orbital debris impact) to much greater 
extent than micro-meteoroids.   Micro-meteoroid flux does not change much with 
altitude in LEO. 
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Table 2-3. Effect of Operational Altitude on Orbital Debris and Micro-Meteoroid Flux of 3mm 
and larger MMOD particles on a randomly tumbling object, in 51.6 deg. inclination orbit, year 
2010, environment models: ORDEM2000 [3] and SSP30425B [4].   
Altitude (km) Orbital debris flux (#/m2-year) 
Ratio of Orbital 
debris flux to flux at 
400km altitude 
Micro-meteoroid 
flux (#/m2-year) 
Ratio of micro-meteoroid 
flux to flux at 400km 
altitude 
300 3.40E-05 0.34 2.69E-5 0.97 
400 9.92E-05 1.00 2.79E-5 1.00 
500 2.05E-04 2.07 2.86E-5 1.03 
800 6.16E-04 6.22 3.00E-5 1.08 
1000 6.97E-04 7.03 3.07E-5 1.10 
1500 3.02E-04 3.04 3.16E-5 1.13 
 
2.8.4 Year of Mission 
The orbital debris environment varies with time because of the dynamic nature of 
orbital debris sources and sinks.  The current debris environment definition [3] 
includes a yearly change in the orbital debris environment flux (Table 2-4).  Over 
time, orbital debris is generated from breakups and spacecraft degradation, the 
quantity of which varies over the years (i.e., debris source term varies with time).  
The primary sink for orbital debris is atmospheric drag which eventually causes 
orbital debris fragments to reenter, thus cleaning the orbital debris environment.  
Atmospheric drag is related to atmospheric density which increases with higher solar 
activity and decreases during lower solar activity.  Because of this, orbital debris in 
LEO will increase and decrease generally in opposite direction to the solar cycle, with 
a one- to two-year delay.  That is, orbital debris will tend to increase as solar activity 
decreases (because less debris is removed by atmospheric drag) and vice-versa when 
solar activity increases.  Only the orbital debris flux changes with time on a yearly 
basis (Table 2-4).  The meteoroid environment varies on a daily basis with the 
presence/absence of various short-term showers, but is relatively constant from year 
to year.   
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Table 2-4. Yearly change in orbital debris flux of 3mm and larger particles on a randomly 
tumbling object in 51.6 deg. inclination orbit, altitude 400 km, ORDEM2000 [3]. 
Year 
Orbital 
debris flux 
(#/m2-year) 
Ratio of Orbital 
debris flux to 
flux in year 2008 
Year 
Orbital 
debris flux 
(#/m2-year) 
Ratio of Orbital 
debris flux to 
flux in year 2008 
2002 6.25E-05 0.64 2013 9.98E-05 1.03 
2003 7.04E-05 0.72 2014 9.19E-05 0.94 
2004 7.60E-05 0.78 2015 8.85E-05 0.91 
2005 7.28E-05 0.75 2016 9.91E-05 1.02 
2006 8.90E-05 0.91 2017 1.24E-04 1.27 
2007 9.52E-05 0.98 2018 1.19E-04 1.22 
2008 9.74E-05 1.00 2019 1.23E-04 1.26 
2009 9.87E-05 1.01 2020 1.22E-04 1.25 
2010 9.92E-05 1.02 2021 1.19E-04 1.23 
2011 1.14E-04 1.17 2022 1.18E-04 1.21 
2012 1.07E-04 1.10 2023 1.22E-04 1.26 
 
2.8.5 Orbit Inclination 
The inclination of the spacecraft orbit about Earth has an influence on orbital 
debris impact flux as shown in Table 2-5.  The OD flux is highly coupled to risk from 
orbital debris.  As long as risk is relatively small (<10%),  the debris flux is directly 
proportional to risk from orbital debris.  
Table 2-5. Effect of orbit inclination on orbital debris flux of 3mm and larger particles on a 
randomly tumbling object in 400 km altitude orbit, year 2010, ORDEM2000 [3] debris model. 
Inclination (deg) Orbital debris flux (#/m2-year) 
Ratio of Orbital 
debris flux to flux in 
51.6 deg. Inclination 
orbit 
0 9.13E-05 0.92 
10 9.13E-05 0.92 
20 9.38E-05 0.95 
28.5 9.75E-05 0.98 
48 9.76E-05 0.98 
51.6 9.92E-05 1.00 
66 1.08E-04 1.09 
90 1.35E-04 1.36 
98 1.49E-04 1.50 
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2.9 Spacecraft Operational Methods to Reduce MMOD Risk 
A number of operational methodologies are used during a mission to reduce 
MMOD risk including collision warning and avoidance, closing hatches, and damage 
detection and location. 
2.9.1 Collision Warning and Debris Avoidance 
One means used to reduce MMOD risk is to simply avoid impact in the first 
place.  The Space Shuttle, ISS and other high value space assets are routinely advised 
of potential collisions with ground-trackable orbital debris.  If the predicted collision 
risk is deemed high enough, a collision avoidance maneuver will be performed.  
Generally, orbital debris of 5cm to 10cm in diameter can be tracked ground-based 
radar systems.   Only relatively large orbital debris objects are tracked and collision 
probabilities determined. Smaller orbital debris and meteoroid particles are not 
tracked because they are either below the detection threshold of the ground-based 
sensors for smaller debris, or too fast and not in Earth orbit for meteoroids.  The 
collision risk is calculated many hours in advance of a potential collision based on the 
orbital elements of the debris object and potential target.  More details can be found 
elsewhere [5, 6].  
2.9.2 Hatch Protocol 
For crewed spacecraft, failure of protective shielding allows debris to penetration 
through the pressure shell and into the crew cabin volume.  Penetrations endanger 
crew survivability from several standpoints.  First, if the hole and cracks in the 
pressure shell exceed the critical crack length, crack growth will not arrest and can 
lead to module unzip.  Second, the pressure loss may be so fast that crew are unable 
to isolate the leak or evacuate successfully.   Third, the internal fragments and other 
effects of a penetration (heat, light, blast/overpressure) can cause crew injury or loss, 
fail internal pressurized tanks resulting in additional secondary fragment release, or 
fail internal critical equipment/hardware necessary for vehicle/crew survival (GN&C, 
ECLSS, etc.).  The possibility exists with crewed spacecraft to seal off unoccupied 
modules using hatches between modules.  Then if penetration occurs to an 
unoccupied module, there is a far lower chance that crew injury or loss would result.  
Modules that are not occupied and are not along a main path of crew operations or 
evacuation are candidates for closing hatches to mitigate MMOD risk.  Primarily such 
modules provide auxiliary functions such as storage of supplies or waste.  Risk 
reduction by closing hatches is a function of the MMOD risk associated with the 
module and the fraction of time that the hatches are closed. 
2.9.3 Damage Detection and Mitigation 
Another means to reduce MMOD risk is to detect and locate MMOD damage that 
is critical using either sensors or inspection via cameras, and mitigating the damage 
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via operations.  For instance, impact damage detection/location systems on spacecraft 
can be used to: 
(1) Detect and locate critical damage to thermal protection system (TPS) 
materials on spacecraft used for reentry of crew and/or cargo.  Detection 
methods include sensors and inspection using cameras.  Mitigation of any 
detected critical damage can be accomplished by not using the spacecraft 
until repairs are performed of the damage, or a replacement spacecraft is 
launched.   
(2) Detect and locate leaks or damage in the pressure shell of crew modules 
via pressure drop and damage detection sensors.  Mitigation can be 
accomplished by sealing the leak with patches or closing hatches to isolate 
the leaking module. 
Table 2-6 summarizes the MMOD impact detection and location systems used for 
mitigating MMOD risk on the NASA Space Shuttle and ISS.  By virtue of its large 
internal volume, the crews of ISS have time to locate and isolate leaks if they were to 
occur by closing hatches.  Hole repair kits are manifested and crews trained to repair 
a leak in a module if it occurs.  Crew escape vehicles are docked to ISS in the event 
of a major event requiring evacuation. 
Table 2-6. MMOD damage detection and location systems used on the Space Shuttle and ISS.  
Spacecraft Damage Detection System 
Space Shuttle Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS) 
Space Shuttle Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System (WLEIDS) 
International Space 
Station 
Hand-held leak detection 
system 
International Space 
Station  
Acoustic emission leak 
detection system 
 
2.10 MMOD Protection Requirements 
Vehicles from the early years of space exploration have used the probabilistic 
approach to develop and implement MMOD protection.  MMOD protection 
requirements are generally expressed in terms of a minimum acceptable reliability 
level or success criteria; i.e., a probability of NOT being struck by a MMOD particle 
that will completely penetrate through the spacecraft shielding or cause damage that 
endangers crew or spacecraft survivability or operability (Table 2-7).  Spacecraft 
MMOD protection is designed to prevent a majority of the micro-meteoroid and 
orbital debris particles that can impact the spacecraft during its lifetime from causing 
serious damage that would endanger crew survivability and/or continued operation of 
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the spacecraft.  Due to spacecraft size and mass constraints, it is not possible with 
current shielding technology to completely eliminate the risk from MMOD impact.  
Shielding is an important component of the overall strategy used to reduce the risk 
from meteoroid/orbital debris impact.  The strategy to meet requirements also can 
include other operational means, such as collision warning and avoidance to reduce 
the risk from orbital debris impact as well as damage detection and mitigation. 
Table 2-7 provides a listing of historical MMOD protection design requirements.  
Generally, each program defines critical penetrations as those that would endanger 
the survivability of the vehicle and/or crew, although requirements for mission 
success and functionality have been defined as well. 
Table 2-7. MMOD Protection Requirements for Various Spacecraft.  
Spacecraft Environments Considered 
Required Probability 
of No Penetration 
(PNP) 
Apollo Command and 
Service Module (CSM) Meteoroids 
0.995 per 8.3day 
mission 
Apollo Lunar Lander 
Module Meteoroids 0.995 per mission 
Skylab Module Meteoroids 0.995 per 8 month mission 
Spacelab Module Meteoroids  0.999 for 7 day mission 
Space Shuttle Orbiter 
vehicle 
Meteoroids and Orbital 
Debris 
0.995 per mission 
(for damage resulting 
in LOCV)1 
Hubble Space Telescope Meteoroids and Orbital Debris 0.95 for 2 years 
International Space 
Station  Meteoroids and Orbital Debris 
0.98 to 0.998 per 
critical element over 
10 years  
 
2.10.1 Requirements Influence on MMOD Protection Capability 
The ISS has MMOD protection requirements consistent with past programs, 
although it carries by far the most capable MMOD shields ever flown.   This is 
because ISS is larger and exposed longer than other space vehicles.  It operates at 
higher altitudes in general than other spacecraft and its operations extend into the 
future.  These factors increase the expected number of MMOD impacts.  To meet 
comparable protection requirements, ISS shielding must be more effective.  For 
instance, most ISS critical hardware exposed to the MMOD flux in the velocity vector 
                                                 
1 Original Shuttle design requirements for meteoroid protection alone (not including orbital debris) 
were 0.95 PNP for 500 missions; however, this requirement was not met. 
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(front) or port/starboard (sides) directions will be protected by shields effective at 
stopping 1cm to 1.3cm diameter aluminum debris particle at typical impact velocity 
and angle (9 km/s, 45 deg. impact angle).  In comparison, shielding on Mir space 
station was in general able to stop 0.3cm particles [7], the Space Shuttle Orbiter is 
capable of stopping 0.1cm to 0.5cm particles [8], and Apollo/Skylab were able to stop 
0.15-0.2cm particles under similar impact conditions.   
2.11 Iteration of Analysis Process to Meet MMOD Protection Requirements 
The assessed PNP is compared to requirements for MMOD protection to 
determine if protection design is sufficient.  The shielding design effort is successful 
when the assessed PNP is greater than the required PNP, for a spacecraft design and 
operations that are at final pre-flight level (well past CDR).  As illustrated in Figure 
2-1, iteration of the risk assessment and risk reduction process is always necessary to 
update analysis assumptions on the design and operations of the spacecraft, and to 
meet protection requirements and optimize the design; i.e., meet the requirements 
with less weight, lower volume (less standoff), less cost, etc.  Several techniques are 
described in this section and applied iteratively to optimize the design and operations 
to meet MMOD requirements.  This process relies on MMOD analysts working 
closely with project engineering and operations personnel to determine the most 
practical means to meet MMOD requirements. 
2.11.1 Find MMOD Risk Drivers 
Perform detailed assessment of penetration risks for the overall vehicle to 
determine the zones that control the risks (i.e., areas with the highest MMOD risk).  
Selectively improve the protection capability in the areas identified as risk drivers.  
Several methods are used to clearly illustrate risk drivers including bar charts of 
MMOD risk by region, tables of MMOD risk for each region of the FEM geometry 
model (include the fraction of total risk and risk/area by region) and color contour 
plots of MMOD risk on the spacecraft FEM.  Constant updates of the color contour 
plots are especially useful as the design and operations (attitude timeline) change, to 
keep current on where MMOD risks are concentrated. 
2.11.2 Re-Examine Analysis Assumptions for Risk Drivers 
After risk drivers are identified, ensure the bases of the risk assessment are 
justified for regions of the spacecraft that drive MMOD risk.  Items to consider 
include: (a) verify all incidental shadowing from hardware and structures near the risk 
drivers been incorporated in the analysis, (b) check the reasonableness of the ballistic 
limit equations and predicted particle size at the failure threshold of each risk driver,  
(c) confirm with engineering that the failure criteria for the risk drivers are justified, 
(d) perform hypervelocity impact tests on the materials representative of risk drivers, 
compare to predictions from the BLEs and update BLEs accordingly with the new 
test data.     
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2.11.3 Incorporate Directional Shielding 
Reduce shielding weight by optimizing shielding weight distribution to account 
for the directional MMOD distribution.  Shielding on each critical item is tailored for 
the environment and its location on station.  Because MMOD impact rate is highest 
on forward and side surfaces, more capable shielding (heavier or with greater 
standoff) is applied to these surfaces and less on the Earth facing surface.  Shielding 
should also be reduced in areas where shadowing from neighboring structure reduce 
impacts. If shielding is optimized, the ratio of normalized risk/normalized area should 
be equal for all surfaces of the spacecraft.  The goal of this effort therefore is to 
equalize the ratio of risk to area for the various vehicle zones.  The risk/area ratio for 
each zone is assessed and shielding optimized by repeated BUMPER code runs. 
2.11.4 Reduce MMOD Risk by Maximizing Shadowing 
Take advantage of shielding/shadowing from neighboring items.  Locate external 
critical equipment to trailing or Earth-facing surfaces to reduce MMOD impact rates, 
or put them in areas highly shadowed by other hardware.  
2.11.5 Reduce MMOD Risk by Changing Spacecraft Orientation 
Pick lowest impact risk spacecraft orientations, by minimizing frontal/side areas 
(gravity gradient orientations are generally high-risk for MMOD) and by orienting the 
most vulnerable surfaces into aft or nadir directions.  Figure 2-9 shows that the best 
orientation to minimize MMOD impact for a relatively short cylinder (1.5m long, 1m 
diameter) is with cylindrical length axis oriented perpendicular to the orbital plane.  A 
vertical (gravity-gradient) orientation (with length axis parallel to Earth radial) has a 
30% higher MMOD penetration risk.  An orientation with length axis parallel to 
velocity vector is in the middle.  Selecting the best flight attitude by pointing the most 
vulnerable surfaces aft or toward Earth is standard procedure for the Space Shuttle.  
Other spacecraft can take a similar approach. 
FEM 
(Color contour: 
Red = high 
penetration risk, 
Blue = low 
penetration risk)  
debris
velocity
Earth  
velocity
Earth
velocity
Earth
Number of 
MMOD 
Penetrations 
9.31E-5 8.22E-5 1.06E-4 
PNP 0.99991 0.99992 0.99989 
N Ratio 1.13 1.0 1.29 
Figure 2-9.  Spacecraft Orientation can reduce MMOD risk.  Bases of calculation: 1m diameter x 
1.5m long cylinder, year 2010, duration 1year, 0.13cm Al 6061T6 bumper, 10cm standoff, 
0.32cm Al 2219T87 rear wall, debris ORDEM2000, meteoroids SSP30425B, 400km altitude. 
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2.11.6 Improve Shielding Performance 
Shielding performance can be improved without adding significant mass by 
increasing the spacing between bumper and shielding rear wall (i.e., improving the 
capability to stop larger size MMOD particles which will lower MMOD failure risk), 
or using higher performance alloys and materials for the rear wall.  For example, 
Figure 2-10 illustrates the effect of greater standoff distance on reducing MMOD 
weight.  
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Figure 2-10. MMOD shielding mass as a function of standoff distance.  Bases of calculation: 
constant PNP, Whipple shield with 0.127cm Al 6061T6 bumper and Al 2219T87 rear wall (rear 
wall thickness varies to maintain same PNP as standoff is increased), 1m diameter x 1.5m long 
cylinder, assumed 30% of bumper mass for standoff substructure mass (shield mass = bumper + 
rear wall + standoff structure mass). 
2.11.7 Implement Advanced Shielding 
Incorporating more efficient, multi-bumper shielding concepts can provide 
significant mass-savings.  Typically, 50% or more mass savings are possible using 3-
wall or 4-wall shields (2 or 3 bumpers and a rear wall) compared to 2-walls (single 
bumper and rear wall). To illustrate the issue, consider the shielding required to stop a 
1cm diameter aluminum projectiles at 7km/s, 0o impact angle (normal to the shield).  
Four shield concepts to meet the requirement are given in Figure 2-11: a conventional 
aluminum Whipple shield with a 10.2cm standoff, a Nextel/Kevlar stuffed Whipple 
shield with the same standoff, a Whipple shield with a 30cm standoff, and a Nextel 
multi-shock shield concept.  The stuffed Whipple shield incorporates a blanket 
between the outer aluminum bumper and inner pressure wall that combines two 
materials: NextelTM ceramic fabric and KevlarTM high strength fabric2.  The shielding 
mass estimates are made assuming the shielding encloses a cylinder, with 4.2m inside 
diameter by 8.5m long.  Stuffed Whipple and Multi-Shock shields are described in 
                                                 
2 Nextel is a flexible, ceramic fabric product manufactured by 3M Corporation.  Nextel contains 
alumina, boron oxide and silica.  Kevlar is a product of the E.I. duPont Co. 
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more detail in section 4.  But it is clear for this example that there are significant mass 
savings by using advanced shielding concepts (i.e., up to 50% reduction).   
Also, it is possible to trade weight for protection capability (i.e., capability and 
shield PNP are related), so it can be shown that lower weight and more effective 
protection in terms of higher PNP are possible using Nextel/Kevlar stuffed Whipple 
and Multi-Shock shields compared to conventional Whipple shields.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Areal Density (kg/m2) 
 
Whipple 
S=10cm 
Stuffed Whipple 
S=10cm 
Whipple 
S=30cm 
Multi-Shock 
S=30cm 
Bumper: 7.0 10.6 5.6 5.2 
Rear wall: 17.2 6.6 7.5 3.8 
Total: 24.2 17.3 13.1 9.0 
Surface Area (m2) 
Bumper: 152 152 175 175 
Rear wall: 141 141 141 141 
Mass (kg) including support mass assumed at 30% bumper 
Bumper: 1060 1620 980 910 
Support: 320 490 300 270 
Rear wall: 2420 940 1060 540 
Total: 3800 3050 2340 1720 
Figure 2-11. Shielding Comparison 
 
t=0.26cm Al bumper
t=0.6cm Al2219T87
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standoff
WHIPPLE
10.2cm standoff
t=0.15cm Al bumper
Nextel/Kevlar
Stuffed Whipple
mN-K=0.6g/cm2
Nextel bumpers
mb = 0.52 g/cm2
Multi-Shock
30cm standoff
Nextel ceramic cloth
Kevlar fabric
Projectile in all cases: 1cm diameter aluminum, 1.5g, 7km/s, normal impact
10.2cm
standoff
t=0.21cm Al bumper
t=0.26cm Al2219T87
30 cm
 standoff
WHIPPLE
30cm standoff
30 cm
 standoff
t=0.14cm Al2219T87
t=0.23cm Al2219T87
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2.11.8 Incorporate Toughened Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) Thermal 
Blanket 
Toughening materials, such as ceramic fabric and high-strength fabric, have been 
included within the multi-layer insulation (MLI) thermal blanket that is commonly 
used to provide passive thermal control of spacecraft hardware [15, 16].  These 
additional materials provide improved MMOD shielding.  Additional information is 
provided in Section 6. 
2.11.9 Inert Stored Energy Equipment 
After use, stored energy equipment should be made inert if possible. For instance, 
use multiple storage tanks in series instead of parallel, then reduce or fully 
depressurize storage tanks after emptied.  The risk of catastrophic rupture is 
eliminated when stress levels in the pressure wall are made negligible by 
depressurizing to a small value.  A corollary idea for pressure vessels is to use them 
in series and deplete first the pressure vessels in the locations that are most exposed to 
MMOD impact (those in the forward or side positions), followed by less exposed 
positions.  This could require design and operational modifications to implement for 
propellant tanks and other fluid storage tanks.   Another example is to keep spare 
control moment gyros, flywheels or other momentum storage devices in an inactive 
state until required. 
2.11.10 Reduce Hazards if Shield Penetration Occurs   
Design and operational options are available to reduce hazards if a penetration 
occurs.  For instance, some hatches to unoccupied modules can be kept closed to 
prevent a depressurization of an entire station if a penetration occurred to the module.  
A perforation into an unoccupied module with hatch closed would not result in loss of 
crew from the fragments/shrapnel, light flash, acoustic overpressure, or 
depressurization.  Vent lines between modules could be left open to allow for some 
air circulation and to keep pressures equalized to facilitate hatch opening during 
normal operations.   
2.11.11 Critical Damage Detection, Repair and Replacement 
Inspection and repair of impact damage to critical areas of reentry vehicles (such 
as the crew return vehicle attached to ISS) can be used as a supplement to MMOD 
shielding for maintaining flight worthiness.  Some impact damage to thermal 
protection systems (TPS) on Earth return vehicles is not a hazard while on-orbit (and 
may therefore be undetected) but could become hazardous later during reentry 
aerodynamic heating phases.  Properly placed instrumentation with correct sensitivity 
to detect critical TPS damage can help support the inspection/detection process. 
2.12 MMOD Risk Reduction Opportunities During Spacecraft Operations 
The effort to evaluate and reduce MMOD risk continues during operational 
phases of the spacecraft, in following areas: 
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¾ Evaluate effect on MMOD risk from changes to vehicle design or 
operations. 
¾ Assess methods to reduce MMOD risk. 
¾ Inspect returned hardware and on-orbit photographs for MMOD damage. 
¾ Trend MMOD impact data, provide data to MMOD environment groups 
and evaluate changes in the MMOD environment. 
¾ Provide Flight Projects with data on “near-misses”, which are MMOD 
damages which could be considered critical/catastrophic if  impact 
occurred on other parts of the vehicle. 
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3 Applications 
This section discusses selected application examples of the MMOD protection 
improvement process described in section 2 for Space Shuttle, International Space 
Station, and Exploration vehicles. 
3.1 Changing Shuttle Orientation while Docked to ISS 
MMOD impact risks to the Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle are primarily to the 
wing leading edge (WLE) and nose cap (NC), which are relatively thin and 
vulnerable to MMOD impact damage.   A MMOD risk contour plot illustrates the 
high impact risk to especially underside regions of the WLE & NC (Figure 3-1).  To 
reduce MMOD risks to Shuttle, the orientation of the vehicle was changed during a 
majority the ISS docked phase of the Shuttle mission.  The change in orientation – 
essentially flying the ISS “backwards” – provided incidental shielding to the Shuttle 
as well as directing MMOD sensitive areas away from the ambient MMOD particle 
flux.  The change orients the bottom of the Shuttle in the wake direction of ISS, 
which reduces MMOD impacts to the most vulnerable surfaces of the vehicle, 
improving crew safety and mission success.  In all ISS missions prior to STS-114, the 
belly of the vehicle faced into the ram “velocity” direction of ISS motion and highest 
MMOD impact flux.  Figure 3-2 shows the Shuttle-ISS docked orientation change 
with respect to the ISS velocity direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1. MMOD risk contour for the port wing of the Space Shuttle vehicle (underside/belly 
of vehicle toward bottom of page) – red areas correspond to high-risk of MMOD impact damage 
exceeding failure criteria, blue areas correspond to low-risk. 
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Figure 3-2.  Shuttle-ISS mated flight orientation changed to –XVV (right image) to reduce 
MMOD risks by factor of 5. 
3.2 Late Inspection of Space Shuttle Wing Leading Edge and Nose Cap for 
MMOD Damage 
The WLE and NC of the Space Shuttle vehicle represent the majority of the 
MMOD risk to the vehicle, even given the change in flight orientation described in 
section 3.1.  To further reduce MMOD risks for loss-of-vehicle and crew, a late 
inspection is performed of these high-risk areas, to confirm there is no damage that 
exceeds the limits of allowable damage for safe return (i.e., the WLE & NC failure 
criteria).  The inspection is usually performed just after undock from ISS, using the 
orbiter boom sensor system (OBSS).  This system has been in use since STS-114 
(July 2005). An early inspection is performed of the WLE, NC and other parts of the 
vehicle to detect any potential critical damage to the thermal protection system of the 
vehicle caused by launch debris.  The purpose of the late inspection is to detect any 
critical damage received from MMOD impacts.  The OBSS is a 15m long boom 
terminating in an instrumentation package that can be grappled by the Remote 
Manipulator System of the Space Shuttle spacecraft.  The OBSS has 2 
instrumentation packages (Figure 3-3).  Sensor package 1 consists of a Laser 
Dynamic Range Imager (LDRI) and an Intensified Television Camera (ITVC).  
Sensor package 2 contains a Laser Camera System (LCS) and a digital camera (IDC).  
The sensors can resolve damage at a resolution of a few millimeters, and can scan at a 
rate of about 6cm per second. If flight engineers find potential damage to the areas 
scanned, more detailed or focused scans can be performed.  If critical damage is 
detected with the OBSS, the crew may attempt a repair via a EVA, or if the damage is 
not repairable, the crew will dock with the International Space Station and await a 
rescue mission (see further details in Section 3.3).  Late inspection of the WLE and 
NC, with mitigation if critical damage is found, reduces risks for LOCV by factor of 
2. 
 
 
 
 Prior to STS-114:  
ISS+XVV mated attitude 
Higher MMOD impact risk to belly TPS 
V 
V
For STS-114 and subsequent missions: 
–XVV mated attitude 
Lower MMOD impact risk to belly TPS 
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Figure 3-3.  Orbiter Boom Sensor System (OBSS). 
 
3.3 Shuttle Impact Sensors and On-Orbit Repair 
The Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle was equipped after the loss of Columbia with a  
wing leading edge impact detection system (WLEIDS).  The WLEIDS consists of 
132 single-axis accelerometers mounted along the length of the Orbiter’s leading 
edge wing spars.  During launch, the accelerometers collect data at a rate of 20 kHZ 
and store the data for subsequent downlink to Mission Control.  Within 6 to 8 hours 
of launch, summary files containing the data collected by each accelerometer are 
down linked for analysis to find potential signatures of ascent damage.  This analysis 
is completed within 24 to 48 hours of launch so the results can be used to schedule 
focused inspection using the OBSS sensors. The WLEIDS is also used to detect 
MMOD impacts to the WLE, but use is limited to periods of time that are considered 
high-MMOD risk during the mission, due to limited battery life of the WLEIDS 
accelerometers.  The MMOD impact data is used to guide late mission inspection 
decisions. 
The WLE and nose cap of the Shuttle vehicle consist of reinforced carbon-carbon 
panels and T-seals. The Shuttle Program has manifested two kits for on-orbit RCC 
repair.  The repair must prevent plasma flow through the damaged RCC.  One kit is 
designed to repair small cracks and coating losses on the exterior of the RCC panel. 
The crack repair technique uses a sealant material known as NOAX or non-oxide 
adhesive experimental sealant, containing a pre-ceramic polymer impregnated with 
carbon and silicon-carbide powder.    It is applied by an astronaut using a space-
adapted caulking gun applicator and putty knife.  The second kit is designed for repair 
of 13 mm to 100 mm diameter holes in RCC panels.  This kit is referred to as a plug 
repair and consists of a carbon silicon-carbide (C-SiC) patch coated with sealant.  It is 
mechanically attached to the RCC panel with a T-bar attachment similar to a toggle 
 
ISIS SP2 ISIS SP1
ISIS Digital Camera 
(IDC)
Laser Camera System (LCS)
Laser Dynamic 
Range Imager 
(LDRI)
Intensified Television 
Camera (ITVC)
SP1 Mounting PlateLCS Radiator
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bolt.  If the damage site is less than 13mm, the astronauts will use a special bit to drill 
out the hole. 
If a repair is not feasible, the crew of a critically damaged Shuttle will invoke  
Contingency Shuttle Crew Support (CSCS), also known as safe haven.  The CSCS 
scenario calls for the crew of the damaged vehicle to remain on board ISS until a 
rescue mission can be staged.  The viability of this option is tied to resources on the 
ISS and the time required to prepare a rescue vehicle for launch. 
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4 Equations for Designing MMOD Shields 
This section provides ballistic limit equations characterizing the performance of 
MMOD shields including monolithic single-wall and multi-wall shields.   
Monolithic shield equations are provided for aluminum, titanium, stainless steel, 
carbon-fiber reinforced plastic (CFRP) composites, fused-silica glass, and 
polycarbonate (Hyzod3). Also, the ballistic performance of MLI thermal blanket 
covered aluminum and CFRP is also provided.  The equations include penetration and 
damage equations that predict damage depth and size as a function of impact 
conditions and target parameters, as well as performance equations that relate MMOD 
particle size that is on the failure threshold of the shield as a function of impact and 
target parameters. 
Multi-wall shields include Whipple (dual-wall), Nextel/Kevlar stuffed Whipple 
(triple-wall) and multi-shock (multiple-wall) shields given in Figure 4-1.  Whipple 
shields have an outer “bumper” and inner “rear wall” with a “standoff” or gap 
between the two.  Stuffed Whipple (SW) shields have a blanket of Nextel ceramic 
cloth and Kevlar ballistic protection fabric between the bumper and rear wall.  Multi-
shock (MS) shields have multiple bumpers (3 to 4 typically) followed by a rear wall.  
Ballistic limit equations provided for these shields are of two general types: 
1. Design equations used to size the shielding elements for a particular threat 
particle size and impact conditions, and 
2. Performance equations used to define the particle size on the ballistic limit 
of a particular shield as a function of impact conditions (impact velocity, 
particle density, impact angle and particle shape). 
Design equations are particularly useful when initially determining shield 
parameters to meet a particular design requirement.  More detailed analyses using the 
performance equations and Bumper code are conducted to iterate the design and 
verify requirements have been met.  Hypervelocity impact tests to confirm and update 
the ballistic limit equations for particular shield configurations on the spacecraft 
should be performed during shielding development. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Hyzod™ is a high-strength polycarbonate product from Sheffield Plastics, Inc. 
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Figure 4-1.  MMOD Shield types 
4.1 Single Wall Shielding 
The following sections provide BLEs for single-wall shields made from 
monolithic plates of aluminum alloy, titanium, stainless steel, carbon composite, and 
fiberglass composite.  The effect on protection performance from adding multi-layer 
insulation (MLI) thermal blankets to the exterior of the shielding is also described. 
4.1.1 Aluminum monolithic shields 
The Cour-Palais single wall penetration equation [18, 19] considers hypervelocity 
impact into a semi-infinite plate which leaves a crater.   Semi-infinite targets are thick 
enough that there is no noticeable change on the back surface of the target behind the 
impact crater (i.e., the back surface remains flat and free of cracks after the impact). 
Penetration depth into a semi-infinite target, P∞, depends on projectile to target 
density ratio, ρp/ρt, as follows: 
For ρp/ρt < 1.5,  
( ) 3/2
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25.018/19 cos24.5 ⎟⎠
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   (4-1) 
For ρp/ρt ≥ 1.5,  
( )
3/23/2
25.018/19 cos24.5 ⎟⎟⎠
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   (4-2) 
 
Where 
BHN = Brinell hardness of the target 
Ct = speed of sound in the target (km/s) 
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d = projectile diameter (cm) 
P∞ = penetration depth in semi-infinite target (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = target density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); θ = 0° impact normal to target 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
 
For aluminum on aluminum impacts at speeds in excess of 5 km/s, the crater is 
nearly hemispherical.  As the thickness of the plate is decreased, the plate undergoes 
internal fracturing near the rear surface (incipient spall) and development of attached 
spall, detachment of spalled material from the rear surface, and finally perforation 
when the entry crater and spallation area overlap.  Figure 4-2 illustrates the cratering 
process.  Note that as target thickness decreases, the crater elongates as spall develops 
on the rear side of the target; i.e., penetration depth increases as the target becomes 
thinner, even though there is no change in impact conditions. 
  
 
 
   (a)      (b) 
 
 
 
  (c)      (d) 
Figure 4-2.  Hypervelocity impact damage modes in aluminum: (a) craters in semi-infinite 
targets, (b) attached spall, (c) detached spall and (d) complete penetration or perforation of the 
target.  Impact damage from soda-lime glass projectiles into Al 1100 targets at 5.9 km/s; target 
thickness to projectile diameter ratio are: (a) t/d = 10, (b) t/d = 4, (c) t/d = 3.4, (d) t/d = 3 [26]. 
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Equation 4-3 gives the required shielding thickness to prevent attached (incipient) 
spall on the back of the aluminum plate.  Equations 4-4 and 4-5 provide the shielding 
thickness to prevent detached spall and complete perforation of the aluminum plate, 
respectively.   
To prevent incipient spall: t ≥ 3 P∞ (4-3)
To prevent detached spall: t ≥ 2.2 P∞ (4-4)
To prevent perforation: t ≥ 1.8 P∞ (4-5)
 
For a specific shielding configuration, the particle size on the threshold of either 
perforation, detached spall or incipient spall is determined using: 
( )
( )
19/18
3/2
5.025.0
cos24.5 ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡=
t
pt
c CV
BHN
k
td θ
ρρ
   (4-6) 
Where 
BHN = Brinell hardness of the target 
Ct = speed of sound in the target (km/s) 
dc = critical projectile diameter on threshold of given damage mode (cm) 
k = damage parameter, either 1.8, 2.2 or 3.0 for perforation, detached spall 
or incipient attached spall, respectively 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = target density (g/cm3) 
t = target thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); θ = 0° impact normal to target 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
Table 4-1 provides an overview of the range in impact conditions that the 
aluminum BLEs have been validated by hypervelocity impact test. 
Table 4-1. Application comments for Aluminum single plate ballistic limit equation 
 Validated for Applied to Comments 
Materials Aluminum Aluminum alloys  
Impact angles 0° to >85° Normal, oblique Equation appears to slightly over-predict penetration depth for impact angles over 45o [20] 
Impact 
velocities < 8 km/s All  
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4.1.2 Titanium Monolithic Shield 
Equations for predicting penetration into a single layer titanium alloy shield have 
been developed [22].  The following equation relates penetration depth into a semi-
infinite thickness of titanium with projectile and target parameters: 
3/25.0
25.0 cos24.5 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= −∞
tt
p
Ti C
VBHNdP θρ
ρ
    (4-7) 
This equation is used to calculate the minimum diameter of a spherical particle 
that produces a given amount of damage to the impacted titanium wall as follows:  
3/25.0
25.011 cos24.5
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−−− ⎟⎟⎠
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VBNHKtd θρ
ρ
   (4-8) 
The minimum thickness of a titanium wall to prevent a given amount of damage 
is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 3/15.03/25.025.0 1224.5 ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡= −−− ECBHNKt pttTi ρπρ   (4-9) 
 
Where 
BHN = Brinell hardness of the target 
Ct = speed of sound in the target (km/s) 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
E = projectile normal component kinetic energy (J) = π/12 d3 ρp (Vcosθ)2 
K = damage parameter for titanium alloy, either 1.8, 2.4 or 3.0 for 
perforation, detached spall or incipient attached spall, respectively 
P∞ Ti = penetration depth in semi-infinite titanium target (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = target density (g/cm3) 
tTi = titanium thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); θ = 0° impact normal to target 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
Typical physical properties of titanium alloys are given in the following table.  
The following figure plots impact data on titanium Ti-15-3-3-3 alloy compared to the 
predictions using the above ballistic limit equations.  Pass/fail criterion for these tests 
was based on presence of detached spall (pass if no detached spall present). 
 
J S C - 6 4 3 9 9  
 
V e r s i o n :  A  
 
 40  
  
 
Table 4-2. Titanium alloy physical properties 
Material Form Density (g/cm3) 
Brinell 
Hardness 
Speed of 
Sound (km/s)
Ti-15V-3Cr-3Al-3Sn Sheet 4.73 257 4.26 
Ti-15V-3Cr-3Al-3Sn Bar 4.65 390 4.62 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Ballistic limits for titanium 15-3-3-3 sheet and bar stock. 
 
4.1.3 Stainless Steel Monolithic Shield 
The following set of penetration equations were developed based on cratering 
experiments into CRES 15-5PH stainless steel [24, 25]. 
( ) ( ) 3/2
5.0
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To prevent perforation of the stainless steel, it is assumed the thickness of the 
steel is given by the following equation.  Additional impact data is necessary to 
determine the coefficient used in this equation. 
SteelSteel Pt 8.1≥      (4-11) 
The diameter of the impacting particle that is at the perforation limit of a stainless 
steel plate of thickness, tSteel, is: 
( )( ) ( ) 632.0
474.0
19/18 cos57.1 −
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= θρ
ρ
Vtd
t
p
Steel     (4-12) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
PSteel = penetration depth in semi-infinite steel target (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = target density (g/cm3) 
tSteel = thickness of steel target (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); θ = 0° impact normal to target 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
4.1.4 Carbon-Fiber Reinforced Plastic (CFRP) Single Wall Shields 
Crater formation and shock transmission in a non-isotropic material such as CFRP 
is considerably different to that seen in metals. For semi-infinite CFRP, a 
modification of the Al cratering equation is given in equations 4-13 through 4-15, 
which includes an empirically derived single material parameter (KCFRP) to describe 
the effect of material properties [21].  Additionally, a term is included to account for 
the effect of MLI on top of the CFRP plate.  
Expected penetration depth into a semi-infinite CFRP plate as a function of 
impact parameters is given by the following: 
( )
t
MLI
pCFRP
mKVdKP ρθρ 2cos 3/2
5.0 −=∞    (4-13) 
Typical values for the density of graphite-composites, ρt, are 1.5-1.6 g/cm3. 
The equations below describe the required CFRP shielding thickness to prevent 
either detached spall or complete perforation: 
To prevent detached spallation: t ≥ 3.0 P∞ (4-14)
To prevent perforation: t ≥ 1.8 P∞ (4-15)
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For a specific CFRP shielding configuration, the ballistic limit particle size on 
threshold of a given damage mode can be determined using: 
( )( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ += 3/25.0 cos
2
θρ
ρ
VKk
mKtd
pCFRP
tMLI
c    (4-16) 
 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter on threshold of given damage mode (cm) 
k = damage parameter, either 1.8 or 3.0 for perforation and detached spall, 
respectively 
KCFRP = material parameter for CFRP = 0.52 
K2 = ballistic performance factor for MLI compared to CFRP = 4.5 
mMLI = areal density of MLI thermal blanket (g/cm2) 
P∞ Ti = penetration depth in semi-infinite titanium target (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = CFRP target density (g/cm3) 
t = CFRP thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); θ = 0° impact normal to target 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
Table 4-3 provides an overview of the range in impact conditions that the 
aluminum BLEs have been validated by hypervelocity impact test. 
Table 4-3. Application comments for CFRP ballistic limit equations 
 Validated for Applied to Comments 
Materials CFRP CFRP 
The dependence of ballistic limit on 
fiber/epoxy type, fiber volume content, 
weave type, lay-up, etc. are included in the 
parameter KCFRP which has been validated 
for a 3.8 mm thick quasi-isotropic laminate. 
For different configurations, this parameter 
may require empirical adjustment. 
Impact angle Normal (0°) Normal, oblique  
Impact velocities 5.8-6.6 km/s All  
 
4.1.5 Fiberglass Composite Single Wall Shields 
A penetration equation has been derived for a mixture of e-glass fibers and epoxy 
resin with density, ρt, of 1.8 g/cm3, from test data provided in [23]: 
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( ) 3/2
5.0
cos434.0 θρ
ρ
VdP
t
p
FG ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=     (4-17) 
To prevent perforation of the fiberglass plate, the thickness of the fiberglass is 
given by the following equation. 
FGFG Pt 8.1≥      (4-18) 
The diameter of the impacting particle that will be at the perforation of a 
fiberglass plate of thickness, tFG, is: 
( ) )3/2(
5.0
cos28.1 −
−
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= θρ
ρ
Vtd
t
p
FG     (4-19) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
PFG = penetration depth in semi-infinite fiberglass target (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = target density (g/cm3) 
tFG = thickness of fiberglass target (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); θ = 0° impact normal to target 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
4.1.6 Effect of MLI on ballistic limits 
Multi-layer insulation (MLI) thermal blankets added to the top of a single wall 
shield can have a significant effect on the ballistic performance of the shield.  For the 
case of an MLI blanket that is directly over the single wall, without a gap between the 
MLI and the single wall, the following equation can be used to find the diameter of 
the impacting particle that is a the perforation limit of the plate under the MLI (i.e., 
failure criteria = perforation of plate under the MLI): 
( ) MLIwithoutcpMLIc dVmd _63.047.0 cos2.2 += −− θρ    
 (4-20) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at threshold of shield failure (cm) 
dc_without MLI = critical projectile diameter at shield failure without MLI 
(cm) 
mMLI = areal density of the MLI blanket (g/cm2) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); θ = 0° impact normal to target 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
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4.2 Dual-Wall Whipple Shield 
The Whipple shield consists of a single bumper followed at a distance by the rear 
wall.  Generally, a MLI thermal blanket is placed on the exterior of the bumper, or in 
the space between the bumper and rear wall.  For ISS crew modules, the rear wall 
serves as a pressure shell that contains atmospheric pressure, and is therefore under 
hoop and longitudinal stress.  This stress is a relatively low fraction of the yield 
strength of the material (<25% for most ISS modules), and the presence of stress does 
not influence the protection limits of the shield (for perforation and/or detached 
spall).  The gap between the outer bumper and rear wall is under vacuum (even for 
ISS crew modules).  The function of the first wall, the “bumper”, is to break up an 
impacting MMOD particle into a cloud of material that expands while moving across 
the gap, resulting in the impactor energy and momentum being distributed over a 
wide area of the rear wall.  This approach is more mass-effective than a single-wall at 
defeating a hypervelocity MMOD particle.  However, a disadvantage is the additional 
volume needed for the Whipple shield compared to a single-wall shield.  The 
thickness and material properties of the bumper and rear wall are important in 
breaking up and eventually defeating the projectile, as summarized in the following 
section on the physics of a Whipple shield impact.  A much more extensive 
discussion of the physics underlying hypervelocity impact into spacecraft shielding 
can be found elsewhere [27-31]. 
4.2.1 Impact Physics 
A key factor governing the performance of spaced shields is the state of the debris 
cloud generated after hypervelocity impact, that is projected behind the bumper 
toward the rear wall.  The debris cloud contains a mixture of  solid, liquid and/or 
vaporized materials from the bumper and projectile depending on the impact 
pressures generated in the projectile and bumper at impact, and the thermal and 
mechanical properties of the materials involved.   Solid fragments in the debris cloud 
are generally more penetrating when they contact the rear wall then liquid or vapor.  
The higher the impact pressure, the fewer solid fragments and greater melt/vapor 
contained in the debris cloud [32].  Impact pressure increases as projectile velocity 
increases, impact obliquity angle decreases (i.e., becomes more normal), and the 
density of projectile and target increase.  
The shock waves that move through the projectile and first bumper after impact 
are complex.  The initial compressive shock wave compresses the bumper and target 
materials to high density and temperature.  Compressive waves are reflected as a 
tensile or rarefaction wave at free surfaces from the back of the bumper and sides of 
the projectile.  If the stress near the free surface exceeds the tensile strength of the 
material, spall planes will occur and material is ejected from the free surfaces. The 
rarefaction wave moves at faster speeds through high-density compressed material.  
As this material is released from high-pressure and density by the rarefaction wave, 
internal energy is raised and temperatures can exceed melting or vaporization 
temperatures.  If the bumper is too thin, the rarefaction wave will overtake the 
compressive wave moving through the projectile, degrading it and preventing a 
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portion of the projectile from being adequately shocked to induce melting or 
vaporization, resulting in solid projectile fragments.  However, if the bumper is too 
thick relative to the projectile, release of solid bumper fragments is possible.   
Figure 4-4 illustrates a typical ballistic limit curve for a Whipple shield, for 
normal impact by an aluminum sphere, and assuming the Whipple shield is made 
from an aluminum alloy.  This curve shows the critical aluminum projectile diameter 
on the threshold of shield failure.  Failure is defined as either perforation or detached 
spall from the rear wall of the shield.  The Whipple shield ballistic limit is compared 
to a monolithic, single aluminum plate of the same mass as the combined Whipple 
shield bumper and rear wall.  Three different penetration regimes are defined for a 
Whipple shield, depending on normal component velocity of the impactor, which 
determines the resulting impact pressure and state of the debris cloud: (1) deforming 
projectile regime, (2) projectile fragmentation/melt regime, and (3) projectile 
melt/vaporization regime. 
In the deforming projectile regime, below normal component impact velocities 
(Vn) of 3km/s, the impact shock pressures are so low that the projectile deforms but 
remains essentially intact after bumper impact. Some spall may occur in the 
projectile, but the projectile and bumper fragments in the debris cloud are 
characteristically solid in this velocity range.  A deformed but substantially intact 
projectile then impacts the shield’s rear wall at a substantial fraction of the initial 
impact speed (>80% for bumper thickness to projectile diameter ratio of 0.2).  
Because of this, Whipple shield performance generally suffers if impacted by 
projectiles near a normal component velocity of 3km/s.  In deforming projectile 
regime, the projectile becomes more damaging as speed increases.  Target material 
strength, hardness and thickness are important parameters influencing penetration 
resistance in this regime. 
In the projectile fragmentation/melt regime, between normal component impact 
velocities of 3 km/s and 7 km/s,  the projectile is exposed to intense enough stress 
waves and heating that it fragments.  Projectile fragmentation extent increases as 
velocity increases, and the effectiveness of the shield is predicted to increase with 
velocity in the projectile fragmentation regime.  Above about Vn of 5.5km/s, the 
projectile begins to melt [27, 29].  Thus, the debris cloud in the fragmentation/melt 
regime is composed of both solid and melted particles and droplets, with the 
proportion of melt increasing with velocity.  As the debris cloud expands across the 
space between bumper and rear wall, the rear wall is exposed to distributed point 
loads from multiple small (relative to the initial projectile size) solid fragments and 
melt particles.  Properties that influence penetration resistance in this regime include 
bumper strength, density, equation-of-state, thickness and thermodynamic properties 
(melt temperature, latent heat of fusion, etc.); bumper standoff distance from the rear 
wall; and rear wall strength and thickness.  
In the projectile melt/vaporization regime, above Vn of 7 km/s, it is assumed that 
fragmentation of the projectile has essentially reached its limit, and increases in 
projectile velocity lead to higher loading of the rear wall from a debris cloud that 
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consists mostly of molten materials.  The important shielding variables that influence 
protection performance in this regime include bumper density, thickness and 
equation-of-state; standoff distance, as well as rear wall thickness and strength. 
Above Vn of 10 km/s for aluminum-on-aluminum impacts, the temperature of some 
of the projectile material upon release from shock compressed state equals/exceeds 
the vaporization temperature for aluminum, and vaporization is complete above Vn of 
24 km/s based on one-dimensional calculations [29]. The debris cloud in this regime 
is expected to contain increasing amounts of vaporized projectile/bumper material 
above 10 km/s (for aluminum-on-aluminum impacts).   However, there is also a 
possibility the debris cloud in this regime can contain solid materials, either from the 
projectile and/or bumper, depending on bumper thickness to projectile diameter ratio.  
Table 4-4 provides a summary of CALE hydrocode calculations on the fraction of 
projectile in either solid or liquid states as a function of impact velocity, and bumper 
thickness to projectile diameter ratio (t/d).  CALE is a two-dimensional arbitrary 
Lagrangian Eulerian material dynamics computer model.   The results from the 
CALE calculations indicate for impacts at and above 8 km/s, there is a significant 
fraction of projectile material that does not reach complete melt state.  This is in 
disagreement with theory based on one-dimensional models, that aluminum 
projectiles should be completely melted above 7-8 km/s [29].  Primarily the 
explanation for this is that 2- and 3-dimensional effects include free-surface 
reflections not present in 1-dimensional calculations, that act to degrade compressive 
shock waves in the projectile, increasing the likelihood of solid fragments in the 
debris cloud.  Additionally, impact from non-spherical projectiles, depending on 
shape, can result in lower fraction of the projectile exposed to pressures that result in 
complete disruption and melting/vaporization.  The debris cloud state influences how 
shield performance is extrapolated into velocities beyond test data.  If the debris cloud 
consists mainly of molten and vaporized materials, the debris cloud produces an 
impulsive load to the rear wall which implies the rear wall thickness scales with 
impactor momentum [27].  However, if the debris cloud contains solid fragments, 
cratering results from the point loads in the debris cloud, and rear wall thickness will 
scale with impactor kinetic energy. 
For impact speeds less than 7 km/s, impact data exists to establish the 
performance limits of spacecraft shielding and materials.  Above 7 km/s, there is very 
limited experimental data.  Therefore, a conservative approach has been taken to 
Whipple shield ballistic limit equations above 7 km/s, to extrapolate to higher 
velocities with constant kinetic energy, due to the greater possibility of some solid 
material in the debris cloud with a single bumper.  For double- and multiple-bumper 
systems, which are more effective at breaking up and thermally processing projectiles 
into a debris cloud consisting of molten materials, an assumption that shield rear wall 
thickness scales with constant momentum is used  [10, 33]. 
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Figure 4-4.  Ballistic limits for equal mass monolithic and Whipple shields.  Monolithic target is 
0.44cm thick Al 6061-T6.  Whipple shield consists of 0.12 cm thick Al 6061T6 bumper followed 
at 10 cm by 0.32 cm thick Al 6061T6 rear wall. 
Table 4-4. CALE Hydrocode Results for Projectile Solid/Liquid Fraction in the Debris Cloud as 
a Function of Velocity (V) and Bumper Thickness to Projectile Diameter Ratio (t/d).  
 Fraction of  Projectile in debris cloud that is melted 
t/d V=6 km/s V=8 km/s V=10 km/s V=12 km/s V=14 km/s 
0.05 0.05 0.15 0.31 0.42 0.55 
0.1 0.05 0.28 0.55 0.75 0.89 
0.2 0.06 0.29 0.75 0.97 0.99 
0.3 0.06 0.31 0.77   
0.5 0.06 0.32 0.82   
0.8 0.06  0.95   
 
4.2.2 Whipple Shield Design Equations 
The following equations were provided in earlier work [34], and represent 
equations that can be used for preliminary design of MMOD protection using 
Whipple shields.  Additional analyses supported by tests will be necessary to show 
preliminary shield designs meet or exceed MMOD protection requirements.   Bumper 
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and rear wall thickness to defeat a given threat particle are determined by the 
following equations (assuming Vn ≥ 7 km/s).  
bpbbpbb dcmct ρρρ ==     (4-21) 
Where 
cb = coefficient 0.25 when S/d < 30, and cb = 0.2 when S/d ≥ 30 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
mp = projectile areal density (g/cm2) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρb = bumper density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing between outer bumper and rear wall (cm) 
tb = bumper thickness (cm) 
 
( ) 5.05.03/16/15.0 )70(/)( σρρ SVMdct npbpww =   (4-22) 
Where 
cw = coefficient 0.16 cm2-sec/(g2/3 km) 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
Mp = projectile mass (g) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρb = bumper density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing between outer bumper and rear wall (cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/sec) 
 
4.2.3 Whipple Shield Performance Equations 
The following equations [34] define the protection capability limits for a Whipple 
shield in terms of a critical particle size (dc) that causes failure (complete penetration 
or detached spall of the rear wall).  These equations assume that the bumper thickness 
is adequate to disrupt the projectile at high velocities, i.e., that equation 4-20 is 
satisfied (for Vn = 7 km/s).  If the bumper is too thin, then the following equations 
over-estimate the performance of the shield.  If the bumper is too thick, then the extra 
bumper mass is not effective, i.e., shield performance will not suffer, but the extra 
bumper mass will not improve shielding performance (unless the bumper becomes 
very thick, i.e., the thickness is greater than the diameter of the projectile at the 
shield’s ballistic limit). 
At higher velocities, the debris cloud impacting the rear wall will contain various 
amounts of solid, liquid and vapor components of the projectile depending on impact 
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conditions (projectile size, impact speed, obliquity, projectile density, shape and 
bumper thickness).  The critical particle size for Vn ≥ 7 km/s is given by 
( ) 3/13/13/29/13/13/2 )70/(cos918.3 σθρρ SVtd bpwc −−−=   (4-23) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
S = standoff distance from back of bumper to front of rear wall (cm) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/sec) = V cosθ 
 
At low velocities, below 3 km/s, impact shock pressures are low and the projectile 
remains essentially intact after impact on the bumper.  The shield’s rear wall is then 
impacted by a deformed or slightly fragmented projectile.  The critical particle size 
for Vn ≤ 3 km/s is given by 
( )( ) ( )[ ] )19/18(3/25.03/55.0 )(cos6.040 Vttd pbwc ρθσ +=  (4-24) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tb = bumper thickness (cm) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/sec) = V cosθ 
 
The projectile is more damaging as velocity increases in the low velocity regime, 
resulting in the critical particle size decreasing as velocity increases.  At velocities 
above Vn=3 km/s, projectile fragmentation during the collision with the bumper 
becomes significant.  Above 5.5 km/s, the projectile will begin to melt for aluminum 
on aluminum impacts [29].   A fragmenting or partially molten projectile is less 
damaging to the rear wall then a substantially intact projectile, thus critical particle 
size increases in the intermediate velocity range: 3 km/s < Vn ≤ 7 km/s: 
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( )( ) ( )[ ] [ ]
[ ] ( )75.04/)70/(071.1
)4/(75.1cos248.1/40/
3/13/19/13/13/2
)19/18(5.05.0
−×+
−×+=
−−
nbpw
npbwc
VSt
Vttd
σρρ
θρσ
 (4-25) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρb = bumper density (g/cm3) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
S = standoff distance from back of bumper to front of rear wall (cm) 
tb = bumper thickness (cm) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/sec) = V cosθ 
 
For highly oblique impacts (θ ≥ 65o), bumper fragments contribute the majority of 
damage to the rear wall.  Thus, the critical particle size for impact angles over 65o 
should be set to the critical particle size for 65o (to prevent over-prediction of the 
critical projectile diameter) as given by 
6565 => = θθ cc dd     (4-26) 
4.2.4 Whipple Shield Performance Equations as Function of Bumper 
Thickness 
Sometimes it is not practical to design Whipple shielding with bumper thickness 
satisfying equation 4-20.  In these cases, the following ballistic limit equations can be 
used to predict shield performance [35].  These equations were based on a modified 
version of JSC standard whipple shield equations [34].  For Vn ≥ 7 km/s, the critical 
particle size at failure threshold of the shield’s rear wall is given by 
( ) 3/13/13/29/13/13/23/22 )70/(cos918.3 σθρρ SVtFd bpwc −−−−=   (4-27) 
F2 is given by 
critbskmVcb dtdtwhenF n )()(;1 /72 ≥= =   (4-28) 
( ) ( ) critbskmVcbDS
c
b
DS
c
b
DS dtdtwhenrd
tr
d
trF
n
)()(;125110 /7/
2
//2 <−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+−−= =  
 (4-29) 
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The term, rS/D, is the ratio between the required rear wall thickness when no 
bumper is present, tw when tb=0, and the rear wall thickness when the bumper is 
properly sized by equation 4-20.  Note that F2 and rS/D are found once for a given 
shield configuration at Vn = 7 km/s, and values for dc and F2 will need to be found 
iteratively using equations 4-26 and 4-28.   
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
=
==
critbcbw
bw
DS dtdtwhent
twhentr
//
0
/    (4-30) 
As given in equation 4-20, (tb/d)crit values are as follows. 
( ) 30/2.0 ≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= dSwhendt
b
p
critb ρ
ρ
   (4-31) 
( ) 30/25.0 <⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= dSwhendt
b
p
critb ρ
ρ
   (4-32) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
F2 = coefficient that corrects for low tb/d ratios, and depends on dc 
ρb = bumper density (g/cm3) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
rS/D = ratio of rear wall thickness without bumper to rear wall thickness 
with bumper (equation 4-29) 
S = standoff distance from back of bumper to front of rear wall (cm) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/sec) = V cosθ 
 
The low-velocity equation in [35] is based on earlier work given in [36]:  
For Vn ≤ Vlow-lim, 
( ) )19/18(
3/2518.0796.0
/
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
∞ np
bw
c VK
tktd ρ    (4-33) 
The low-velocity to intermediate transition velocity, Vlow-lim, is defined by [37] for 
aluminum projectile on aluminum targets as 
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lim 397.0853.1
−
− ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+=
c
b
low d
tV    (4-34) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
k = constant based on rear wall failure criterion = 0.18 for perforation of 
rear wall, 0.22 for detached spall, and 0.3 for incipient attached spall of 
rear wall 
K∞ = material constant = 0.42 for aluminum alloys, and 0.25 for steel 
alloys 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
tb = bumper thickness (cm) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/sec) = V cosθ 
For normal component velocities between the low velocity limit and 7 km/s, a 
linear interpolation is used as in equation 4-24.  
4.2.5 Effect of MLI on Whipple Shield Performance Equations 
The location of the MLI thermal blanket relative to the bumper and rear wall 
effect influences the ballistic performance of Whipple shields.  MLI closer to the rear 
wall is more effective in increasing ballistic performance. 
Equations for assessing the increase in the critical particle size for Whipple 
shields with MLI are given by [10]: 
MLIccLimHin MLIwithoutdMLIwithdVVfor Δ+=≥ − ;    (4-35) 
5.0)/( SSmk MLIMLIMLIMLI =Δ    (4-36) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
∆MLI = change in critical particle size in high-velocity regime due to MLI 
(cm) 
kMLI = MLI constant = 1.4 cm3/g 
mMLI = MLI areal density (g/cm2) 
S = standoff distance from back of bumper to front of rear wall (cm) 
SMLI = gap distance from back of bumper to front of MLI (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
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VHi-Lim = intermediate to high transition velocity = 7 km/s 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
Also, when MLI is present, the low-velocity to intermediate velocity transition 
occurs earlier, i.e., 
 VLo-Lim = 2 km/s with MLI 
 VLo-Lim = 3 km/s without MLI 
 
4.2.6 Performance Equations for ISS Whipple Shields 
The approach taken to satisfy safety requirements for human-occupied spacecraft 
includes performing a final impact tests on flight-realistic hardware, after which 
updates are made to ballistic limit equations as necessary to match available impact 
data.  These BLEs are used to update MMOD risk assessments.   
Updated BLEs resulting from impact tests on ISS Whipple shields including MLI 
thermal blankets and flight realistic materials are given by the following equations.  
These equations are valid for specific shields, as defined in Table 4-5.  For these 
equations, the failure criteria is no penetration or detached spall from the rear wall. 
High-Velocity: when V ≥ VH/(cosθ)xh, 
( ) 3/23/1 cos −−= θρ VKd pHc    (4-37) 
Intermediate-Velocity: when VL/(cosθ)xl < V < VH/(cosθ)xh, 
( )( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ]xlLxhH
xh
Hxlel
pli
xl
L
xh
H
xl
Lxh
phi
c
VV
VVK
VV
VVK
d
−−
−
++−−
−−
−
+−−
−
−+
−
−
=
θθ
θθρ
θθ
θθρ
coscos
coscos
coscos
coscos
3/23/45.0
3/23/23/1
  (4-38) 
 
 
Low-Velocity: when V ≤ VL/(cosθ)xl, 
( )( ) 3/22/13/4cos −−+−= VKd pelLc ρθ    (4-39) 
There is an impact angle constraint for oblique impacts above 65o; i.e., 
( ) ( )ococ dd 6565 ==> θθ    (4-40) 
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Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
KH = high-velocity coefficient (g1/3 km2/3 s-2/3) 
Khi = high-intermediate velocity coefficient (g1/3) 
KL = low-velocity coefficient (g1/2 cm-1/2 km2/3 s-2/3) 
Kli = low-intermediate velocity coefficient (g1/2 cm-1/2) 
mMLI = MLI areal density (g/cm2) 
S = standoff distance from back of bumper to front of rear wall (cm) 
SMLI = gap distance from back of bumper to front of MLI (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
VH = intermediate to high transition velocity (km/s) 
VL = low to intermediate transition velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
el = exponent 
xl = low velocity exponent 
xh = high velocity exponent 
 
ISS Whipple shields are used in areas of the cylinder and end cones (EC) of the 
US Laboratory and Node modules, as well as the Service Module (SM) large and 
small diameter cylinder sections.  For the US Laboratory (USL) and Nodes, Whipple 
shields provide protection where MMOD impact rates are expected to be lowest, 
whereas Nextel/Kevlar stuffed Whipple shields are used where MMOD impact rates 
are higher.  Table 4-5 provides ISS Whipple shield parameters and coefficients for the 
updated ballistic limit equations. 
Table 4-5. BLE Coefficients and Shield Parameters for ISS Whipple Shields. 
 USL Cylinder 
USL End 
Cone 
Node 
Forward 
Cylinder 
Node Aft 
Cylinder 
Node End 
Cone #1 
Node End 
Cone #2 
SM Small 
Diameter 
Cylinder 
SM Large 
Diameter 
Cylinder 
Mat’l tb Al6061T6 Al6061T6 Al6061T6 Al6061T6 Al6061T6 Al6061T6 AMG-6 AMG-6 
Mat’l tw Al2219T87 Al2219T87 Al2219T87 Al2219T87 Al2219T87 Al2219T87 AMG-6 AMG-6 
tb (cm) 0.20 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.10 
S (cm) 10.7 22.2 10.7 10.9 22.2 22.1 5.0 5.0 
SMLI (cm) 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.5 4.5 
tw (cm) 0.48 0.48 0.64 0.41 0.58 0.58 0.16 0.16 
mMLI 
(g/cm2) 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.06 0.06 
KH 4.643 5.910 4.085 3.643 4.980 6.329 0.553 0.710 
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Khi 1.269 1.615 1.116 0.977 1.361 1.730 0.151 0.194 
Kli 0.892 0.891 0.685 0.524 0.679 0.736 0.074 0.093 
KL 1.168 1.168 1.262 0.687 1.078 1.169 0.154 0.194 
VH (km/s) 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
VL (km/s) 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 
xh 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
xl 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
el 
<60o; -1/3 
≥60o; -2/3 
-0.5 
<60o; -1 
≥60o; -2/3 
<60o; -1/3 
≥60o; -2/3 
<60o; -1/6 
≥60o; -2/3 
-0.5 -1/3 -1/3 
 
4.2.7 Performance Equations for ISS Node Whipple Shields 
The Whipple shields on ISS Node 2 and 3 (Node 2/3) modules are slightly 
different from the Whipple shields on Node 1.  Node 2/3 standoff distance is greater 
than in Node 1, and the MLI thermal blanket is mounted directly behind the Node 2/3 
bumper (Figure 4-5).  The reason for these differences is partly that the Node 2/3 
modules were manufactured by ESA/Alenia, while NASA/Boeing was responsible 
for Node 1 production.  Impact tests were performed on realistic samples of the Node 
2/3 Whipple shields including MLI (0.05 g/cm2), and ballistic limit equations were 
updated based on the results, using previous ESA/Alenia Whipple equations as the 
starting point for the update [38].  For these equations, failure is defined as a 
perforation (complete penetration, through-hole or through-crack) of the rear wall 
(pressure shell) or detached spall from the back of the rear wall. This failure mode 
would lead to air leak and internal fragments which endangers crew survivability.  It 
can be noted that “detached spall” without a perforation of the rear wall is not a 
common type of failure.  It is much more likely to completely penetrate the rear wall 
than to have detached spall without penetration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5.  ISS Node Whipple Shields. 
The equations given below were modified from the previous BLEs used by Alenia 
in Node 2/3 risk assessments [39], to fit results from hypervelocity impact tests.  The 
modified equations increase the predicted ballistic limits at the low and intermediate 
 
Outer bumper
2.5mm Al 6061-T6
13cm
MLI
Rear wall
4.8mm Al 2219-T87
Outer bumper
2.5mm Al 6061-T6
13cm
MLI
Rear wall
6.4mm Al 2219-T87
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velocities to fit the test data for low-obliquity impacts, but decreased at high 
velocities to fit the test data.  
Low-velocity, V ≤ VL (cosθ)x : 
 
19/18
3/25.0exp
5.0
3
)(cos
)40/(/
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +=
VK
tKtd
p
L
L
bsw
c ρθ
σ    (4-41) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
K3s = low-velocity constant 
KL = low-velocity coefficient 
tb = bumper thickness (cm) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
VL = low to intermediate transition velocity (km/s) 
expL = low-velocity angle exponent 
x = low velocity exponent 
 
High-velocity, V ≥ VH (cosθ)y : 
 ( ) ( ) 3/1exp3/23/19/13/13/23/23 cos70/ SVtKKd HbpwdHc θσρρ −−−−=  (4-42) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρb = bumper density (g/cm3) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
K3d = high-velocity constant 
KH = high-velocity coefficient 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
S = standoff distance from back of bumper to front of rear wall (cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
VH = intermediate to high transition velocity (km/s) 
expH = high-velocity angle exponent 
y = high velocity exponent 
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Intermediate-velocity, VL (cosθ)x < V < VH (cosθ)y : 
( )( )
( )( )
( )[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−×+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−×⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +=
−−−−
+
θθ
θσθρρ
θθ
θ
ρθ
σ
x
L
y
H
x
LyH
bpwdHi
x
L
y
H
y
H
p
xL
Li
bsw
c
VV
VV
StKK
VV
VV
K
tKt
d
coscos
cos
)70/(cos
coscos
cos
cos
40//
3/13/1)3/2(exp9/13/13/23/2
3
)19/18(
5.03/2exp
5.0
3
 (4-43) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρb = bumper density (g/cm3) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
K3d = high-velocity constant 
K3s = low-velocity constant 
KH = high-velocity coefficient 
KHi = high-intermediate velocity coefficient 
KL = low-velocity coefficient 
KLi = low-intermediate velocity coefficient 
tb = bumper thickness (cm) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target. 
S = standoff distance from back of bumper to front of rear wall (cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
VH = intermediate to high transition velocity (km/s) 
VL = low to intermediate transition velocity (km/s) 
expH = high-velocity angle exponent 
expL = low-velocity angle exponent 
x = low velocity exponent 
y = high velocity exponent 
 
There is a cutoff angle for oblique impacts above 65o; i.e., 
( )occo ddfor 65,65 ==> θθ    (4-44) 
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Table 4-6. Parameters for Node 2/3 Whipple Shield BLEs 
Parameter 
Value when 
θ < 60o 
Value when 
θ ≥ 60o 
VL 3.3 2.4 
x -1/3 -2/3 
expL 1/3 0.8 
KL 0.5 0.5 
K3s 0.7 0.7 
KLi 1.108 0.896 
VH 6.8 6.8 
y -0.8 -0.8 
expH -2/3 -2/3 
KH 1.1 1.1 
K3d 0.16 0.16 
KHi 0.306 0.306 
 
Figure 4-6 shows predicted ballistic limits from the Node 2/3 Whipple equations 
using the following shield conditions, as well as impact data compared to the 
predictions [38]. 
tb = 0.16cm Al 6061-T6 bumper thickness 
tw = 0.48cm Al 2219-T87 rear wall thickness 
σ = 57ksi rearwall yield strength (note, 1ksi = 1000psi = 6.895 MPa), 
ρp = 2.796g/cm3 projectile density, 
ρb = 2.713g/cm3 bumper density, 
S = 12.217cm shield standoff distance between bumper and rearwall 
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Expect failure at & above curves. 
Open data points are no failure, closed data points are failure.
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Figure 4-6. Predicted ballistic limits for Whipple shield using Node 2/3 BLEs with 0.16cm thick 
bumper, 12cm standoff, and 0.48cm thick rear wall. 
 
Figure 4-7 shows predicted ballistic limits from the Node 2/3 Whipple equations 
using the following shield conditions, as well as impact data compared to the 
predictions [38]. 
tb = 0.25cm Al 6061-T6 bumper thickness 
tw = 0.64cm Al 2219-T87 rear wall thickness 
σ = 57ksi rearwall yield strength (note, 1ksi = 1000psi = 6.895 MPa), 
ρp = 2.796g/cm3 projectile density, 
ρb = 2.713g/cm3 bumper density, 
S = 12.07cm shield standoff distance between bumper and rearwall 
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Expect failure at & above curves. 
Open data points are no failure, closed data points are failure.
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Figure 4-7. Predicted ballistic limits using Node 2/3 BLEs for a Whipple shield with 0.25cm 
bumper thickness, 12cm standoff, and 0.64cm rear wall thickness. 
 
4.3 Triple-Wall: Nextel/Kevlar Stuffed Whipple Shield 
The stuffed Whipple shield includes Nextel ceramic fabric and Kevlar high-
strength fabric as “stuffing” between an outer aluminum bumper and shield rear wall 
(or inner pressure shell) as given in Figure 4-8. This shield provides better MMOD 
protection than conventional two- or three-wall all-aluminum shielding [40, 44].  
Semi-empirical design and performance equations follow for Nextel/Kevlar stuffed 
Whipple shields [10].   
4.3.1 Stuffed Whipple Shield Design Equations 
The outer bumper thickness is given by 
bpbb dct ρρ=     (4-45) 
The areal density of the Nextel and Kevlar intermediate layer is given by 
pKNKevlarNextel dcm ρ−− =     (4-46) 
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The Nextel/Kevlar stuffing should be placed halfway between the outer bumper 
and inner rear wall.  Nextel areal density is 75% and Kevlar 25% of the total 
intermediate blanket mass per unit area.  Suitable results are obtained from Nextel4 
style AF62 and style AF10 ceramic cloths (areal densities are 0.1 g/cm2 for AF62 and 
0.027 g/cm2 for AF10) although many other Nextel styles, or other ceramic fabrics 
(such as Astroquartz), or glass cloth fabrics (e- or s-glass fabrics) can be substituted 
without loss of performance.  Kevlar fabric in a ballistic protection weave style 
(typically plain weave) provides the best protection for the high-strength layer.  HVI 
tests indicate Kevlar KM2, style 705 (0.023 g/cm2 areal density) provide best results, 
although Kevlar 29 style FDI-120 or 710 (0.032 g/cm2 areal density) also provide 
good performance.  Other high-strength fabrics such as Spectra have also 
demonstrated good performance in impact tests [10, 34]. 
The rear wall thickness is given by 
( ) 5.0215.03/1
1.1
0 )40()(cos −−−
− ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
+= σρθρ
ρ
SVM
mt
dc
ct wnp
KevlarNextelpb
p
ww  (4-47) 
Where 
co = coefficient = 0.38 
cb = coefficient = 0.15 
cN-K = coefficient = 0.23 
cw = coefficient = 8.84 s/km 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
mNextel-Kevlar = Nextel and Kevlar areal density (g/cm2) 
Mp = projectile mass (g) 
ρb = outer bumper density (g/cm3) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tb = outer bumper thickness (cm) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
                                                 
4 NextelTM is a product of the 3M Corporation. AstroquartzTM is a product of J.P. Stevens 
Company. KevlarTM is a product of the DuPont Company.  Kevlar KM2 style 705 is a Hexcel 
Schwebel Company fabric style.  Kevlar FDI-120 is a fabric style available from Fabric Development 
Incorporated. 
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Figure 4-8.  Stuffed Whipple shield cross-sectional diagram. 
 
4.3.2 Stuffed Whipple Shield Performance Equations 
The following equations predict critical particle size on the failure threshold of 
stuffed Whipple shields as a function of impact and target parameters [10].   
The equations are divided into three penetration regimes, with coefficients and 
exponents derived from test data.  The high-velocity extrapolation beyond the test 
database is based upon impact momentum scaling.  Experimental evidence through 
7.5km/s impact speeds indicates the rear wall is bulged or deflected across a relatively 
wide area, and results from exposure to blast loading by a debris cloud that contains 
finely divided particles, liquid and gas.  There are few if any craters on the rear wall 
due to larger solid fragment impact.  Previous work indicates that momentum scaling 
is appropriate for distributed blast loading of the rear wall, whereas kinetic energy 
scaling is more appropriate when the damage mechanism is cratering from point 
loads.  There is no impact cutoff angle for these equations, as the intermediate blanket 
protects the rear wall from bumper debris in highly oblique impacts. 
High-velocity, V ≥ 6.5 (cosθ)-0.75 : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 3/25.03/16/13/13/1 cos40/ SVtKd pwwSWHc −−−−= θσρρ  (4-48) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
KH-SW = 0.6 (km1/3 s-1/3) when mNextel-Kevlar = 0.25mshield to 0.35mshield 
 
Outer Bumper
• disrupt projectile
S1 = S/2 Ceramic Fabric Layer
• disrupt, melt/vaporize debris cloud fragments
High-Strength Fabric Layer
• slow expansion of debris cloud
• stop residual fragments
• do not contribute damaging material in debris cloud
θ
Projectile:
Diameter d
Velocity V
Impact angle θ
S2 = S/2
Rear Wall
• Resist impulsive loading
• Resist fragment penetration
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KH-SW = 0.45 (km1/3 s-1/3) when mNextel-Kevlar = 0.1mshield to 0.15mshield 
mNextel-Kevlar = Nextel and Kevlar areal density (g/cm2) 
mshield = overall shield areal density (g/cm2)  
mshield = mbumper + mNextel-Kevlar + mrear-wall 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Low-velocity, V ≤ 2.6 (cosθ)-0.5 : 
 ( ) ( )[ ]totalbLwpSWLc mCtVKd −−−−− += 5.05.03/43/2 40/cos σρθ   (4-49) 
Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
KL-SW = 2.35 (g0.5 km2/3 cm-3/2 s-2/3)  
mb-total = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities of 
the outer bumper, Nextel, Kevlar and MLI (g/cm2):  
mb-total = mb + mNextel + mKevlar + mMLI 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.6 (cosθ)-0.5 < V < 6.5 (cosθ)-0.75 : 
( )[ ]
( )
( )[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−×+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−×⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +=
−−
−
−−
−
−−
−
−−
θθ
θσθρρ
θθ
θ
ρθ
σ
5.075.0
5.0
6/13/225.03/13/1
5.075.0
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5.0
5.0
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)40/(cos)(
cos6.2cos5.6
cos5.6
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40/
VStK
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pwwSWHi
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c
 (4-50) 
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Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρb = bumper density (g/cm3) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
KHi-SW = 0.321 when mNextel-Kevlar = 0.25mshield to 0.35mshield 
KHi-SW = 0.241 when mNextel-Kevlar = 0.1mshield to 0.15mshield 
KLi-SW = 1.243 (g0.5 cm-3/2 )  
mb-total = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities of 
the outer bumper, Nextel, Kevlar and MLI (g/cm2):  
mb-total = mb + mNextel + mKevlar + mMLI 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Table 4-7 provides impact test data on a variety of stuffed Whipple designs (see 
Table 4-8 for definition of the shields).  Note tests were performed on all-aluminum, 
three-wall shields of the same mass per unit area as a Nextel/Kevlar stuffed Whipple 
shield.  Most tests were conducted on 2-stage light-gas guns, with velocities of 
7.5km/s and less.  Some tests were conducted at impact speeds of over 11km/s with 
an inhibited shaped charge launcher (ISCL) at Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) 
[40, 41].  Other tests were performed at 10km/s with a thin-plate hypervelocity 
launcher (HVL) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) [41].  The data clearly shows 
that Nextel/Kevlar intermediate bumpers provide protection advantages over an 
equivalent mass aluminum intermediate layer.  Figure 4-9 provides ballistic limit 
curves and impact data for a specific stuffed Whipple shield design, namely one with 
an overall standoff of 10.7cm, containing a 0.2cm Al 6061-T6 bumper followed by a 
Nextel/Kevlar blanket consisting of 6 Nextel AF62 layers and 6 Kevlar 710 layers, 
and a 0.48cm Al 2219-T87 rear wall. 
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Table 4-7. Stuffed Whipple and All-Aluminum Shield Impact Data [10] 
Type 
Shield 
AD 
(g/cm2) 
Spacing 
(cm) Test No. 
Proj. 
Dia. 
(cm) 
Proj. 
Mass 
(g) 
Velocity 
(km/s) 
Impact 
angle 
(deg) 
Rear Wall Damage 
Nextel/Kevlar Stuffed Whipple Ballistic Limit Data 
SW-2 2.16 11.4 MSFC 1455 1.27 3.00 5.82 0 Perf: 1.6cm 
SW-3 1.78 7.6 SNL-HVL-6 0.73 0.56 10.10 45 No Perf 
SW-4 2.67 11.4 JSC B654 1.00 1.46 6.84 0 No Perf, v.slight dish 
SW-Lab 2.78 11.4 ARC2139 1.19 2.49 7.03 0 No Perf, bulge 
SW-Lab 2.78 11.4 ARC2141 1.27 3.01 7.03 0 No Perf, 1.7cm bulge 
SW-Lab 2.78 11.4 JSC B890 0.95 1.27 2.94 0 No Perf, bump 
SW-Lab 2.78 11.4 JSC B875 1.00 1.47 4.87 0 No Perf, no bulge 
SW-Lab 2.78 11.4 ARC2140 1.19 2.49 7.07 45 No Perf, slight bulge 
SW-Lab 2.78 11.4 ARC2127 1.59 5.87 5.2 60 No Perf, small craters 
SW-
cupola 
2.21 17.78 JSC 20274 1.27 3.00 6.68 0 No Perf, deep bulge 
SW-
cupola 
2.21 17.78 JSC 20310 1.27 3.00 6.82 45 No Perf, bulge 
SW-ATV 1.37 12.7 JSC 20254 0.71 0.53 7.0 0 No Perf, slight bulge 
Comparison tests between Nextel/Kevlar and all-Aluminum shields 
SW-1 1.75 7.6 JSC B305 0.95 1.26 6.70 45 No Perf, bulge 7mm 
All-Al-1 1.82 7.6 JSC B562 0.71 0.52 6.42 45 Perf: 4mm, cracks 
All-Al-1 1.82 7.6 JSC B560 0.71 0.52 6.94 45 Perf, 15mm cracks 
All-Al-1 1.82 7.6 JSC B563 0.67 0.44 6.96 45 No Perf, bulge, BL 
SW-2 2.16 11.4 JSC B536 1.00 1.46 6.85 15 No Perf, slight dish 
SW-2 2.16 11.4 JSC B537 1.00 1.46 4.86 15 No Perf, crater 
All-Al-2 2.66 11.4 JSC B535 0.95 1.26 6.64 15 Perf, 32mm crack 
SW-1 1.75 7.6 JSC B549 1.00 1.46 6.60 60 No Perf, bulge 6mm 
All-Al-3 1.73 7.6 JSC B520 0.75 0.62 6.99 60 Perf, 6x5mm 
SW-3 1.78 7.6 SwRI-ISCL-5993-10 0.85 0.87 11.18 0 No Perf, bulge, BL 
All-Al-3 1.73 7.6 SwRI-ISCL-5993-12 0.84 0.84 11.03 0 
Perf: 4.3cm petalled 
hole 
SW-3 1.78 7.6 SwRI-ISCL-5993-14 1.01 1.46 11.42 45 No Perf, bulge 
All-Al-3 1.73 7.6 SwRI-ISCL-5993-13 0.92 1.11 11.32 45 
Perf, large petalled 
hole 
SW-3 1.78 7.6 SNL-HVL-5 0.74 0.56 10.0 0 No Perf 
All-Al-3 1.78 7.6 SN-HVL-3 0.81 0.75 10.2 0 Perforated 
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Table 4-8. Shield Parameters for Stuffed Whipple and Al-Aluminum Impact Tests 
Type 
Shield 
overall 
areal 
density 
(g/cm2) 
Spacing 
(cm) 
Bumper 
thickness, 
tb (cm)* 
Inter- 
mediate 
areal 
density 
(g/cm2) 
Intermediate 
bumper description 
Rear wall 
thickness, 
tw (cm) 
Rear wall 
material 
Nextel/Kevlar Stuffed Whipple Shields 
SW-1 1.75 7.6 0.1 0.56 
Mesh, 4 Nextel 
AF62, 4 Kevlar 710 0.32 Al 2219T87 
SW-2 2.16 11.4 0.16 0.82 Mesh, 6 Nextel AF62, 6 Kevlar 710 0.48 Al 2219T87 
SW-3 1.78 7.6 0.13 0.53 4 Nextel AF62, 4 Kevlar 710 0.32 Al 2219T87 
SW-4 2.67 11.4 0.19 0.79 6 Nextel AF62, 6 Kevlar 710  0.48 Al 2219T87 
SW-Lab 2.78 11.4 0.2 0.85 MLI, 6 Nextel AF62, 6 Kevlar 710 0.48 Al 2219T87 
SW-
cupola 2.21 17.8 0.2 0.97 
3 Nextel AF62, 
1.27mm Al 6061T6, 
14 Kevlar KM2 705 
0.25 Al 6061T6 
SW-ATV 1.37 12.7 0.13 0.12 
2 Nextel AF10, 3 
Kevlar KM2 705 0.32 Al 2219T87 
All-Aluminum Shields 
All-Al-1 1.82 7.6 0.13 0.56 0.2cm Al 2024T3 0.32 Al 2219T87 
All-Al-2 2.66 11.4 0.19 0.91 0.32cm Al 2219T87 0.48 Al 2219T87 
All-Al-3 1.73 7.6 0.1 0.54 0.2cm Al 6061T6 0.32 Al 2219T87 
* Note, all bumpers are Al 6061-T6 alloy 
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Figure 4-9.  Stuffed Whipple ballistic limits. 0.2cm Al 6061T6 bumper, 6 Nextel AF62 + 6 
Kevlar 710 intermediate bumper, 10.7cm overall standoff, 0.48cm Al 2219T87 rear wall. 
4.4 All-Aluminum Triple-Wall Shield 
The all-aluminum triple-wall shield consists of two separate bumpers followed by 
a rear wall.  The following equations are referred to as “ESA triple-wall” equations, 
and are adapted from the NASA Whipple equations (Eq. 4-23 through 4-25) with 
ESA coefficients [48, p.3-10].  The failure criteria is perforation or detached spall 
from the rear wall.  The general form of the equation is given below.   Note this 
equation is applied to both high and low velocity regimes, with parameters defined in 
Tables 4-9 and 4-10.  
 
λ
υδκξγβ
ϑμ
ρρθρ
ρ /1
1
1
2
2
)(cos ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅
⋅⋅+=
bwp
bbw
c SVK
tKtd    (4-51) 
For impact velocities in the transition region, i.e., when impact velocity is 
between VL and VH, linear interpolation is used to calculate the ballistic limit, as 
follows:  
 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−⋅+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−⋅= ==
LH
Ln
VVc
LH
nH
VVcc VV
VVd
VV
VVdd
HnLn ,,    (4-52) 
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Table 4-9. Triple-Wall Damage Equation Terms 
Symbol Unit Description 
tw cm Thickness of rear wall 
tb cm Combined thickness of all bumpers 
K1, K2 - Equation specific characteristic factors 
dc cm 
critical projectile diameter at shield failure 
threshold 
ρp, ρb, ρw g/cm3 Density of projectile, bumper, rear wall 
V km/s Impact velocity 
Vn km/s Normal component impact velocity = Vcosθ 
VL km/s Lower velocity limit = 3 km/s 
VH km/s High velocity limit = 7 km/s 
θ deg Impact angle with respect to surface normal 
S cm Space between outer bumper and rear wall 
σw ksi Rear wall yield stress 
 
Table 4-10. Parameter Values for the Triple-Wall Ballistic Limit Equation 
Velocity 
Regime 
(km/s) 
K1 K2 λ β γ κ δ, ξ υ1, υ2, μ 
Vn < 3 0.312 (40/σw)0.5 1.667 K1 1.056 0.5 2/3 0 0, 5/3 0, 0, 1 
Vn > 7 0.107 (70/σw)0.5 0 1.5 0.5 1 0 -0.5, 1 0.167, 0, 0 
 
4.5 Multi-Shock Shields 
Multi-shock (MS) shields are defined as a combination of four ceramic fabric 
bumpers followed by either an aluminum or Kevlar rear wall (Figure 4-10).  Ceramic 
bumpers produce higher shock pressures in the projectile than aluminum, which 
translates into better projectile breakup [10, 42, 43].  Fabric ceramic bumpers are 
more damage tolerant than monolithic (solid) ceramic layers which tend to 
disintegrate upon impact.  Fabrics do not generate much (or any) secondary ejecta 
compared to conventional aluminum materials, and therefore greatly reduce any 
contribution to the orbital debris environment population when impacted.  Thus 
fabrics are more suitable for spacecraft shielding applications than solid bumpers. 
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Figure 4-10. Multi-shock shield configurations. 
Table 4-9 shows that MS shields are more effective than Whipple shields at 
protecting from hypervelocity impacts.  Multiple bumpers are more successful at 
MMOD protection because they provide greater breakup of hypervelocity projectiles 
than equivalent weight single bumpers.  Multiple bumper shield systems are more 
efficient than single bumpers at converting projectile kinetic energy to internal energy 
within the projectile which causes increased melting and vaporization of the 
projectile, thereby decreasing the size and number of solid particles impacting the 
rear wall.  Multiple layer shields also decrease the expansion speed of the debris 
cloud, which decreases loading of the rear wall.  These attributes contribute to the 
effectiveness of MS shields.  
A ceramic fabric used in the MS shield is NextelTM, although other ceramic 
fabrics or glass-fiber fabrics can be used, with little to no adverse effect on shielding 
performance.  The important parameter to control is the overall mass per unit area of 
the bumpers, in relation to the projectile mass per unit area that the shield is designed 
to stop, typically at the average impact velocity and angle conditions experienced on-
orbit, or for a standard test condition of 7km/s at impact angle of 0o (or normal to the 
shield). 
 
Aluminum rear wall
standoff
Ceramic or glass fabric bumpers
Kevlar or high-strength fabric rear wall
standoff
Ceramic or glass fabric bumpers
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Table 4-11. Comparison of Whipple, Multi-Shock and Mesh Double-Bumper Shield Impact Data  
Table provides the shield mass per unit area that resulted in no perforation or detached spall of 
rear wall (i.e., no failure) for the given projectile diameter and mass. All impact tests occurred at 
6-7 km/s for Al 2017-T4 spherical projectiles of given diameter at the indicated impact angle. 
Overall Shield 
Spacing (cm) 
Impact Angle 
(deg) Whipple Shield 
Multi-Shock 
Shield 
Mesh Double-
Bumper Shield 
  Shield Areal Density (g/cm2) and [test number] 
0.32 cm (0.045 g) aluminum projectile 
5 0o 
1.12  
[JSC-A1464] 
0.53 
[JSC-A624] 
0.41 
[JSC-A963] 
10 0o 
0.60 
[JSC-A235] 
0.29 
[JSC-A1231] 
0.25 
[JSC-A1285] 
10 45o 
1.50 
[JSC-A1195] 
0.31 
[JSC-A1317] 
0.36 
[JSC-A1069] 
0.64 cm (0.37 g) aluminum projectile 
10 0o 
2.07 
[JSC-B128] 
1.10 
[JSC-B112] 
0.94 
[JSC-B77] 
20 0o 
0.96 
[JSC-B31] 
0.63 
[JSC-B70] 
0.64 
[JSC-B27] 
0.95 cm (1.3 g) aluminum projectile 
30 0o 
1.35 
[ARC-1895] 
1.02 
[UDRI 4-1293] 
1.08 
[UDRI 4-1172] 
 
4.5.1 Multi-Shock Shield Design Equations 
The following equations are used to size MS shield elements for impacts with 
velocity greater than 6.4 cos-0.25θ km/s and S/d > 15.  In these equations, the 
combined areal density of all four bumpers is given by mb, and the overall spacing 
from outermost bumper to the rear wall is given by S.  The combined areal density for 
all bumpers is approximately equal to the areal density of the single bumper in a 
Whipple shield, designed for the same impact conditions.  The rear wall of the MS 
shield is significantly less than for the Whipple shield.  Major weight savings can be 
obtained by reducing the rear wall thickness for stopping a given threat particle, 
especially when sufficient spacing is available (S ≥ 30d).  The areal density of all four 
bumpers in the MS shield is given by: 
 pb dm ρ185.0=        (4-53) 
The thickness of an aluminum rear wall is determined by the following equation, 
where k = 41.6 s/km and normalized rear wall yield strength, σ’ = σ/40 (unitless). 
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 5.021 '−−−= σρ SVMkt wnw      (4-54) 
The mass per unit area of a Kevlar rear wall is determined by the following 
equation, where K = 29 s/km.  Good shield performance is obtained using Kevlar 
KM2 (style 705 or 706), or Kevlar 29 (style 710 or FDI-120)5. 
 2−= SVMKm nw      (4-55) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
k = coefficient = 41.6 (s/km) 
K = coefficient = 29 (s/km) 
mb = bumper areal density (g/cm2) 
M = projectile mass (g) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
σ’ = normalized rear wall yield stress = σ/40 (unitless) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
4.5.2 Performance Equations for MS Shields with Aluminum Rear Wall 
The following equations provide the impacting particle size at the failure 
threshold of a MS Shield with an aluminum rear wall.  Failure is defined as a 
perforation or detached spall of the rear wall.  It should be noted that rear wall 
perforation is the primary failure mode. Detached spall of the rear wall has not been 
observed in impact tests on MS shields.   
High-velocity, V ≥ 6.4 (cosθ)-0.25 : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 3/23/13/16/13/13/1 cos40/ SVtKd pwwMSHc −−−−= θσρρ  (4-56) 
                                                 
5 KevlarTM is a product of the DuPont Company.  Kevlar KM2 style 705 is a Hexcel Schwebel 
Company fabric style.  Kevlar FDI-120 is a fabric style available from Fabric Development 
Incorporated. 
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Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
KH-MS = 0.358 (km1/3 s-1/3)  
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall 0.2% offset tensile yield stress (ksi) (note 1ksi=1000 lbf/in2 = 
6.895 MPa) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Low-velocity, V ≤ 2.4 (cosθ)-0.5 : 
( ) ( )[ ]bLwpMSLc mCtVKd += −−−− 5.05.03/43/2 40/cos σρθ   (4-57) 
Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
KL-MS = 2.0 (g0.5 km2/3 cm-3/2 s-2/3)  
mb = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities of all 
four bumpers (g/cm2) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.4 (cosθ)-0.5 < V < 6.4 (cosθ)-0.25 : 
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 (4-58) 
Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρb = bumper density (g/cm3) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
KHi-MS = 0.193  
KLi-MS = 1.12 (g0.5 cm-3/2 )  
mb = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities of all 
four bumpers (g/cm2) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
  No limits are necessary on oblique impacts because the ceramic bumpers do not 
produce damaging fragments.  Ceramic fabric debris from the bumpers consist of 
short fibers up to a few millimeters long which are ejected in a normal direction 
toward subsequent bumpers and rear wall, but are not very damaging and do not 
penetrate lower level shield layers.  Figure 4-11 provides the expected performance of 
a MS shield using the above equations with an aluminum rear wall, 0.31 g/cm2 total 
areal density, and 10 cm overall standoff. 
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Figure 4-11. Multi-shock shield ballistic limit curves. MS consists of 4 Nextel AF26 bumpers 
(0.043 g/cm2 each), 0.051cm Al 2024T3 rear wall, 2.54cm gap between bumpers, 10.2cm overall 
spacing. 
 
4.5.3 Performance Equations for MS Shields with Kevlar Rear Wall 
The following equations provide the impacting particle size at the failure 
threshold of a MS Shield with a Kevlar rear wall.  Failure is defined as a perforation 
of the rear wall.  Kevlar KM2 (style 705 or 706) or Kevlar 29 style 710 can be used as 
rear wall materials.  
High-velocity, V ≥ 6.4 (cosθ)-0.25 : 
 ( ) 3/23/13/13/13/1 cos SVmKd pwMSHc −−−−= θρ  (4-59) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
KH-MS = 0.41 (km1/3 s-1/3)  
mw = areal density of rear wall (g/cm2) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
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Low-velocity, V ≤ 2.4 (cosθ)-0.5 : 
( ) [ ]bLwwpMSLc mCmCVKd += −−−− 5.03/43/2 cos ρθ   (4-60) 
Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
CW = rear wall coefficient = 0.5 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
KL-MS = 2.7 (g0.5 km2/3 cm-3/2 s-2/3)  
mb = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities of all 
four bumpers (g/cm2) 
mw = rear wall areal density (g/cm2) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.4 (cosθ)-0.5 < V < 6.4 (cosθ)-0.25 : 
[ ]
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p
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c
 (4-61) 
Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
CW = rear wall coefficient = 0.5 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρb = bumper density (g/cm3) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
KHi-MS = 0.221 
KLi-MS = 1.506 (g0.5 cm-3/2 )  
mb = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities of all 
four bumpers (g/cm2) 
mw = rear wall areal density (g/cm2) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
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θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
4.6 Hybrid Multi-Shock Shield 
Hybrid multi-shock (MS) shields are defined as a combination of multiple 
ceramic fabric and aluminum layers, specifically two separate layers of ceramic fabric 
followed by two separate aluminum layers.  Hybrid MS shields are considered for 
applications where the protection capability of Whipple shields is improved in a 
relatively uncomplicated way by adding two NextelTM ceramic fabric layers over an 
aluminum 2-sheet Whipple shield (Figure 4-12).  The two outer Nextel bumpers and 
the aluminum bumper are all equally spaced from each other.  The spacing between 
the aluminum bumper and aluminum rear wall is twice the inter-bumper spacing.  
Both Nextel bumpers together contain approximately the same areal density as the 
aluminum bumper, while the rear wall is approximately twice the areal density of the 
aluminum bumper.  Hypervelocity impact testing to derive the hybrid multi-shock 
shield ballistic limit equations below focused on two types of shields: 
(1) A 20cm overall standoff (1.05 g/cm2) hybrid shield with 2 Nextel BF54 
bumpers (0.108 g/cm2 each), a 0.1cm Al 6061-T6 bumper, and a 0.18cm 
Al 6061-T6 rear wall. 
(2) A 7.6cm overall standoff (0.42 g/cm2) hybrid shield with 2 Nextel AF26 
bumpers (0.043 g/cm2 each), a 0.041cm Al 6061-T6 bumper, and a 
0.081cm Al 6061-T6 rear wall.  This shield was a 40% scale model of the 
shield described in item 1 above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-12. Hybrid Nextel/Aluminum Multi-Shock Shield. 
 
Aluminum rear wall
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S/4
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Ballistic limit equations for the hybrid shield are given below based on analysis of 
about 50 hypervelocity impact tests conducted by NASA on hybrid shields.  
High-velocity, V ≥ 6.5 (cosθ)-2/3 : 
 ( ) ( ) 3/13/13/23/23/13/2 40/cos15.2 σθρ SVmd pwc −−−=  (4-62) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
mw = areal density of rear wall (g/cm2) = tw ρw 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Low-velocity, V ≤ 2.7 (cosθ)-0.5 : 
( ) ( )[ ]bLwpxc mCtVd += −−− 5.05.03/2 40/cos2 σρθ   (4-63) 
Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
mb = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities of all 
three bumpers (g/cm2) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
x = 7/3 when θ ≤ 45o, x = 2 when θ > 45o 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.7 (cosθ)-0.5 < V < 6.5 (cosθ)-(2/3) : 
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 (4-64) 
Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
mb = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities of all 
three bumpers (g/cm2) 
mw = areal density of rear wall (g/cm2) = tw ρw 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
x = 7/3 when θ ≤ 45o, x = 2 when θ > 45o 
 
 For oblique impact angles over 75o, use the critical diameter calculated at 75o; 
that is, for θ > 75o: dc = dc (θ=75o). 
 
4.7 Mesh Double-Bumper (MDB) Shield 
The mesh double-bumper (MDB) shield comprises four components (Figure 4-
13): (1) a mesh bumper, (2) a continuous bumper, (3) a high-strength fabric 
intermediate layer, and (4) a rear wall.  The mesh provides an efficient method to 
breakup projectiles.  It can be placed a short distance in front of the continuous 
bumper as shown in Figure 4-13, or directly on or under the continuous bumper.  Due 
to the overlap of the wires, it provides the same breakup capability as a thicker 
continuous bumper.  Hypervelocity impact tests demonstrated that the spread angle of 
the debris cloud after impact on a wire mesh is greater than an equivalent areal 
density solid aluminum bumper [45, 46].  Bumper fragments from mesh bumpers are 
smaller and less damaging to the rear wall due to the small wire diameter.  
The multiple shocks created by the mesh and continuous bumper increases 
disruption as well as the thermal state of the projectile, compared to a Whipple shield.  
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This is evident from experimental results, where far more melt was present on the 
rear wall from mesh double-bumper tests compared to conventional Whipple or 3-
metallic plate shield tests, and was also evident in computational studies [33, 45].   
From analytical studies [10], the Kevlar or Spectra high-strength fabrics used in the 
intermediate layer slow and defeat fragments in the debris cloud, and reduce the 
expansion speed of the debris cloud.  These high-strength, low-density materials work 
well lower down in the shield, near the rear wall.  However, these materials are not 
effective as an outer bumper because they have poor projectile breakup 
characteristics, particularly when exposed to impact by glass, aluminum and higher 
density projectiles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-13. Mesh double-bumper shield. 
 
4.7.1 MDB Shield Design Equations 
The following equations are used to size the thickness and mass per unit area of 
the MDB shield elements given in Figure 4-13.  These equations are applied when the 
impact velocity component (V cos1/3θ) is greater than 6.4 km/s. Generally, the 
particle diameter, d (cm), which the shield is designed to stop at average impact 
conditions is used to size the shields.   
The mesh areal density is given by: 
 pmesh dm ρ04.0=        (4-65) 
 
Mesh Bumper
• disrupt projectile, spread debris cloud, reduce secondary ejecta
S1 = 4d
High-Strength Fabric Layer
• decrease debris cloud expansion
• stop residual fragments
θ
Projectile:
Diameter d
Velocity V
Impact angle θ
Rear Wall
• Resist impulsive loading
• Resist fragment penetration
Continuous Second Bumper
• disrupt fragments, melt/vaporize fragments
S2 = 4d
S (overall standoff)
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The mesh has wires in a square pattern with a wire diameter to projectile diameter 
ratio of from 0.07 to 0.10. As an example, the mesh used in some of the screening 
tests using a 0.32cm diameter aluminum projectile [46] consisted of 0.3mm diameter 
aluminum 5056 wires in a square pattern, 0.051 g/cm2 areal density, with 30 by 30 
wires every 2.5cm by 2.5cm, and a 0.56mm gap between wires.  Aluminum and steel 
mesh bumpers have been used with good success.  Steel mesh is used to improve the 
capability of International Space Station module shields, such as on the FGB module 
“Zarya” [47].    
The first to second bumper spacing is four times the projectile diameter: S1 = 4d. 
The continuous aluminum bumper is sized by the following equation.  
 pbumperAl dm ρ093.0_ =       (4-66) 
A high-strength fabric intermediate layer, for example Kevlar KM2 or Spectra 
fabric, is mounted a distance S2 = 4d in front of the rear wall.  For the Kevlar or 
Spectra intermediate bumper, the areal density is determined using the following 
equation.  
 pKevlar dm ρ064.0=        (4-67) 
If Nextel cloth is used for the intermediate layer, the areal density is:  
 pNextel dm ρ095.0=        (4-68) 
The rear wall areal density to prevent perforation and detached spall is determined 
by:  
 5.02/3 '−−= σSVMCm nww       (4-69) 
Where 
Cw = coefficient = 9 (cm-1/2 km-1 s) 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
mAl_bumper = continuous aluminum bumper areal density (g/cm2) 
mKevlar = Kevlar areal density (g/cm2) 
mmesh = mesh areal density (g/cm2) 
mNextel = Nextel areal density (g/cm2) 
mw = rear wall areal density (g/cm2) 
M = projectile mass (g) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
σ’ = normalized rear wall yield stress = σ/40 (unitless) 
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θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
4.7.2 MDB Shield Performance Equations 
The following equations provide the impacting particle size at the failure 
threshold of a MDB shield.  Failure is defined as a perforation or detached spall of the 
rear wall.     
High-velocity, V ≥ 6.4 (cosθ)-1/3 : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2/13/13/16/13/13/1 cos40/6.0 SVtd pwwc −−−= θσρρ  (4-70) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall 0.2% offset tensile yield stress (ksi) (note 1ksi=1000 lbf/in2 = 
6.895 MPa) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Low-velocity, V ≤ 2.8 (cosθ)-0.5 : 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]KbLwpc mmCtVd ++= −−− 5.05.03/53/2 40/cos2.2 σρθ   (4-71) 
Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
mb = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities the 
mesh and continuous aluminum bumper = m1 + m2 (g/cm2) 
mK = intermediate bumper (Kevlar or Spectra) areal density (g/cm2)  
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
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tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.8 (cosθ)-0.5 < V < 6.4 (cosθ)-1/3 : 
( )[ ]
( )
( )[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−×+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−×⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ++=
−−
−
−−
−−
−
θθ
θσθρρ
θθ
θ
ρθ
σ
5.03/1
5.0
6/12/19/23/13/1
5.03/1
3/1
5.03/4
5.0
cos8.2cos4.6
cos8.2
)40/(cos)(323.0
cos8.2cos4.6
cos4.6
cos
)(40/11.1
VSt
VmmCtd
pww
p
KbLw
c  (4-72) 
Where 
CL = low velocity coefficient = 0.37 (cm3/g) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at shield failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρw = rear wall density (g/cm3) 
mb = total bumper areal density and is the sum of the areal densities the 
mesh and continuous aluminum bumper = m1 + m2 (g/cm2) 
mK = intermediate bumper (Kevlar or Spectra) areal density (g/cm2)  
S = overall spacing (gap distance) between outer bumper and rear wall 
(cm) 
σ = rear wall yield stress (ksi) 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
  No limits are necessary on oblique impacts because the Kevlar/Spectra 
intermediate blanket provides protection to the rear wall from damaging bumper 
fragments. 
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5 Equations for Predicting Protection Limits of Thermal Protection 
System (TPS) Materials 
A number of spacecraft are capable of returning crew and/or cargo to Earth, 
including the Space Shuttle Orbiter vehicle, the planned Orion Crew Exploration 
Vehicle (CEV), several return vehicles designed for use on Space Station, and science 
related experiment return capsules.  Various types of thermal protection system (TPS) 
materials cover these spacecraft to protect them during return to Earth and the heating 
associated with atmospheric entry.  Penetration and ballistic limit equations are 
required to predict the expected damage from hypervelocity MMOD particles and 
quantify associated risk.  This section provides penetration equations for high-
temperature TPS materials including ceramic tiles, reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC), 
and ablators.  Results from hypervelocity impact tests were used in the derivation of 
these equations, details of which are reported elsewhere [49-52].   
5.1 TPS Failure Criteria 
MMOD risk assessments for reentry vehicles rely on TPS failure criteria defined 
by technical assessments of TPS allowable damage extent.  These assessments 
generally include (a) evaluation of thermal conditions within the damaged TPS and 
underlying substructure, (b) determination of whether TPS damage will grow during 
reentry, (c) evaluation of whether the substructure, internal components and the 
overall vehicle will survive the elevated temperatures and thermal/structural loading 
during reentry.  Depending on the local heating environment and type of TPS, 
superficial TPS damage could lead to loss of vehicle during reentry (i.e., damage that 
only penetrates part way through the TPS).  Greater levels of TPS damage are 
generally allowed where heating is lower during reentry.    
TPS damage detection and repair can improve reentry survivability.  If critical 
TPS damage is found and mitigated prior to reentry, then the failure criteria for loss 
of vehicle generally shifts from TPS damage to substructure penetration or internal 
component damage (i.e., the new failure criteria can become damage to internal 
components that is an immediate hazard for survivability on-orbit, or to damage that 
cannot be mitigated via repair).    
There is a need therefore, for ballistic limit equations that predict MMOD damage 
extent to TPS, to TPS/substructure, and to internal components behind the 
TPS/substructure.  These ballistic limit equations define projectile size at the 
threshold of the maximum allowable damage to the TPS. 
5.2 Low-Density Ceramic Tile Penetration Equations 
Penetration equations are reported below for low-density tiles: (1) LI-900 and LI-
2200 tile (without TUFI coating), and (2) TUFI coated AETB-8 tile.  These equations 
are valid for impact damage that extends down to, but not past the bondline between 
the tile and strain isolation pad (SIP).    
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5.2.1 LI-900 and LI-2200 Tile Penetration Equations 
Penetration data from tests on two typical ceramic tiles used on Shuttle were 
regressed to develop a penetration equation into the tile (Equation 4-1): standard low-
density (LI-900) and high-density (LI-2200) tiles [49, 50].  The nominal bulk density 
of LI-900 material is 0.14 g/cm3 whereas LI-2200 nominal density is 0.35 g/cm3.  The 
tiles are composed of compacted 1.5 micron diameter, 99.6% pure, silica fibers fused 
with colloidal silica during a high-temperature sintering process.  LI-2200 contains an 
additional 2% by weight dispersed silicon-carbide particles.  The tiles have a 
borosilicate glass coating on top and sides, 0.2mm to 0.38mm thick with a 2.4 g/cm3 
density. 
The tiles were bonded to an aluminum substrate.  The penetration equations are 
not valid for tiles without a backing, which would be subject to spall on the backside 
of the tile.  Hypervelocity impact tests were conducted on LI-900 and LI-2200 tiles 
bonded with RTV adhesive to a 0.4cm thick (0.18 g/cm2) Nomex felt strain isolation 
pad (SIP), which is itself bonded with RTV adhesive to an aluminum plate or 
aluminum honeycomb panel that simulates the vehicle substrate.  At the bondline 
with the SIP, the tiles have been densified by application of a ceramic slurry to the 
bottom which fills voids between fibers and provides a strengthened bonding surface 
for the SIP.  The densification adds approximately 0.15 g/cm2 and provides a 0.5mm 
thick layer that is hard and strong.  The density gradually decreases toward the 
interior of the tile with most of the densified material remaining within 2.5mm from 
the bonding surface.   
An equation relating penetration depth in the tile to projectile parameters is as 
follows: 
( ) ( ) [ ]98.0cos/27.1 23/25.0 == RVdP tp θρρ    (5-1) 
Rearranging this equation: 
( ) ( ) 3/25.0 cos/79.0 −−= θρρ VPd tpcc     (5-2) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at threshold of critical penetration depth 
(cm) 
P = penetration depth into tile (cm) 
Pc = critical penetration depth at failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = target density (g/cm3) 
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θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Other equations are given below for entry hole diameter in the tile (Dh), surface 
coating spall diameter (Ds), and maximum cavity diameter (Dc). 
( ) 3/23/2 sin45.014.2 θ+= VdDh     (5-3) 
( ) 3/23/2 sin78.098.2 θ+= VdDs     (5-4) 
( ) 3/23/23/1 sin25.0185.1 θρ += VdD pc    (5-5) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
Dh = Entry hole diameter for crater in tile, excluding any coating spall 
present (cm).  Note, for elliptical holes, Dh is the equivalent circular hole 
diameter with equivalent area as the elliptical entry hole, Dh = (D_max * 
D_min)0.5 
Ds = Diameter of surface coating spall; i.e., the area where the borosilicate 
glass coating is removed (cm) 
Dc = Maximum diameter of crater (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
5.2.2 TUFI-coated AETB-8 Tile Penetration Equations 
Alumina Enhanced Thermal Barrier (AETB) tiles with toughened unipiece 
fibrous insulation (TUFI) coating were developed at the NASA Ames Research 
Center as an improvement to the LI-900 tile.  The TUFI coating is similar to the 
densification at the bondline, adding mass and strength at the surface of the tile.  This 
results in a tile that is more durable and exhibits less surface damage when impacted 
compared to LI-900. A borosilicate glass coating covers the AETB-8/TUFI tile, but 
this coating does not spall around the impact point as it often does with LI-900.  The 
AETB tiles demonstrate higher strength, added durability, and similar maximum 
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operational temperature as LI-900.  The penetration equation below is valid for an 
AETB-8 tile bonded to SIP and substructure.  The AETB-8 tiles have a nominal 
density of 8 lb/ft3 (0.13 g/cm3), but the TUFI coating and densification at the bondline 
nearly double the overall density of the tile for typical tile thickness (i.e., to 0.24 
g/cm3 for a 3.2cm thick tile).  
An equation relating penetration depth in the AETB-8 tile to projectile parameters 
is as follows: 
( ) ( ) 3/25.0 cos/177.1 θρρ VdP tp=     (5-6) 
Rearranging this equation: 
( ) ( ) 3/25.0 cos/85.0 −−= θρρ VPd tpcc    (5-7) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at threshold of critical penetration depth 
(cm) 
P = penetration depth into tile (cm) 
Pc = critical penetration depth at failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = target density (g/cm3) = 0.24 g/cm3 for TUFI coated AETB-8 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
5.3 Tile and Aluminum Substructure Penetration Equations 
General ballistic limit equations given below were developed to predict the 
critical particle diameter resulting in threshold perforation of a TPS tile and 
substructure.  The targets consist of typically LI-900 or LI-2200 tile bonded to SIP 
and to aluminum substructures. Both aluminum plate and aluminum honeycomb 
substructures are considered.  Failure is defined as any hole or through-crack in the 
substructure, whether aluminum plate or in the second facesheet of the honeycomb 
panel, represented by TPS-5 damage mode and higher in Figure 5-1.  Additional 
details on the hypervelocity impact data and techniques used to derive the equations 
are given in reference [49]. 
High-velocity, Vn ≥ 7 km/s: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) 3/23/13/13/23/1 cos70/5.03 −−++= θσρ Vtttd pSIPwHCTc  (5-8) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at failure threshold of the tile and substrate 
(cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
σ = substructure 0.2% offset tensile yield stress (ksi) (note 1ksi=1000 
lbf/in2 = 6.895 MPa) 
tT = tile thickness (cm) 
tHC = overall honeycomb panel thickness (cm) 
tw = substructure wall thickness (cm) = either the aluminum plate 
thickness or the sum of both honeycomb facesheet thickness for 
honeycomb panel substrates 
tw+SIP = combined substructure wall and equivalent SIP thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
Low-velocity, Vn ≤ 2.5 km/s: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]5.05.05.03/53/2 /70/cos82.1 AlTTwpc ttVd ρρσρθ += −−−  (5-9) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at failure threshold of the tile and substrate 
(cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρT = tile density (g/cm3) 
ρAl = aluminum density (g/cm3) = 2.8 g/cm3 
σ = substructure wall 0.2% offset tensile yield stress (ksi) (note 1ksi=1000 
lbf/in2 = 6.895 MPa) 
tT = tile thickness (cm) 
tHC = overall honeycomb panel thickness (cm) 
tw = substructure wall thickness (cm) = either the aluminum plate 
thickness or the sum of both honeycomb facesheet thickness for 
honeycomb panel substrates 
tw+SIP = combined substructure wall and equivalent SIP thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
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Intermediate-velocity, 2.5 km/s < Vn < 7 km/s : 
( )[ ]
( )
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −×++
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −×⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +=
−
+ 5.4
5.2cos)70/()5.0(82.0
5.4
cos0.7
cos01.1
)/(70/
3/13/13/23/1
5.0
5.05.0
θσρ
θ
ρθ
ρρσ
Vttt
Vttd
pSIPwHCT
p
AlTTw
c  (5-10) 
 
The equivalent thickness of the substrate wall and SIP, tw-SIP (cm), is given 
by: 
 
AlSIPwSIPwSIPw mtequivalentttt ρ/)( +=+=+   (5-11) 
 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at failure threshold of the tile and substrate 
(cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρT = tile density (g/cm3) 
ρAl = aluminum density (g/cm3) = 2.8 g/cm3 
mSIP = SIP areal density (g/cm2) = 0.18 g/cm2 
σ = substructure wall 0.2% offset tensile yield stress (ksi) (note 1ksi=1000 
lbf/in2 = 6.895 MPa) 
tT = tile thickness (cm) 
tHC = overall honeycomb panel thickness (cm) 
tw = substructure wall thickness (cm) = either the aluminum plate 
thickness or the sum of both honeycomb facesheet thickness for 
honeycomb panel substrates 
tw+SIP = combined substructure wall and equivalent SIP thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
  
J S C - 6 4 3 9 9  
 
V e r s i o n :  A  
 
 89  
  
 
Figure 5-1. Hypervelocity Damage Modes for TPS Tiles 
 
5.4 Tile and Composite Honeycomb Substructure Penetration Equations 
The following equations define the critical particle size causing threshold 
perforation of a 5.1cm thick TUFI coated AETB-8 tile bonded to 0.4cm thick SIP and 
to a graphite-cyanate composite honeycomb panel.  More details of the target and 
hypervelocity impact test results are found in reference [53]. The graphite composite 
honeycomb sandwich has 0.2cm thick graphite-cyanate composite facesheets, and has 
an overall thickness of 3.8cm including the honeycomb core.  Failure is defined as 
any hole or through-crack in the second facesheet of the honeycomb panel.  
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High-velocity, Vn ≥ 7 km/s: 
 ( ) 3/23/1 cos98.2 −−= θρ Vd pc      (5-12) 
 
Low-velocity, Vn ≤ 2.5 km/s: 
( ) 3/23/52/1 cos64.2 −−−= Vd pc θρ      (5-13) 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.5 km/s < Vn < 7 km/s : 
( )
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −×+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −×⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡=
−
5.4
5.2cos814.0
5.4
cos0.7
cos
43.1
3/1
5.0
θρ
θ
ρθ
V
Vd
p
p
c     (5-14) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at failure threshold of the tile and substrate 
(cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
5.5 Penetration Equations for Insulated Aluminum Rear Wall behind Tile and 
Composite Substrate 
The following equations define the critical particle size causing threshold 
perforation of an aluminum rear wall panel, that is located at distance S behind a 
5.1cm thick TUFI coated AETB-8 tile bonded to a 0.4cm thick SIP and a graphite-
cyanate composite honeycomb panel.  The graphite composite honeycomb sandwich 
has 0.2cm thick graphite-cyanate composite facesheets, and has an overall thickness 
of 3.8cm including the honeycomb core.  A high-temperature insulation pad, 
consisting of a beta-cloth bag filled with silica fiber insulation (0.2 g/cm2 areal 
density for the entire insulation pad), was located directly on top of the aluminum 
panel. More details of the target and hypervelocity impact test results are found in 
reference [53].  Failure is defined as any hole or through-crack in the aluminum rear 
wall.  
High-velocity, Vn ≥ 7 km/s: 
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( ) ( ) 3/13/23/13/23/1
3/23/1
40/36.019.3
98.2
σρ
ρ
MLIwnp
np
c mtSV
V
d +
+= −−
−−
  (5-15) 
 
Low-velocity, Vn ≤ 2.5 km/s: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 2/13/53/22/1
3/23/55.0
40/36.0cos67.1
cos64.2
σθρ
θρ
MLIwp
p
c mtV
V
d +
+= −−−
−−−
 (5-16) 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.5 km/s < Vn < 7 km/s : 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+= −−− 5.4
5.2n
LocHicLocc
Vdddd      (5-17) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 2/112/1
15.0
40/36.0cos905.0
cos43.1
σθρ
θρ
MLIwp
p
Loc mt
d +
+= −−
−−
−   (5-18) 
( ) ( ) 3/13/23/13/1
3/1
40/36.0872.0
814.0
σρ
ρ
MLIwp
p
Hic mtS
d +
+= −
−
−   (5-19) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at failure threshold of the tile, substrate 
and aluminum rear wall (cm) 
dc-Lo and dc-Hi = intermediate projectile diameter (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
mMLI = areal density of insulation blanket (g/cm2) 
S = standoff distance from back of substrate to front of rear wall (cm) 
 tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
σ = rear wall 0.2% offset tensile yield stress (ksi) (note 1ksi=1000 lbf/in2 = 
6.895 MPa) 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
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5.6 AFRSI Blanket Penetration Equation 
Advanced Flexible Reusable Surface Insulation (AFRSI) is a TPS material 
consisting of bulk insulating layer of fibrous ceramic batting sandwiched between 
inner and outer ceramic fabric layers. The material has a quilt-like appearance with 
ceramic thread stitching.  A gray ceramic C-9 coating covers the AFRSI.  The 
penetration equations are valid for an AFRSI blanket bonded by RTV adhesive to a 
substrate.  The equations could under-estimate penetration depth for AFRSI not 
bonded to a substrate.  
( ) 3/25.0 cos44.1 θρ VdP p=     (5-20) 
Rearranging this equation: 
( ) 3/25.0 cos69.0 −−= θρ VPd pcc    (5-21) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at threshold of critical penetration depth 
into the AFRSI (cm) 
P = penetration depth into AFRSI (cm) 
Pc = critical penetration depth at failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
5.7 AFRSI and Composite Honeycomb Substructure Penetration Equations 
Penetration equations below provide the critical particle size causing threshold 
perforation of a 2.2cm thick AFRSI blanket bonded to a graphite-cyanate composite 
honeycomb panel.  The graphite composite honeycomb sandwich has 0.2cm thick 
graphite-cyanate composite facesheets, and has an overall thickness of 3.8cm 
including the honeycomb core.  Failure is defined as any hole or through-crack in the 
second facesheet of the honeycomb panel.  
High-velocity, Vn ≥ 7 km/s: 
 ( ) 3/23/1 cos0.2 −−= θρ Vd pc      (5-22) 
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Low-velocity, Vn ≤ 2.5 km/s: 
( ) 3/23/52/1 cos19.2 −−−= Vd pc θρ      (5-23) 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.5 km/s < Vn < 7 km/s : 
( )
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −×+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −×⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡=
−
5.4
5.2cos
547.0
5.4
cos0.7
cos
189.1
3/1
5.0
θρ
θ
ρθ
V
Vd
p
p
c     (5-24) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at failure threshold of the AFRSI blanket 
and composite honeycomb substrate (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
5.8 Penetration Equations for Insulated Aluminum Rear Wall behind AFRSI 
blanket and Composite Substrate 
The following equations define the critical particle size causing threshold 
perforation of an aluminum rear wall panel, that is located at distance S behind a 
2.2cm thick AFRSI blanket (with C-9 ceramic coating) bonded to a 0.4cm thick SIP 
and a graphite-cyanate composite honeycomb panel.  The graphite composite 
honeycomb sandwich has 0.2cm thick graphite-cyanate composite facesheets, and has 
an overall thickness of 3.8cm including the honeycomb core.  A high-temperature 
insulation pad, consisting of a beta-cloth bag filled with silica fiber insulation (0.2 
g/cm2 areal density for the entire insulation pad), was located directly on top of the 
aluminum panel. More details of the target and hypervelocity impact test results are 
found in reference [53].  Failure is defined as any hole or through-crack in the 
aluminum rear wall.  
High-velocity, Vn ≥ 7 km/s: 
( ) ( ) 3/13/23/13/23/1
3/23/1
40/36.019.3
0.2
σρ
ρ
MLIwnp
np
c mtSV
V
d +
+= −−
−−
  (5-25) 
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Low-velocity, Vn ≤ 2.5 km/s: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 2/13/53/22/1
3/23/55.0
40/36.0cos67.1
cos19.2
σθρ
θρ
MLIwp
p
c mtV
V
d +
+= −−−
−−−
 (5-26) 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.5 km/s < Vn < 7 km/s : 
( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+= −−− 5.4
5.2n
LocHicLocc
Vdddd      (5-27) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 2/112/1
15.0
40/36.0cos905.0
cos19.1
σθρ
θρ
MLIwp
p
Loc mt
d +
+= −−
−−
−   (5-28) 
( ) ( ) 3/13/23/13/1
3/1
40/36.0872.0
547.0
σρ
ρ
MLIwp
p
Hic mtS
d +
+= −
−
−   (5-29) 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at failure threshold of the AFRSI blanket, 
substrate and aluminum rear wall (cm) 
dc-Lo and dc-Hi = intermediate projectile diameter (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
mMLI = areal density of insulation blanket (g/cm2) 
S = standoff distance from back of substrate to front of rear wall (cm) 
 tw = rear wall thickness (cm) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
σ = rear wall 0.2% offset tensile yield stress (ksi) (note 1ksi=1000 lbf/in2 = 
6.895 MPa) 
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
 
5.9 Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) Penetration Equations 
Reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC) is a structural composite used as the TPS for the 
high temperature areas of the Space Shuttle Orbiter (wing leading edge and nose cap) 
and other space vehicles.  A silicon carbide barrier is included on the exterior surfaces 
of the RCC to provide oxidation resistance and provide for reusability.   
The RCC substrate is an all-carbon composite laminate fabricated in a multiple 
pyrolysis and densification process from a phenolic-graphite layup.  The substrate has 
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a density of 1.44 g/cm2 to 1.6 g/cm2.  A 0.5mm to 1.0mm thick silicon carbide (SiC) 
coating is formed on exterior surfaces of the RCC in a reaction diffusion process.  
Further oxidation resistance is provided by impregnation via treatment with 
tetrethyorthosilicate (TEOS) that when cured leaves a silicon dioxide (SiO2) residue 
throughout the coating and substrate.  Any remaining porosity and microcracks in the 
coating are filled by an application of a surface sealant (sodium silicate-SiC mixture) 
in final steps of the fabrication process.  For the Shuttle vehicle, typical RCC 
thickness is 6.4mm, with the substrate 4.3mm to 5.3mm thick and the remainder SiC 
coating.   
A penetration equation for RCC [49-50] is as follows:  
( ) 3/25.0 cos)/(61.0 θρρ VdP tp=     (5-30) 
Rearranging this equation: 
( ) 3/25.0 cos)/(64.1 −−= θρρ VPd tpcc    (5-31) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at threshold of critical penetration depth 
into the RCC (cm) 
P = penetration depth into RCC (cm) 
Pc = critical penetration depth at failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = target density (g/cm3) = 1.6 g/cm3 for RCC 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
Figure 5-2 shows typical hypervelocity damage modes for RCC.   Damage 
thresholds were established as a function of the projectile’s normal component kinetic 
energy (the specified damage mode occurs at and above the given kinetic energy). 
RCC becomes completely penetrated with increasing projectile size and/or 
velocity as the growing front-side crater meets the rear-side spall.  The required 
thickness of RCC to prevent perforation is greater than the penetration depth as 
follows.   
Pt nperforatioprevent 3.2_ =      (5-32) 
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And to prevent rear-side spall, the minimum RCC thickness is:  
Pt spallprevent 5.4_ =       (5-33) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2. Hypervelocity Impact Damage Modes and Kinetic Energy Thresholds for RCC 
The following equation has been developed [49] to predict through-hole diameter 
in RCC if complete penetration occurs:  
( ) 36.0cos20.2 3/13/1 −= θρ VdD pH    (5-34) 
Where 
Surface Coating Damage
Carbon Substrate Penetration
Rear-Side Spall Complete Penetration
K.E. = 0.5 J
K.E. = 4 to 7 J K.E. = 30 to 50 J
0.24mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o
0.6mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o 1.0mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o
1” Hole
K.E. = 3700 J
4.8mm diameter Al @ 7km/s, 0o
J S C - 6 4 3 9 9  
 
V e r s i o n :  A  
 
 97  
  
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
DH = hole diameter in RCC (cm) = equivalent circular hole diameter for 
elliptical holes = (Dmax * Dmin)0.5 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
5.10 Penetration Equations for Ablators 
Penetration equations have been developed for two types of TPS ablators: 
Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator (PICA) and Avcoat.  PICA was developed by 
NASA Ames Research Center and was the primary TPS material for the Stardust 
sample return capsule.  PICA is being considered for use on Orion.  Avcoat is an 
alternative heat shield material being considered for Orion, and was the Apollo heat 
shield material. 
5.10.1 Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator (PICA) Penetration Equation 
PICA is a combination of carbon fiberform and phenolic resin that is made in a 
range of densities, from 0.24 g/cm3 for nominal density PICA to 0.48 g/cm3 for high-
density PICA.  A penetration equation for PICA based on impact test data is as 
follows:  
( ) 3/292.05.085.0 cos72.0 θρρ VdP PICAp −=     (5-35) 
“Penetration” in this equation refers to the maximum cavity depth (see Figure 5-
3).  In some cases, projectile fragments leave trails that penetrate beyond the open 
cavity in the PICA.  The depth of these fragments is not predicted by the above 
equation.  Rearranging this equation: 
( ) 784.0082.1588.0 cos47.1 −−= θρρ VPd PICApcc     (5-36) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at threshold of critical penetration depth 
into the PICA (cm) 
P = cavity penetration depth into PICA (cm) 
Pc = critical penetration depth at failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρPICA = target density (g/cm3) = 0.24 – 0.48 g/cm3 for PICA 
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θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-3. Results from Test HITF-6023.  Nominal density PICA. Top view on left, x-ray side 
view on right.  Projectile: 0.32cm diameter Al 2017-T4 sphere, 6.59 km/s, 0o impact angle 
(normal to target).  Damage size: 2.0x2.3cm entry hole, 6.1cm cavity depth, 3.8cm maximum 
cavity diameter. 
 
5.10.2  Avcoat Ablator Penetration Equation 
Avcoat is a glass-phenolic ablative material used in the Apollo heat shield.  The 
process to manufacture Avcoat was reconstituted and impact tests performed on the 
new Avcoat formulation.  Previous Apollo-era Avcoat penetration equations [54] 
were modified based on results from the recent tests, as follows. 
( ) 4/cos25.1 3/25.006.1 =<= orwhenVdP tpp ρρθρ   (5-37) 
( ) 4/cos61.1 3/25.006.1 >= tpp whenVdP ρρθρ    (5-38) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
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P = penetration depth into Avcoat (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
ρt = target density (g/cm3) = 0.528 g/cm3 for Avcoat 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4. Results from Test HITF-8360 on Avcoat.  On left is a top view and on right is an x-
ray side view.  Projectile: 0.34cm diameter Al 2017-T4 sphere, 6.98 km/s, 0o impact angle 
(normal to target).  Damage size: 2.8x2.9cm entry hole/surface damage size, 3.3cm cavity depth. 
32.7mm
(laser 
measurement)
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6 Equations for Predicting Failure Limits of Spacecraft Hardware 
This section provides ballistic limit equations for spacecraft hardware, including 
honeycomb panels, toughened multi-layer insulation (MLI), and fused silica glass 
(used in window ports). 
6.1 Honeycomb Panels 
Honeycomb panels are often used in space vehicle construction due to their light-
weight and high strength and stiffness.  However, honeycomb panels are more easily 
penetrated by hypervelocity MMOD particles compared to two walls of each 
thickness to the facesheets of the honeycomb panel (i.e., the panel without a 
honeycomb core), or compared to other core fills such as metal foam.  The 
honeycomb core tends to channel the debris cloud behind the first facesheet, which 
results in greater penetration of the second facesheet compared to without the 
honeycomb core.  A rough estimate of the ballistic limit for honeycomb sandwich 
structures is to use the Whipple shield equations (i.e., Equations 4-22 through 4-24 
for example), and constrain the standoff distance to the product of twice the 
honeycomb cell diameter, or to the core thickness, whichever is less as follows: 
),2(min coreHCCell tDS −=    (6-1) 
Where 
S = shield standoff distance (cm) 
DCell = honeycomb cell diameter (cm) 
tHC-core = honeycomb core thickness (cm) 
 
Additional honeycomb sandwich panel ballistic limit equations can be found 
elsewhere [48].  Methods to improve honeycomb sandwich ballistic limits include (1) 
increase the diameter of the honeycomb cells, or (2) substitute a core material that 
does not channel the debris cloud, such as metal foam. 
 
6.2 Toughened MLI 
Multi-layer insulation (MLI) thermal blankets cover many areas of ISS and other 
spacecraft.  These thermal blankets consist of 20 or more layers of ultra-thin materials 
(aluminized mylar or kapton for instance), with thicker exterior covers (both sides) to 
improve handling characteristics.  MLI thermal blankets typically do not provide a 
large amount of additional MMOD protection.  Toughening MLI thermal blankets 
with Nextel ceramic cloth and Kevlar high-strength fabric has been investigated in 
previous work [10, 55, 56].  For instance, a cooperative effort with the Canadian 
Space Agency resulted in toughening the MLI over critical electronic and propulsion 
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systems on the RADARSAT satellite [56].  The RADARSAT MLI was modified to 
include 1 to 2 layers of Nextel AF10 ceramic fabric.  The added mass was 0.25 to 0.5 
kg/m2, while the risk of penetration dropped by a factor of 3 [56].   
Ballistic limits for a non-toughened (baseline) MLI thermal blanket (0.188 g/cm2 
mass per unit area) at a short distance (1.5cm) from an aluminum rear wall are as 
follows.  Failure criterion is defined as any hole or through-crack in the aluminum 
rear wall.   
High-velocity, V ≥ 6.0 (cosθ)-0.5 km/s: 
 ( ) 3/23/13/2 cos −−= θρ VtKd pwHc     (6-2) 
Low-velocity, V ≤ 2.5 (cosθ)-1 km/s: 
( ) [ ]bwpLc mtVKd 37.0cos 5.03/43/2 += −−− ρθ    (6-3) 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.5 (cosθ)-1 km/s < V < 6.0 (cosθ)-0.5 km/s : 
[ ]
( )
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−×+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−×⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +=
−−
−
−−
−−
−
15.0
1
3/13/13/2
15.0
5.0
5.03/2
)(cos5.2)(cos0.6
)(cos5.2
)(cos
)(cos5.2)(cos0.6
)(cos0.6
cos
37.0
θθ
θθρ
θθ
θ
ρθ
VtK
VmtKd
pwhi
p
bwli
c  (6-4) 
 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at failure threshold of the rear wall (cm) 
KH = high-velocity coefficient = 2.9 (for baseline MLI) 
Khi = high-intermediate velocity coefficient = 0.878 (for baseline MLI) 
Kli = low-intermediate velocity coefficient = 0.923 (for baseline MLI) 
KL = low velocity coefficient = 1.7 (for baseline MLI) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
mb = areal density of MLI thermal blanket (g/cm2) = 0.188 g/cm2 for 
baseline MLI 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm)  
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
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Ballistic limits for a toughened MLI thermal blanket (0.307 g/cm2 mass per unit 
area) at a short distance (1.5cm) from an aluminum rear wall are as follows.  The 
toughened MLI in this case contains two layers of Nextel style AF10 (0.027 g/cm2 
each) added to the MLI just under the outer cover.  In addition, three layers of Kevlar 
KM2 style CS-705 fabric (0.023 g/cm2 each) are added to the back of the MLI.  The 
areal density of the toughened MLI blanket is 0.307 g/cm2.  The general ballistic 
limits for the toughened MLI over aluminum rear wall are given below. Failure 
criterion is defined as any hole or through-crack in the aluminum rear wall.   
High-velocity, V ≥ 6.2 (cosθ)-0.25 km/s: 
 ( ) 3/23/13/2 cos −−= θρ VtKd pwHc     (6-5) 
Low-velocity, V ≤ 2.5 (cosθ)-1 km/s: 
( ) [ ]bwpLc mtVKd 37.0cos 5.03/43/2 += −−− ρθ    (6-6) 
 
Intermediate-velocity, 2.5 (cosθ)-1 km/s < V < 6.2 (cosθ)-0.25 km/s : 
[ ]
( )
[ ] ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−×+
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−
−×⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +=
−−
−
−−
−−
−
125.0
1
3/13/13/2
125.0
25.0
5.03/2
)(cos5.2)(cos2.6
)(cos5.2
)(cos
)(cos5.2)(cos2.6
)(cos2.6
cos
37.0
θθ
θθρ
θθ
θ
ρθ
VtK
VmtKd
pwhi
p
bwli
c  (6-7) 
 
Where 
dc = critical projectile diameter at failure threshold of the rear wall (cm) 
KH = high-velocity coefficient = 1.34 (for Nextel/Kevlar toughened MLI) 
Khi = high-intermediate velocity coefficient = 0.729 (for toughened MLI) 
Kli = low-intermediate velocity coefficient = 0.923 (for toughened MLI) 
KL = low velocity coefficient = 1.7 (for toughened MLI) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
mb = areal density of MLI thermal blanket (g/cm2) = 0.307 g/cm2 for 
Nextel/Kevlar toughened thermal blanket 
tw = rear wall thickness (cm)  
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
Vn = normal component of projectile velocity (km/s) = V cosθ 
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Table 6-1 provides example critical particle sizes for the two MLI concepts 
(baseline and Nextel/Kevlar enhanced MLI) with a 0.19cm thick AMG-6 rear wall 
assumed in the calculated BLEs for the two concepts. Another example of the use of a 
toughened MLI option is to upgrade the current baseline MLI thermal blanket on the 
Orbital Module of the Soyuz with a toughened blanket.  The Orbital Module of the 
Soyuz (the round pressurized crew module at the front of the vehicle) represents the 
MMOD risk driver for the Soyuz.  Over 80% of the Soyuz MMOD risk is due to the 
Orbital Module [10], because of the thin shielding in this region of the vehicle; i.e., 
MMOD protection is with the baseline MLI blanket at short distance (1.5cm) from a 
0.19cm thick aluminum pressure shell (alloy AMG6).  Adding Nextel and Kevlar to 
the MLI blanket provides considerable improvement in MMOD protection. The 
Nextel ceramic fabric in the enhanced MLI blanket acts like an additional bumper to 
improve projectile breakup.  The Kevlar is a good debris cloud “catcher”.  Table 6-2 
shows the reduction in MMOD risks using the enhanced blanket in place of a baseline 
blanket, and the option adds 20kg to the vehicle if implemented. 
Table 6-1. Example aluminum particle diameters at ballistic limit of two MLI configurations 
(baseline and Nextel/Kevlar toughened) at 1.5cm standoff from 0.19cm thick Aluminum AMG6 
rear wall. 
Impact Conditions 
Critical particle 
diameter for baseline 
MLI 
(cm) 
Critical particle 
diameter for toughened 
MLI  
(cm) 
At 3 km/s, 0o impact 
angle 0.152 0.190 
At 7 km/s, 0o impact 
angle 0.186 0.286 
At 9 km/s, 45o 
impact angle 0.198 0.295 
 
Table 6-2. MMOD Penetration Risk over 15years for Soyuz Protection Options [10].  Penetration 
is defined as a hole or through-crack in the pressure shell or critical damage to propellant tanks. 
Protection Case Probability of No Penetration (PNP) MMOD Risk
 MMOD Risk 
Reduction 
Baseline MLI 0.900 10% - 
Toughened MLI over 
Orbital Module 0.966 3.4% Factor of 3X 
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6.3 Transparent Materials 
Fused silica glass is typically used for window ports on Shuttle, ISS and other 
spacecraft.  Recent work on polycarbonate materials indicates they have greater 
damage tolerance from MMOD impact then conventional fused silica glass. 
6.3.1 Fused Silica Penetration Equations 
The following equation predicts penetration depth into fused silica glass [57]. 
( ) 3/25.006.1 cos53.0 θρ VdP p=     (6-8) 
( )[ ] 94.03/25.0 cos89.1 −−= θρ VPd pcc     (6-9) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
dc = critical projectile diameter at threshold of critical penetration depth 
into fused silica glass (cm) 
P = cavity penetration depth into fused silica glass (cm) 
Pc = critical penetration depth at failure threshold (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
For no perforation of the fused silica glass, the thickness must be two times 
greater than the penetration depth in semi-infinite glass, that is:  
Pt nperforatioprevent 2_ =       (6-10) 
To prevent rear-side detached spall, the minimum glass thickness is:  
Pt spallprevent 3_ =       (6-11) 
And to prevent any cracks on the rear side of the glass, the minimum glass 
thickness is:  
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Pt cracksspallprevent 7__ =       (6-12) 
Rearranging: 
( ) 63.047.094.0_ cos95.0 −−= θρ Vtd pnperforatioc    (6-13) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
dc_perforation = critical projectile diameter at threshold of completely 
penetrating a fused silica glass plate of thickness t (cm) 
t = thickness of fused silica glass (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
6.3.2 Penetration Equations for Polycarbonate 
Hyzod AR6  polycarbonate is a transparent amorphous thermoplastic with a hard 
coated surface that resists abrasion providing high impact strength and high modulus 
of elasticity. Hyzod AR has impact strength 250 times stronger than float glass and 30 
times stronger than acrylic. Hyzod polycarbonate is currently being used as a 
transparent cover protecting ISS hatch windows. Details of hypervelocity impact 
testing and damage equations for polycarbonate are given in reference [56, 57]. 
The impact particle size at the perforation limit of a polycarbonate plate is given 
by the following equation. 
 ( ) 3/13/23/1_ cos04.1 −−−= θρ Vtd pPCnperforatioc     (6-14) 
The impact particle size at the detached spall threshold from rear side of a 
polycarbonate plate is given by: 
 ( ) 3/13/23/1_det_ cos98.0 −−−= θρ Vtd pPCspallachedc    (6-15) 
The impact particle size at the attached spall threshold from rear side a 
polycarbonate plate is given by: 
                                                 
6 Hyzod AR is a trademark of Sheffield Plastics, Inc. 
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 ( ) 3/13/23/1__ cos65.0 −−−= θρ Vtd pPCspallattachedc    (6-16) 
Where 
d = projectile diameter (cm) 
dc_perforation = critical projectile diameter at threshold of completely 
penetrating a fused silica glass plate of thickness t (cm) 
tPC = thickness of polycarbonate (cm) 
ρp = projectile density (g/cm3) 
θ = impact angle from target normal (deg); note impact at θ = 0 deg is 
normal to the target  
V = projectile velocity (km/s) 
 
Polycarbonate reduces the mass to stop a given size particle compared to fused 
silica, as given in Figure 6-1.  
For 2mm Al Projectile, normal (0o) impact
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Figure 6-1.  Hyzod and Fused Silica mass per unit area to prevent perforation, as a function of 
impact velocity for a 0.2cm diameter aluminum projectile at 0o impact angle. 
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7 MMOD Damage Detection Sensors 
NASA has developed a number of systems that detect MMOD impact strikes on 
spacecraft.  Knowledge of a strike can simply be noted if there is no damage, or it can 
provide a powerful clue if an air leak occurs, or if there is some other equipment 
malfunction.  
In the case of the MIR accident, for instance, months passed while the Russian 
Space Agency determined exactly where on the pressure hull the breach had 
occurred. With the use of damage detection sensors, there is additional information to 
investigate these types of problems. 
This becomes more significant with long space flights. In the case of MIR, or the 
ISS (International Space Station), if there is a serious breach of pressure integrity 
(i.e., the craft is leaking air) the crew can always “come home”. They are in earth 
orbit and space rules dictate that there is always the capacity to return crewmembers 
in the event of an emergency. A mission to the moon, however, or a mission to Mars, 
takes days or months and immediate return is not usually possible.  
In a spacecraft with a breached pressure hull, the crew would have to spend a lot 
of time, if not all of it, in spacesuits, with the accompanying long-term problems of 
eating, drinking, and sanitation. With knowledge of where the strike occurred, the 
crew has an opportunity to repair the damage and regain pressure integrity in their 
vessel. 
 
7.1 Impact Damage Detection using Piezoelectric Film Sensors 
One type of “Strike Detector” utilizes a blanket approach to detecting projectile 
impacts. It covers the area to be monitored with a piezoelectric film that has the 
property that a mechanical impact on the film causes an electrical output. An example 
of the piezoelectric effect is found as an accessory on backyard gas grills. These grills 
typically have an igniter.  Pressing the button on the igniter results in a mechanical 
impulse which hits a piezoelectric element and creates an electrical spark to start the 
flame. The piezoelectric film operates in a similar manner as the backyard grill 
igniter, except it is much thinner and will not create as great a voltage. Nevertheless, 
it will output an easily measurable signal. 
The piezoelectric film consists of a polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF) plastic with a 
metalized layer on each side (Figure 7-1). The voltage difference that results from a 
mechanical strike occurs between the two metalized layers.  This voltage difference is 
detected and the location of the strike determined by subdividing the film into distinct 
sections. 
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Figure 7-1. PVDF Film 
 
7.1.1 Application of Piezoelectric Blanket Strike Detector to Spacecraft 
Covering the spacecraft with a piezoelectric blanket is not that much of a burden. 
There is typically a MLI thermal blanket covering the hull or exterior a spacecraft. 
There may also be shielding consisting of light aluminum panels covering the 
sensitive areas of the spacecraft. The addition of a layer of film does not have a 
significant effect on the overall combination. 
The Strike Detector consists of a series of panels, arranged together in an array to 
cover whatever surface area needs monitoring. The panels are usually of a uniform 
size and type, but this is not required. A typical size for a panel could be 2 feet x 3 
feet. The panels are attached to each other in an X and Y direction, until the area of 
interest is covered (Figure 7-2). It is not required that the panels all be uniform and if 
circumstances dictate that another size of panel would be better for a particular area, 
that can be done. 
The panels are all in communication with a centralized electronics module that is 
typically located inside the pressure hull. The centralized module talks with the 
various panels and makes decisions based on the information received. The module 
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displays the information to the spacecraft crew and provides data for telemetry to the 
ground. A typical centralized module consists of a laptop computer attached to a 
small electronics unit. 
A two-wire buss system connects the panels. These two wires provide power and 
data to all panels. Each panel can be built with the 2-wire buss running to each of its 
four sides so that it is possible to add a new panel by attaching it onto the top, bottom, 
left, or right of any existing panel. An array of panels can cover any imaginable 
surface.  
The panels physically nearest the centralized electronics module connect to it via 
the 2-wire buss. Since the module is typically inside the pressure hull and the panels 
are outside, this requires two electrical feed-throughs through the pressure barrier. 
 
Figure 7-2.  Panels Arranged into a Detector Array 
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7.1.2 Inside a Strike Detector Panel 
Each panel is (usually) similar to every other panel, although each is maintained 
as a unique entity. A panel has its own set of electronics to communicate with the 
central module, and inside the electronics is a unique software address to identify the 
panel specifically. A particular panel can be located almost anywhere, but there needs 
to be a log of exactly where each one is being used. 
Panels are subsequently divided into “pixels” (Figure 7-3). Each pixel represents 
the smallest area where an impact can be located. For instance, if a 2 feet x 3 feet 
panel is divided into six one-foot square pixels, then an impact could be detected 
from any of the six pixels. Each pixel has a separate wire to connect it to the panel 
electronics. 
 
Figure 7-3. Picture of Film Divided Into 48 Pixels 
In the panel electronics, there is a register that equates to the number of pixels. If 
the panel has 12 pixels, there is an associated “Main” register of 12 bits, where each 
bit corresponds to a particular pixel. If a signal is generated by pixel #3, and if the 
signal exceeds the threshold requirement, then it will set the #3 bit in the Main 
register. The panel registers will subsequently be read by the central electronics 
module, which will now know the identity of the panel, and the identity of the 
pixel(s) that are reporting being hit.  
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There is a second register in each panel electronics, similar to the Main register. 
The second register is referred to as the First-To-Arrive (FTA) register and is exactly 
the same size as the Main. The purpose of the FTA register will be discussed in a later 
section.  
Finally, each panel can perform secondary tests on its pixels. One test is to check 
if any pixels are shorting to the backplane. Shorting is a common consequence of an 
impact, usually as a result of the piezoelectric material being torn and allowing the 
conductive layers on each side to touch together. 
Another secondary test that each panel can perform on its pixels is to conduct a 
capacitance test. Each pixel will normally have a certain amount of capacitance, 
dependent on its physical size. If a pixel is significantly “blown away” by an impact, 
or if the wiring to the pixel is cut, there will be a dramatic reduction in the amount of 
capacitance measured. 
These secondary tests can provide valuable information in addition to the primary 
piezoelectric signal. 
7.1.3 Testing and Characterization of the Strike Detector  
Extensive testing has taken place of the detector at NASA’s facilities at the 
Johnson Space Center, at Rice University in Houston, and at NASA’s White Sands 
Test Facility in New Mexico. Results show that the piezoelectric film does a good job 
of detecting when a projectile hits a pixel in a panel. 
In a majority of the cases, the sensitivity of the pixels is high enough that one 
impact has the effect of being detected by multiple pixels, and not just the one being 
hit. To some extent this is a useful mechanism, since viewing the area where the 
pixels are responding will indicate an area, in the middle of which is where the actual 
impact took place. The number of pixels that are responding gives an indication of the 
severity of the impact. 
To improve the resolution as to which pixel actually got hit, a technique was 
developed utilizing the time occurrence of the various signals. The non-impacted 
pixels that respond are detecting the mechanical vibrations from the impact. These 
mechanical forces travel across the surface of the detector at sonic velocity, so there 
is a measurable difference in the time in which each signal arrives. The pixel that 
suffered the impact will always be the first to respond, and it is recorded in the First-
To-Arrive (FTA) register, which then inhibits itself to any further inputs. All 
subsequent signals are recorded in the Main register. The pixel signals are thus 
resolved into the first-to-arrive and then everybody else. Typically after a hit, there 
will be one bit set in the FTA register, and several bits set in the Main register.  
Interestingly, it is not absolute that there will only be one bit set in the FTA 
register. The realities of the electronics are that it takes a short, but finite, amount of 
time for the FTA register to realize it has a bit set, and inhibit itself to any more 
inputs. Currently this amount of time is around 40 nanoseconds.  Therefore, if the 
J S C - 6 4 3 9 9  
 
V e r s i o n :  A  
 
 112  
  
first two signals (or more) are less then 40 nanoseconds apart, then both of them will 
set bits in the FTA register. This situation never happens when there is a clean shot on 
the detector, but it is not unknown to occur when the detector is behind a shield, or 
some other barrier which produces a debris cloud or cone of debris. Particles of the 
debris cloud can hit the detector at the same time (arriving within the 40 nanosecond 
gate) and produce multiple FTA bits. The detector is reporting what it is 
experiencing. If multiple FTA’s happen, then that provides information that there was 
a debris cloud and the lateral extent of the debris cloud. 
The secondary data from the Shorts and Capacitance tests also give insight into 
the nature and extent of the damage. If pixels are measured as being shorted after an 
impact, that indicates that the material has been torn, or at least showered with debris, 
and it must have been near the hit. If a pixel has lost capacitance, that is evidence that 
material has disappeared, and it was presumably located where the hit occurred. 
7.1.4 Specifications of the Strike Detector 
A cross-sectional diagram of a typical strike detector is shown in Figure 7-4.  The 
type of PVDF utilized in the current version of the NASA Strike Detector is a film 27 
microns thick. This film is usually manufactured in rolls up to 24inch wide. Thus, a 
panel can be as long as desired, and up to 24inch wide.  Each film is encapsulated 
front and back with 1 mil thick polyimide, currently Kapton, and conductive ink is 
screen printed onto the polyimide for the wiring.  It is also on this layer that the 
electronics are located. 
Another layer of polyimide, with conductive ink traces, carries the 2-wire power 
and data buss. 
Two more layers of polyimide carries a second set of wiring and electronics, and 
a second 2-wire buss. These provide redundancy for the detector, hence some 
survivability. The detector will always note the first hit quite well, but depending on 
the amount of damage, an area may be in poor condition to report on any subsequent 
events. Providing a second path for all functions means that the detector can still 
respond, until a second hit to that area at least, or until the damaged panel can be 
replaced. 
Finally, a top and bottom layer of polyimide is used to provide an over-all cover 
to the assembly. The detector cross section is then one layer of foil, and seven layers 
of polyimide. The weight per area of the complete detector (Figure 7-5) is 5.185 oz/ft2 
(1.6 kg/m2). 
Power consumed by the Strike Detector is small while it is in its normal 
monitoring mode. Since the actual detection mechanism is piezoelectric, no power at 
all is required by the sensing element. The film will convert the kinetic energy of an 
incoming projectile into an electrical signal. 
Some power is needed by the associated panel electronics, however. The 
electronics consist mostly of a CMOS gate array and typically uses around 10 
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milliwatts. If the secondary electronics is also turned on, it would require an identical 
amount. 
When a strike is detected, the affected panel signals the central electronics. The 
central electronics module will command the panels out of monitoring mode and into 
a higher power communications mode. When this happens embedded processors in 
the panels will awaken and become available for bidirectional communication with 
the module. The amount of power required when in the communication mode is 
greater then when in the regular monitoring mode, but after communications are 
finished the panels are put back into the low-power monitoring mode. 
Since a large part of the panel electronics is a single gate array, there is a practical 
limit on how many pixels can be in a panel. Each pixel has to have a unique line into 
the gate array, and there are a maximum number of pins available on the gate array. 
Currently, the NASA Strike Detector uses a 160 pin gate array, which makes 
available 96 pins for pixels. Thus, there is a limit of 96 pixels per panel.  
The software address for each panel is 8 bits in length so at the present time the 
maximum number of panels is 256. That number is easily changed, of course. 
 
Figure 7-4. Cross-Section of Panel Construction 
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Figure 7-5.  Piezoelectric Pixels Encapsulated With Polyimide Layers and Conductive Ink 
Circuitry Applied 
 
7.1.5 Example Application 
An example could be a cylindrical object of 10 feet diameter and 30 feet long, a 
large but not unreasonable size for spacecraft components. For purposes of this 
discussion, the area at the ends will be neglected, but these can be “added on”. 
The area of interest is the circumference times the length, or an area of 942 ft2.  
Since each panel can be a maximum of 24 inch wide, the panels could be 
constructed to travel down the length of the cylinder. Each panel would then be 24 
inch x 30 feet, or 60 ft2. This would mandate just over 15 panels to completely cover 
the sides of the cylinder. If 1 ft2 resolution is acceptable as a criterion for actual strike 
detection and location, then there would be 60 pixels per panel. Overall, there would 
be 942 pixels, since the area is 942 ft2. 
The weight of a single panel, with full redundancy, would be 5.185 oz/ft2 x 60 ft2 
= 19.4 lbs. The total weight of all the panels would be 305 lbs. 
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Individual panel power would be 10 milliwatts, for a total power of 160 milliwatts 
in monitor mode (assuming 16 panels). The power would increase to several watts 
when in communication mode. 
 
Figure 7-6.  Application example showing 16 panels (2 ft wide x 30 ft long) to cover spacecraft 
shell 
 
7.1.6 Operational Scenario 
When the detector described in the previous section receives a hit, the following 
process would take place. 
• The pixel, or pixels, that received the impact would send the signals to their 
panel’s electronics. The panel electronics would store this information in its Main 
and First-To-Arrive (FTA) registers. 
• The panel electronics would then signal to the Central Module that it had recorded 
a hit. 
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• The Central Module would then bring all the panels into communicate mode. At 
his time the module does not know which panel was struck, only that one had 
raised the alarm. 
• The Central Module then broadcasts a request for the panel that raised the alarm 
to identify itself. A broadcast command is received by all panels because it has a 
generalized address that is received by them all. 
• The affected panel communicates to the module. If there is more then one panel 
that needs to respond, there is a buss arbitration protocol to ensure that all panels 
get a chance to communicate. 
• The module then requests the Main and FTA register information of the particular 
panel, which the panel sends. The module then directs the panel to perform the 
secondary tests, Shorts and Capacitance, to determine the extent of the damage. 
The panel complies by performing the secondary tests and reports the results to 
the module.  
• The module repeats this sequence on any other panels that may have indicated 
being struck. When finished, it broadcasts a reset command to all the panels and 
puts them all back into monitor mode. 
• The central electronics module then examines and presents the data to the crew 
and spacecraft telemetry. If presents a graphical image showing where the hit 
occurred on the structure, and how much damage was suffered by the detector. 
The amount of damage suffered by the detector indicates how violent the strike 
was. 
This entire process takes a matter of seconds, so the information presented to the 
crew is basically real-time. 
7.1.7 Number of Detectors 
The NASA Strike Detector is a straight forward way to determine when and 
where an impact occurs. There have been many tests of the technique, and it has 
proven to be robust and reliable, particularly for the first impact. Accuracy of a 
detector receiving a clean shot is basically 100%.  
A variation is to use two detectors, one a few inches above the other, to determine 
characteristics about the projectile. If there is a clean signal from each detector, 
various parameters can be determined by comparing the two signal’s location and 
timing, such as the projectile trajectory vector, and its speed. In actual tests of this 
concept the reliability of the numbers depends in part on the angle the projectile 
relative to the detector planes. If the trajectory is normal to the plane, the numbers are 
typically quite good. But if it is at a significant angle, say 45 to 60 degrees, then in 
about half the cases there is some ambiguity. The first detector always indicates 
correctly, but the second detector can be subjected to a shower of debris that can 
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distort the reading. In these high-angle cases, the possibility of getting a non-
ambiguous reading on the second detector (i.e., only one pixel in the FTA) is 
approximately 50%. Even in these cases, however, there is still valuable information. 
It can still be determined in which general direction the impact came from, even 
though the exact angle may be somewhat ambiguous. 
Survivability after the first impact is being evaluated now, and reliability is being 
improved with the addition of a backup set of electronics and the power/data buss. 
This may not be required for all cases. If the detector is protecting an inflatable 
structure, for instance, a strike that is big enough to significantly damage the detector 
is big enough that repairs would be warranted on the structure, so the detector panel 
could be replaced at that time. 
If the backup reliability is not required, two layers of polyimide could be 
dispensed with, saving nearly 30% of the weight. In the 10 feet x 30 feet cylinder 
example, the weight would drop from 305 lb to 217 lb. 
It is even theoretically possible to garner some projectile information from the 
signal shape itself, although tests have revealed this to be rather involved. It is an area 
for future development. 
The best utilization of the Strike Detector depends on the exact requirements. At 
this time, to monitor the pressure hull of a typical spacecraft it would seem that a 
single layer of the detector, with a second level of redundancy, should be located 
against the pressure hull. Dust and small debris, that do not make it to the pressure 
hull, would not be measured. More significant projectiles that do make it to the hull 
would be detected. Even stronger impacts that are capable of doing damage would be 
measured and damage noted on the secondary tests. 
This Strike Detector promises a reliable and affordable way to monitor the impact 
environment around a spacecraft. It was the subject of a disclosure in the NASA Tech 
Briefs [58].  
 
7.2 Acoustic Sensor Detector 
When a particle impacts the target, it generates a transient acoustic signal. The 
impacts are energetic (typically greater than 100 micro-joule); hence the resulting 
acoustic signal is typically strong. This transient acoustical signal travels through the 
structure developing small structural strains as it propagates. These strains are easily 
detected using PVDF sensors. The resulting electrical signal is conditioned by an 
associated preamplifier and is passed to the data acquisition system. The frequency 
content of signals generated is typically in the 100 kHz range. An example is shown 
in Figure 7-7. 
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Figure 7-7. Typical sensor signals from 1 milli-Joul impact 
 
7.2.1 PINDROP Acoustic Sensor System 
The Particle Impact Noise Detection and Ranging on Autonomous Platform 
(PINDROP) acoustic sensor system detects a hypervelocity impact by sensing the 
acoustic wave generated in a target material. The sensors used are typically small (2 
cm), thin (25 micron) Polyvinylidene Fluoride (PVDF) piezoelectric polymers. These 
sensors generate an electrical signal in response to an acoustic strain, where the signal 
amplitude provides a measure of the impact energy or momentum (depending on 
target material). Hypervelocity particles larger than 30 micron are easily detected and, 
if desired, the impact location of the particle on the target can be deduced from the 
signal arrival times at multiple sensors. 
The sensor system is applicable to a wide variety of target materials and 
structures. Because of this versatility, this sensor system is usually not developed as a 
separate independent structure, but rather makes use of other structures already 
present or proposed. For example, initially it was developed for use in combination 
with an aerogel capture tray. It has also been studied for use in combination with 
other sensor (resistive, optical, etc.) to provide accurate event timing and additional 
information about the impacting particle.  
An alternative deployment is to simply distribute an array of sensors on the 
spacecraft or lunar habitat structures to form a large area sensor system. The 
versatility of this approach has been demonstrated in hypervelocity impact tests, 
where large signals were measured for particle impacts on Multi-Layer Insulation 
(MLI) thermal blankets (front and back layers), single and multi-layer woven Kevlar 
fabric shields, thin Mylar film, graphite composite boards, and solid aluminum plates 
and structures. Hence, promising locations for sensors include antennas, solar panels, 
Whipple shields and thermal blankets. This type of deployment is more complicated 
to marry to the spacecraft or lunar structures, since the structural complexity along the 
path from impact location to sensor must be minimized. However, the approach is 
quite suitable for detecting impacts by meteoroids larger than 50 micron. Because of 
its large effective aperture, it can improve our statistical sampling of these large 
J S C - 6 4 3 9 9  
 
V e r s i o n :  A  
 
 119  
  
micrometeoroids by nearly an order of magnitude over what can be achieved with a 
system using a dedicated surface, and this can be done at a considerable mass savings. 
In general, the system requirements are modest. The sensor, cable, and 
preamplifier have a combined mass of typically 20 gm per sensor, and power 
consumption of 15 mW per sensor. A typical system, consisting of 32 sensors with 
two 16-channel preamplifier modules, has a total system mass of less than 1 kg and a 
power draw of 0.5 watts (continuous).  
This PINDROP project was originally developed under the NASA Planetary 
Instrument Definition and Development (PIDD) program. It became a key component 
of the LAD-C aerogel collector system (intended for flight on the ISS as a DoD Space 
Test Program payload). The system passed PDR and was undergoing space 
qualification tests when the LAD-C program was discontinued, a direct result of 
NASA’s decision to terminate the STS program in 2010. The principal development 
still needed for the PINDROP system would be calibration of the target material and 
structure selection, space qualification of the components, and development of the 
electrical interface to the spacecraft.  Also, parts and prototype implementations 
conform to the potential space environment and since the sensor system was tested 
with realistic supporting elements, the system is felt to be at TRL-5. 
7.2.2 Acoustic Sensor Application Considerations for Metallic Modules 
In a series of tests, data was collected on hypervelocity (5 km/s) particles 
impacting aluminum plates (Figure 7-8). The plates were type 6061aluminum, 25 cm 
(10 inches) square, and 1.59 mm (1/16 inch) thick. The 0.8 mm particles penetrated 
the sample leaving a hole approximately 3 mm in diameter. The large acoustic signal 
developed at each of these sensors was found to have a voltage level of approximately 
0.8 volts p/p. Similar signal voltage levels were found for both normal 
(perpendicular) and 45° particle impacts. Smaller 0.3 mm diameter particles did not 
penetrate, and generated acoustic signals on the order of 0.3 volts p/p. Hence, from 
this limited data the signal levels (in volts) are approximately the same as the particle 
diameter (mm). For a 100 micron particle, the initial signal level should then be 
approximately 100 mV p/p. 
The loss factor measured for these samples was about 0.13% for these 25 cm 
square plates. While much of this loss is due to reflection losses at the plate edges, 
this loss factor sets a maximum allowable signal reduction with propagation distance. 
Using this and the lowest speed estimate (for a plate wave in aluminum) of 1350 
m/sec, the initial signal decreases to 10% of its initial level in 8.8 m (6.5 msec), 1% in 
18 m (13.1 msec), and 0.1% in 27 m (19.6 msec). 
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Figure 7-8. Typical signal from impact with aluminum plate (with envelope and exponential fit) 
 
A second factor is signal loss due to spreading. In this test, the sensors were 
placed approximately 10 cm from the point of impact. Signal amplitude in the plate 
will decrease approximately as the square root of the distance (due to “cylindrical 
spreading”). Hence, it will be reduced to 10% of its original magnitude at a distance 
of 10 meters.  
Considering the two sources of signal loss, for a 100 micron particle striking at a 
distance of 10 meters from the sensor, we expect 10% reduction from spreading and 
no more than an additional 99% reduction due to damping. Hence, the final signal 
level will be 0.1 mV p/p.  This is approximately the anticipated noise floor of a 
reasonably quiet facility or platform. (The actual background noise level at the 
facility used in these tests was 1.3 mV; however, the system has also been used in 
quieter facilities approaching the limiting system noise level of 0.003 mV.) This 
corresponds to a detection capability at 10 m range for a 100 micron particle. 
The above is for detection on a bare aluminum plate with uniform impedance. 
When impedance discontinuities are present (i.e. support frames or ribs) a portion of 
the signal will be reflected and another portion will be lost due to mode conversion 
into more dissipative waves. Hence, the detection range will be reduced. This topic 
requires additional study, but an initial suggestion is that each frame support may 
reduce signal intensity by 20%. 
J S C - 6 4 3 9 9  
 
V e r s i o n :  A  
 
 121  
  
An initial set of measurements has been performed on the small scale test 
structure, fabricated to include the features of one proposed lunar habitat (Figure 7-9). 
These measurements support the above conclusions [59]. 
 
Figure 7-9. Small scale test structure designed to evaluate signal propagation 
 
The presence of MLI thermal blankets will have two influences. They will add a 
small additional contribution to the damping (loss factor) and will slow (and possibly 
break) the incoming particle. Hypervelocity tests with 1 mm particles developed 
acoustic signals of approximately 0.8 V p/p on the aluminum layers, and of 0.10 V 
p/p on the Kapton outer cover layer. This suggests a potentially significantly reduced 
impact energy is available at the underlying aluminum surface. Additionally, while 
the hole formed in the front Kapton layer was 1 mm diameter, the hole in the final 
aluminum foil layer was 3 mm diameter. Either significant mass of the MLI material 
is breaking off and also impacting the underlying surface, or (less likely) the particle 
is breaking up. Unfortunately, the signals formed on aluminum plates when covered 
with thermal blankets has not yet been measured.  
The above suggests a rough design formula for the sensor layout. For impact 
detection we need sensors separated by no more that five frame supports or no more 
than 10 meters distance (whichever is less). For localization, we need four sensors, 
preferably separated by no more than three frame supports to reduce complicating 
reflections. These estimates are tentative and should be refined by additional tests.  
However, based on the data in hand we can make an estimate.  If we consider a 
cylindrical structure, with a diameter of 8 m and a length of 36 m, placed on its side, 
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then this structure would have a top side area of about 400 m2.  If  hull supports are 
placed every meter and bulkheads every 4 m, then this structure would require 
approximately 32 sensors.  With 100% sensor system redundancy, the mass of our 
system would be approximately 2 kg.  Its power consumption would be 1 w.  The 
system would be capable of detecting a hypervelocity impact by large (ca. 100 
micron) particles and would provide a localized position for the impact.  This system 
could be monitored by a single dedicated microprocessor system, or the data could be 
fed into the structure's own housekeeping computer for analysis.  The detection 
threshold could be adjustable or it could be fixed depending on the experience gained 
and the particular application. 
7.2.3 Acoustic Sensor Application Considerations for Inflatable Modules 
Test data was also collected for sensors mounted on other materials (HDPE, 
Kevlar fabric, etc.) which might find use in shielding applications. Signal levels from 
these sensors are also satisfactory, though losses are higher.  If such material is used 
to shield the structure, and we monitor impacts directly from such material, the 
sensors would probably have to be more closely spaced then would be the case if the 
aluminum structure was directly monitored.  The number sensors required would 
depend in some measure on how the shielding material was attached to the structure 
and to adjacent shielding. 
 
Figure 7-10. Measured signal voltage and Q for hypervelocity 1 mm particle impacts. (Q is the 
inverse of the loss factor.) 
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7.3 Fiber Optic Micrometeroid Impact Sensor (FOMIS) 
The Fiber Optic Micrometeoroid Impact Sensor was originally developed as a 
very low-mass, large-area instrument for particle flux measurements in space or lunar 
environments, with initial emphasis on inflatable structures and sails. It consists of a 
thin polymer or metal film in tension. When a particle strikes the film, it behaves as a 
drum and vibrates. Because of its resonant structure, the motions induced are 
relatively large and occur at well-defined frequencies. The vibratory motion of this 
film is then detected by a non-contact Fiber Optic Displacement (FOD) sensor. For 
particles sufficiently large to penetrate the film (i.e., greater than 10 micron) the 
signal amplitude is related to particle size. Also, since only these larger particles will 
pass through the film, it can serve as a particle size-filter for any other sensors placed 
below. 
The FOD sensors are commercially available for other applications. However, the 
system developed for the FOMIS application was optimized at the Naval Research 
Lab (NRL) for low power and mass, and for measuring motions as large as 1 mm 
with 1 Angstrom resolution. These sensors are small, non-contact glass fiber probes, 
which inherently, are essentially unaffected by temperature or radiation. As shown in 
Figure 7-11, the sensor-end of the optical fiber bundle is positioned in close proximity 
to an optically reflective surface.  An Light-Emitting Diode (LED), located at the 
other end, sends light down a central fiber in the bundle.  Reflected light is returned in 
the outer fibers.  Only the intensity of the reflected signal is measured, which is 
linearly related to the separation distance over small distances. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-11. Fiber Optic Displacement  Sensor (exaggerated size) 
The impact target material (drum head) was originally a thin, light-weight 
aluminized Mylar film. However, in hypervelocity impact tests the sensors have 
demonstrated a wider applicability. They have been successfully used with woven 
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Kevlar fabric (under tension), as well as aluminum sheets, and are generally 
applicable to any material that transmits bending-type vibrations (i.e., out-of-plane 
motion). The sensitivity of the instrument will depend on the thickness and type of 
material used. For thin Mylar film, the detection threshold (from statistical fluctuation 
theory) is a hypervelocity particle 0.5 micron diameter. For a thick woven fabric it is 
obviously higher. This is supported by the measurements performed in the 
hypervelocity impact facility at the University of Kent, using the fabric and sensor 
holders shown in Figure 7-12. 
 
Figure 7-12. Test unit containing three sensors (one shown), for hypervelocity impact studies 
 
The voltage output from the detector is typically an audio-frequency signal lasting 
less than one second. In laboratory tests, this signal is captured and processed. For 
spacecraft use, it would be sufficient to use a peak-hold analog circuit to capture the 
amplitude, and pass only this DC voltage level to the spacecraft system for storage 
and transmittal. The power requirement of the system is approximately 300 mW 
continuous, which can support up to 18 sensors. If deployed as a stand-alone 
mechanical structure, the mass will largely be that of the tensioning ring; total mass is 
estimated as 3 kg per square meter of aperture. If designed as an attached structure, or 
an inflatable, the required mass is much less. 
The FOMIS system has proven reliability and ruggedness, and is similar to other 
FOD systems used in commercial applications. However, it has not flown or been 
qualified for spacecraft use. The principal development needed would be designing a 
low-mass support, and the mechanical and electrical interface to the spacecraft. 
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Consequently, it is estimated that this system is at TRL-4, but at an advanced stage at 
that TRL.  It is anticipated that TRL-5 can be achieved in the very near future. 
 
7.4 Resistive Grid Sensor (RGS) System 
The Resistive Grid Sensor is a passive dust particle-flux measuring device 
capable of directly measuring particle size.  It was originally designed as a very 
robust system requiring little system resources (i.e., mass, power, telemetry). Its 
development emphasized large particles (greater than 50 micron) that might pose a 
hazard to space assets. It is anticipated that the RGS would be deployed over a large 
area in order to acquire adequate statistics of the flux of the less-abundant larger 
particles.  The RGS relies on a simple concept for its functionality.  Thin resistive 
lines, lying in parallel, are produced by a lithographic process on a suitable space-
qualified substrate.  Approximately 1000 resistive lines that are 75 micron wide and 
15 cm long, separated by a 75 micron gap can be consistently produced by standard 
present technology. Several grids have been made to this specification.  The 1000 
parallel lines are linked to buses, as illustrated in Figure 7-13, to create a sensitive pad 
measuring about 15 cm x 15 cm. 
 
1000 lines 
in parallel 
between 
buses
bus
bus
blow-up 
showing lines 
connecting 
to a bus
2.69"
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2.97"15 cm
 
Figure 7-13. Resistive Grid Sensor 
The sensor relies for its functionality on the physical action of a hypervelocity 
particle on impacting a surface.  In the size regime for which the sensor was 
developed two basic interactions can occur, depending on the thickness of the 
substrate on which the RGS is mounted and the characteristic of the particle.  Either 
the particle will penetrate or it will cavitate the substrate, destroying an area from 3 to 
10 times its diameter.  If the particle is sufficiently large, greater than 50 micron, it 
will destroy one or more of the resistive grid lines in this process.  By measuring the 
resistance of the sensor (between the buses) the number of lines destroyed can be 
determined, and therefore, a measure of the size of the impacting particle.  Resistance 
measurements can be made at intervals or when other instruments (such as 
PINDROP) indicate an impact. The resistance is then compared with previous 
J S C - 6 4 3 9 9  
 
V e r s i o n :  A  
 
 126  
  
measurements (corrected for temperature) to determine the number lines destroyed by 
the impact.   Generally, particles smaller than 10 micron will erode the grid lines, but 
these will not destroy an entire line; in this case the change in resistance of the RGS 
will be very small (and will not be mistaken for a line break even if many small 
particles impact the sensor between resistance measurements).  Particles in between 
10 and 50 micron may, with statistical predictability, take out a single line.  Whereas 
50 micron and greater hypervelocity particles of any significant density will always 
take out one or more line. 
Because each RGS is only 15 cm x 15 cm, several RGSs are tiled (typically on the 
same backing substrate) to form a larger sensor area. As with other sensors, the sensor 
area needed depends on the mission duration and the anticipated particle flux of the 
largest particles of interest. The electronics to measure resistance of an RGS consists 
of a voltage reference and a 12 bit A/D.  A microprocessor is used to control the 
measurement and record the data for download.  Only one voltage reference and A/D 
is required for the entire RGS array since the measurement is infrequent and 
multiplexed. 
The mass of an RGS system with a 1 m2 area would be 1.1 kg (using the current 
configuration of a 0.5 mm G10 epoglass board with carbon fiber honeycomb 
support).   Electronics, housing and wire would add another 0.7 kg.  Power 
requirements of the system during measurements would be 32 mw for about 1 sec.  If 
resistance measurements were made once an hour, the total electrical energy 
requirement (without heaters) would be the quiescent consumption of the 
microprocessor.   
To date the RGS has not flown. It is under development as part of the DoD Space 
Test Program DRAGONS mission, a one year 800 km to 1000 km altitude flight.  
The RGS has been built and subjected to hypervelocity testing. Figure 7-14 shows the 
effect of a 100 micron glass particle at 5 km/s. The RGS array relies completely on 
available and proven technology, and since its construction is static, robust, and very 
straight forward, its implementation for a 2010 delivery should not be difficult.  The 
principal development issue envisioned is likely to be the interface to a spacecraft and 
the placement of a sufficient area to obtain statistically significant data.  It has not yet 
been interfaced with realistic electronics and is therefore considered to be at TRL-4, 
but the path to TRL-5 is straight-forward and is expected to be reached shortly 
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Figure 7-14. Damage from a 100 um Glass Hypervelocity Impact 
 
7.5 Micrometeoroid Impact Detection System (MIDS) 
The basic configuration of MIDS includes a solid metal plate with a dimension of 
1 m x 1 m, and a thin film under tension placed about 1 cm above the plate (Figure 7-
15).  The sensor suite consists of PINDROP acoustic sensors to detect the signals 
generated by particle impacts with the bottom plate, and fiber optic displacement 
(FOMIS) sensors to measure film motion caused by particles impacting or penetrating 
the film. The thin film also serves to filter out smaller and slower secondary ejecta 
from impacting the metal plate, and also to filter out charged lunar fines, such as 
those that contaminated the Apollo 17 Lunar Ejecta and Meteorite (LEAM) 
experiment. In addition, the thickness of the thin film can be varied for different 1 m 
x 1 m units. Since the velocity distribution of micrometeoroids does not vary 
significantly from a few microns to several hundred microns, the thickness of the film 
can be used to place constraints on the minimum mass threshold for micrometeoroids 
penetrating the film, then hitting the metal plate 
The thin film layer of MIDS monitored by the FOMIS detector provides a good 
indication of particle diameter, while the aluminum plate monitored by PINDROP 
reacts to energy or momentum of the particle (dependent on configuration parameters 
of the structure).  If the film and plate can be separated by tens of centimeters and the 
impact location of the impact on both the film and aluminum plate determined by the 
acoustic propagation, then the velocity of the particle can be determined.  When 
combined with the diameter and momentum or energy, the density of the impacting 
particle can be deduced. The TRL for MIDS is estimated to be somewhere between 
TRL 2 and 3. 
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Figure 7-15. Micrometeoroid Impact Detection System (MIDS) 
 
7.6 Debris Resistive Acoustic Grid Orbital Navy Sensor (DRAGONS) 
This sensor system combines the RGS with the PINDROP acoustic sensors.  One 
possible configuration has been constructed and tested with hypervelocity impacts.  It 
consists of a circuit board with resistive grids imprinted on one side, and PINDROP 
acoustic sensors attached to the other (back) side.  The impact of a hypervelocity 
particle destroys lines proportional to the diameter of the particle while the acoustic 
sensor records signals related to impact momentum/energy.  In addition to impact 
flux, the combined data could lead to an estimation of the density and mass of each 
impacting particle. 
 
7.7 Secondary Ejecta Detection System (SEDS) and Dual-Layer Optical Curtain 
Sensor (DOCS) 
The basic configuration of SEDS includes a Dual-Layer Optical Curtain Sensor 
(DOCS) and the PINDROP acoustic sensors that are attached to a solid plate behind 
the second optical curtain of the DOCS. The SEDS is designed to characterize the 
impact flux, velocity, size, mass, and density of the detected secondary eject particles. 
In order to better measure the lunar secondary ejecta (SE) environment, a Dual-
layer Optical Curtain Sensor can be developed.  Its design is based on the Grain 
Impact Analyzer and Dust Accumulator (GIADA) dust flux instrument developed for 
the European Space Agency (ESA) Rosette mission.  Although this system has been 
satisfactorily flown, changes in the electronics and configuration for better lunar 
secondary ejecta detection are needed. Therefore, DOCS can be considered to be at 
TRL-7.  The principal disadvantage of DOCS is its small area and relatively high 
power consumption. However, since the secondary ejecta flux is several orders of 
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magnitude higher than that of the micrometeoroid background, the small sensing area 
(hundreds of cm2) is adequate to monitor the secondary ejecta environment.  
The operation of the DOCS system depends on lunar secondary ejecta passing 
through two separate light curtains.  The resulting scattered light from each layer is 
recorded by photometers. The data can be analyzed to estimate the impact speed and 
the size of the particle. PINDROP will also be added below the second curtain to 
establish the approximate position of the particle through the light beam, providing a 
correction to the intensity measured as the particle transits each light beam. In 
addition to the position determination, the acoustic signals provide an estimate of the 
momentum of the particle. Thus, knowing the velocity from the light curtain passage, 
and the momentum from the acoustic sensors, the mass of the particle can be 
estimated. Knowing the mass and size of the ejecta particle, its density can be 
estimated. Although the density is not expected to show great variation, it may aid our 
understanding of the regolith formation. The DOCS design will optimize the 
determination of the velocity, size, mass, and density (in order of decreasing 
accuracy) of the secondary ejecta. By keeping the internal scattering to a minimum, 
particles of at least 1 micron moving at 100 m/sec can be detected and fully 
characterized, and that for particles as small as a few tenths of a micron, velocities 
can be determined. 
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8 Concluding Remarks 
 
This report provides guidelines for design and implementation of effective 
MMOD protection.  Important aspects of MMOD protection system design include: 
(1) performing risk assessments to identify regions of the vehicle that drive MMOD 
risk, and (2) evaluating design and operational methods to reduce MMOD risk, 
focusing on the MMOD risk drivers. 
Based on knowledge gained by NASA in implementing MMOD protection for 
ISS and other spacecraft, multi-wall shields provide more effective MMOD shielding 
than single or two-wall MMOD shields.  For instance, Nextel/Kevlar stuffed Whipple 
shields are lighter, and provide higher levels of MMOD protection than all-aluminum 
2- or 3-wall shields.   
Detecting and locating damage to critical hardware and the rear walls of MMOD 
shields can reduce the risk from MMOD impact.  Significant progress has been made 
in developing MMOD impact sensors.  Consideration should be given in future 
vehicle programs to add requirement to integrate damage detection and location 
sensors into MMOD shields. 
Periodic updates to this report will be made in the future as new data is obtained 
and new MMOD protection solutions are evaluated and characterized.   
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